| Marx v Great Neck Park Dist. |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 01594 [92 AD3d 925] |
| February 28, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Joyanna Marx, Appellant, v Great Neck Park District,Respondent, et al., Defendant. |
—[*1] Goldberg & Segalla, LLP, Mineola, N.Y. (Brian McElhenny and Jesse Rutter of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by herbrief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Lally, J.), dated October7, 2010, as granted the motion of the defendant Great Neck Park District for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell on a patch of ice while walking on a sidewalk abuttingcertain land owned by the defendant Great Neck Park District (hereinafter the Park District).
Contrary to the plaintiff's contentions, the Supreme Court properly granted the Park District'smotion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. "Unless astatute or ordinance clearly imposes liability upon an abutting landowner, only a municipalitymay be held liable for the negligent failure to remove snow and ice from a public sidewalk" (Hilpert v Village of Tarrytown, 81AD3d 781, 781 [2011]; see Smalleyv Bemben, 12 NY3d 751 [2009]; Schwint v Bank St. Commons, LLC, 74 AD3d 1312 [2010]; Ferguson v Shu Ham Lam, 74 AD3d870 [2010]; Braun vWeissman, 68 AD3d 797 [2009]). Although the Code of the Village of Great NeckPlaza requires an abutting landowner to remove snow and ice from abutting public sidewalks, itdoes not specifically impose tort liability for a breach of that duty (see Hilpert v Village ofTarrytown, 81 AD3d at 781).
"In the absence of a statute or ordinance imposing liability, the owner of property abutting apublic sidewalk will be held liable only where it, or someone on its behalf, undertook snow andice removal efforts which made the naturally occurring conditions more hazardous" (id.at 782; see Schwint v Bank St.Commons, LLC, 74 AD3d 1312 [2010]; Ferguson v Shu Ham Lam, 74 AD3d 870 [2010]; Braun v Weissman, 68 AD3d 797[2009]). Here, while the Park District acknowledged that it undertook certain snow removalefforts on the sidewalk, it established, prima facie, that its snow removal efforts did not create orexacerbate any dangerous condition on the sidewalk (see Hilpert v Village of Tarrytown,81 AD3d at 782; Krichevskaya v City ofNew York, 30 AD3d 471, 471 [2006]; [*2]Friedman v Stauber, 18 AD3d606, 607 [2005]; see also Urquhartv Town of Oyster Bay, 85 AD3d 899, 900 [2011]). In opposition, the plaintiff merelyspeculated that the icy condition was created by snow removal activities that were allegedlyundertaken by the Park District five days before the incident occurred. Under the circumstances,speculation regarding the actions taken by the Park District and the results of such actions wasinsufficient to raise a triable issue of fact to defeat the Park District's motion (seeKrichevskaya v City of New York, 30 AD3d at 471; Scher v Kiryas Joel Hous. Dev. Fund Co., 17 AD3d 660, 660[2005]; Trabolse v Rizzo, 275 AD2d 320 [2000]).
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the Park District's motion for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. Skelos, J.P., Balkin, Leventhaland Hall, JJ., concur. [Prior Case History: 29 Misc 3d 1217(A), 2010 NY Slip Op51860(U).]