Matter of Stanley v New York State Div. of Parole
2012 NY Slip Op 01610 [92 AD3d 948]
February 28, 2012
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 28, 2012


In the Matter of Demitrious Stanley, Respondent,
v
NewYork State Division of Parole, Appellant.

—[*1]

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Richard Dearing andMatthew W. Grieco of counsel), for appellant.

Richard M. Greenberg, New York, N.Y. (Sara Gurwitch of counsel), forrespondent.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the New York StateBoard of Parole dated October 14, 2009, which, after a hearing, denied the petitioner'sapplication to be released to parole, the appeal is from a judgment of the Supreme Court, OrangeCounty (Ecker, J.), dated April 13, 2011, which granted the petition, annulled the determination,and remitted the matter to the New York State Division of Parole for a de novo parole hearing.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, thepetition is denied, the determination is confirmed, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits.

Pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i (2) (c), the New York State Board of Parole(hereinafter the Parole Board) is required to consider a number of statutory factors in determiningwhether an inmate should be released to parole (see Matter of Miller v New York State Div. of Parole, 72 AD3d690, 691 [2010]; Matter of Mitchellv New York State Div. of Parole, 58 AD3d 742 [2009]). The Parole Board is notrequired to give equal weight to each statutory factor (see Matter of Hanson v New York State Bd. of Parole, 57 AD3d994, 994-995 [2008]), and it is not required to "articulate specifically each factor in itsdetermination" (Matter of Huntley vEvans, 77 AD3d 945, 947 [2010]).

Here, contrary to the Supreme Court's determination that the Parole Board's primary focus indenying parole was the nature of the crime committed, the Parole Board looked at the petitioner'sinstitutional record, including his disciplinary record, program accomplishments, and intendedplans after release regarding employment and living arrangements, as well as the violentcircumstances of his crime and his criminal history (see Matter of Miller v New York StateDiv. of Parole, 72 AD3d at 691; Matter of Porter v Alexander, 63 AD3d 945, 946 [2009]).

Further, after giving due consideration to the statutory factors, the Parole Board denied thepetitioner's application to be released to parole based on the seriousness of the offense, hismultiple disciplinary violations while incarcerated, and the petitioner's criminal history, withparticular attention to the fact that he committed the underlying crime shortly after a period inwhich he was on probation and that he had displayed an escalation of unlawful activities (seeMatter of [*2]Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 477 [2000]; Matter of Miller v New York State Div. ofParole, 72 AD3d 690, 691 [2010]). Thus, the Parole Board's determination was notbased on "irrationality bordering on impropriety" (Matter of Duffy v New York State Div. of Parole, 74 AD3d 965,966 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]; cf. Matter of Huntley v Evans, 77 AD3d 945, 947 [2010]).

The petitioner's remaining contentions are without merit.

Accordingly, the petition should have been denied, the determination confirmed, and theproceeding dismissed on the merits. Dillon, J.P., Florio, Chambers and Lott, JJ., concur.


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