| Matter of Sheng v State of N.Y. Div. of Human Rights |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 02310 [93 AD3d 851] |
| March 27, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Juan Y. Sheng, Appellant, v State of NewYork Division of Human Rights et al., Respondents. |
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Kauff McGuire & Margolis LLP, New York, N.Y. (Kenneth A. Margolis of counsel), forrespondent Time Warner Cable of New York City.
In a proceeding pursuant to Executive Law § 298 to review a determination of the NewYork State Division of Human Rights dated March 24, 2009, which dismissed the petitioner'sadministrative complaint, upon a finding that there was no probable cause, the petitioner appeals,as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Nelson,J.), entered January 7, 2011, as, upon reargument, adhered to its determination in an orderentered July 19, 2010, denying the petitioner's motion to vacate a stipulation discontinuing theproceeding with prejudice.
Ordered that the order entered January 7, 2011, is affirmed insofar as appealed from, withcosts.
Stipulations disposing of proceedings and actions "are favored by the courts and are not to belightly set aside, especially where, as here, the party seeking to vacate the stipulation wasrepresented by counsel" (Kelley vChavez, 33 AD3d 590, 591 [2006] [citation omitted]; see Hallock v State of NewYork, 64 NY2d 224, 230 [1984]; Macaluso v Macaluso, 62 AD3d 963 [2009]; Trakansook v Kerry, 45 AD3d 673[2007]; Town of Clarkstown v M.R.O. Pump & Tank, 287 AD2d 497, 498 [2001]). Aparty seeking to set aside such a stipulation will be granted relief only upon a showing of goodcause sufficient to invalidate a contract, such as fraud, overreaching, duress, or mistake (seeMcCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 302 [2002]; Hallock v State of New York, 64NY2d at 230; Macaluso v Macaluso, 62 AD3d at 963; Trakansook v Kerry, 45 AD3d 673[2007]; Kelley v Chavez, 33 AD3d at 591; Town of Clarkstown v M.R.O. Pump &Tank, 287 AD2d at 498).
Here, contrary to the petitioner's contentions, the Supreme Court properly determined that thepetitioner failed to demonstrate good cause to set aside a stipulation discontinuing the proceedingwith prejudice. The failure of the petitioner's attorney to ascertain or understand the legal effectof a discontinuance with prejudice was not a basis upon which to vacate the stipulation (see Moshe v Town of Ramapo, 54AD3d 1030, 1030-1031 [2008]; Rapp v Briarcliff Contemporaries, 190 AD2d 785,786 [1993]). In addition, the petitioner provided no evidence in support of her claim offraudulent inducement based on opposing counsel's failure to inform the petitioner's counsel ofthe [*2]legal ramifications of a discontinuance with prejudice, asopposing counsel owed no duty to disclose her understanding of those legal ramifications (see Foot Locker Stores, Inc. v PyramidMgt. Group, Inc., 45 AD3d 1447, 1448 [2007]; P.T. Bank Cent. Asia, N.Y. Branch vABN AMRO Bank N.V., 301 AD2d 373, 376 [2003]).
The petitioner's remaining contentions are without merit. Dillon, J.P., Florio, Austin andRoman, JJ., concur.