Nigro v New York Racing Assn., Inc.
2012 NY Slip Op 01660 [93 AD3d 647]
March 6, 2012
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, April 25, 2012


Sara Nigro, Appellant,
v
New York Racing Association,Inc., Respondent.

—[*1]Sullivan Papain Block McGrath & Cannavo, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Stephen C. Glasserand Susan M. Jaffe of counsel), for appellant.

Bee Ready Fishbein Hatter & Donovan, LLP, Mineola, N.Y. (Joshua M. Jemal and CourtCousins of counsel), for respondent.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order ofthe Supreme Court, Nassau County (Parga, J.), entered November 19, 2010, which granted thedefendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

On February 9, 2006, the plaintiff was employed as an exercise rider and groom at BelmontRacetrack, which is owned and operated by the defendant, New York Racing Association, Inc. Atabout 6:00 a.m., the plaintiff was instructed to exercise a horse by riding it at a walking pacealong a dirt horse path. The horse path was intersected in several places by an asphalt road,which was strewn with loose gravel. At the fourth such intersection, the horse slipped whilecrossing the asphalt road and fell, landing on top of the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, thepresence of gravel on the road was a condition she frequently encountered prior to her accident,and she always exercised caution and tried to keep her horse calm when gravel was present. Theplaintiff subsequently commenced this action seeking to recover damages for the injuries she hadsustained in the accident. After depositions had been conducted, the defendant moved forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint based on the doctrine of primary assumption of therisk, and the Supreme Court granted its motion. The plaintiff appeals, and we affirm.

The doctrine of primary assumption of risk provides that a voluntary participant in a sportingor recreational activity "consents to those commonly appreciated risks which are inherent in andarise out of the nature of the sport generally and flow from such participation" (Morgan vState of New York, 90 NY2d 471, 484 [1997]; see Cotty v Town of Southampton, 64 AD3d 251, 253 [2009]; Joseph v New York Racing Assn., 28AD3d 105, 108 [2006]). This includes risks associated with the condition of the surface onwhich the activity is performed, and any open and obvious condition thereon (see Sykes vCounty of Erie, 94 NY2d 912, 913 [2000]; Joseph v New York Racing Assn., 28AD3d at 108; Morlock v Town of N.Hempstead, 12 AD3d 652 [2004]). If the risks are known by or perfectly obvious to theparticipant, he or she is deemed to have consented to them and the property owner has discharged[*2]its duty of care by making the conditions as safe as theyappear to be (see Turcotte v Fell, 68 NY2d 432, 439 [1986]; Brown v City of New York, 69 AD3d893 [2010]).

Here, the defendant made a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment as a matter oflaw based on the doctrine of primary assumption of risk by submitting evidence that the plaintiffwas a highly experienced professional exercise rider who appreciated the risks posed by loosegravel on the asphalt road intersecting the horse path, and was aware of the gravel condition onthe road before she began to cross it for a fourth time on the morning of her accident (seeTurcotte v Fell, 68 NY2d at 442-443; Palladino v Lindenhurst Union Free School Dist., 84 AD3d 1194,1195 [2011]; Joseph v New York Racing Assn., 28 AD3d at 108-109; Morlock vTown of N. Hempstead, 12 AD3d at 653). In opposition, the affidavits of the plaintiff'sexperts were insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant unreasonablyincreased the risk of riding on its premises by, inter alia, using asphalt as a road paving material(see Bendig v Bethpage Union FreeSchool Dist., 74 AD3d 1263, 1264 [2010]; Brown v City of New York, 69AD3d at 894; see also Ioffe vHampshire House Apt. Corp., 21 AD3d 930, 931 [2005]; Capotosto v Roman Catholic Diocese ofRockville Ctr., 2 AD3d 384, 386 [2003]). The plaintiff also failed to raise a triable issueof fact as to whether she acted under the compulsion of a superior in riding across the asphaltroad (see Benitez v New York City Bd. of Educ., 73 NY2d 650, 658 [1989]; Ticha v OTB Jeans, 39 AD3d 310[2007]; Modolo v Fleischmann, 8AD3d 539 [2004]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motionfor summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Balkin, J.P., Eng, Hall and Sgroi, JJ., concur.


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