| Matter of Runge v National Baseball League |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 01855 [93 AD3d 1015] |
| March 15, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of the Claim of Paul Runge, Respondent, v NationalBaseball League et al., Appellants. Workers' Compensation Board,Respondent. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York City (Steven Segall of counsel), forWorkers' Compensation Board, respondent.
Garry, J. Appeal from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Board, filed January 5, 2011,which, among other things, ruled that Workers' Compensation Law § 123 does not barfurther proceedings regarding the claim.
Claimant, a major league baseball umpire, allegedly injured his right knee while umpiring agame in May 1992. The employer and its workers' compensation carrier (hereinafter collectivelyreferred to as the employer) did not contest claimant's right to compensation, and accident andnotice was established by the Workers' Compensation Board in October 1992. The Board did notreach the merits of the claim at that time and closed the case "without prejudice until [a] propermedical report is filed." The record reflects that the employer thereafter paid numerous causallyrelated medical bills from 1992 to 2003. In 2004, the employer disputed certain medical bills andsought relief from the Special Fund for Reopened Cases pursuant to Workers' Compensation Law§ 25-a. Subsequently, it also raised the issue that the claim was barred pursuant toWorkers' Compensation Law § 123. Following a hearing, the Workers' Compensation LawJudge (hereinafter WCLJ) withheld decision pending claimant's submission of both proof that theemployer paid his medical bills and prima facie medical evidence. No further action was takenuntil 2009, when the employer again raised, among other things, the applicability of Workers'Compensation Law § 123 after claimant submitted medical evidence of his injury.Ultimately, the WCLJ found that Workers' Compensation Law § 123 was inapplicable. Onreview, the Board, among other things, affirmed the WCLJ's determination and the employernow appeals.
We affirm. Workers' Compensation Law § 123 states, as relevant here, that "no claimfor compensation . . . that has been otherwise disposed of without an award after theparties in interest have been given . . . [an] opportunity to be heard and for which nodetermination was made on the merits, shall be reopened after a lapse of seven years from thedate of the accident." "As a factual determination for the Board to make, whether such cases fallwithin the ambit of this statute depends on whether they were truly closed, that is, if furtherproceedings, such as the submission of additional medical evidence, were contemplated by theBoard" (Matter of Ford v New YorkCity Tr. Auth., 27 AD3d 792, 794 [2006], lv dismissed 7 NY3d 741 [2006][citations omitted]; accord Matter ofCagle v Judge Motor Corp., 60 AD3d 1118, 1120 [2009], lv dismissed 13 NY3d770 [2009]).
Here, the employer claims that the case was truly closed in October 1992 or, alternatively, inJune 2005. In October 1992, the case was closed "without prejudice" pending the filing ofmedical reports. There is nothing in the record indicating that the claim was contested by theemployer or dismissed for a lack of medical evidence. In June 2005, following the employer'schallenge to several medical bills from 2003 and 2004 and its request for relief from the SpecialFund, the WCLJ found that there was insufficient medical evidence in the record to make adetermination. The WCLJ concluded that no further action was planned "until claimant producesa letter of actual payment of medical bills by [the employer] and prima facie medical [evidence]."As the record demonstrates that the submission of additional medical evidence was contemplatedin 1992 and 2005, we conclude that the Board's finding that the case was not truly closed issupported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Guarino v Town of Islip Highway Dept.,133 AD2d 881, 882 [1987]; Matter of Caputo v Ozone Metal Prods. Co., 78 AD2d 738,739 [1980]). Accordingly, the Board's decision that Workers' Compensation Law § 123 isinapplicable will not be disturbed (seeMatter of Carubia v Colt Indus. [Crucible Steel], 12 AD3d 827, 828 n [2004]).
Peters, J.P., Rose, Kavanagh and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed,without costs.