Matter of Alexandria A. (Ann B.)
2012 NY Slip Op 02360 [93 AD3d 1105]
March 29, 2012
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, April 25, 2012


In the Matter of Alexandria A., a Child Alleged to be PermanentlyNeglected. Delaware County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Ann B.,Appellant.

[*1]Michelle I. Rosien, Philmont, for appellant.

D. Jeremy Rase, County Attorney, Delhi, for respondent.

Robert A. Gouldin, Oneonta, attorney for the child.

Lahtinen, J. Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Delaware County (Lambert, J.),entered March 31, 2011, which, in a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b,granted petitioner's motion to revoke a suspended judgment, and terminated respondent's parentalrights.

Respondent is the mother of Alexandria A. (born in 2006), who has been in foster care sinceFebruary 2008. The child was adjudicated as permanently neglected in a May 2010 order thatwas based on an April 2010 stipulation in which respondent agreed to such a determination andconsented to a one-year suspended judgment subject to numerous terms and conditions. InAugust 2010, petitioner moved via order to show cause for a determination that respondent hadviolated various terms of the order of suspended judgment and sought termination of her parentalrights. Following a hearing, Family Court found that respondent had violated the terms of theorder of suspended judgment and terminated her parental rights. Respondent appeals.

We affirm. "A suspended judgment provides a parent, previously found to have permanentlyneglected his or her child, with a brief grace period within which to become a fit parent withwhom the child can be safely reunited" (Matter of Travis A., 4 AD3d 632, [*2]633 [2004], lv denied 2 NY3d 706 [2004] [internalquotation marks and citation omitted]). "During this grace period, the parent must comply withthe terms of the suspended judgment and, if a preponderance of the evidence establishes theparent's noncompliance, Family Court may revoke the judgment and terminate that party'sparental rights" (Matter of Clifton ZZ.[Latrice ZZ.], 75 AD3d 683, 684 [2010] [internal citation omitted]). "In view of FamilyCourt's direct observation of and access to the parties and the professionals who testified, itsfactual findings will be accorded great deference and will not be disturbed on appeal unlesslacking a sound and substantial basis in the record" (Matter of Kaleb U., 280 AD2d 710,712 [2001] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

Petitioner produced evidence of several significant violations by respondent of the terms ofthe order of suspended judgment including not attending appointments with her caseworker,missing visitation with the child, being discharged from treatment by her mental health counselorbecause she repeatedly failed to attend scheduled sessions, and continuing to misuse prescriptionmedicine. Respondent testified and offered excuses for some of her alleged failures. Thistestimony created credibility issues, which Family Court resolved against respondent. We discernno reason to reject those credibility determinations. There is a sound and substantial basis in therecord supporting Family Court's finding that respondent repeatedly violated terms andconditions of the order of suspended judgment.

Respondent contends that she was not afforded enough time to comply with the terms of theone-year suspended judgment since petitioner's order to show cause was filed about three to fourmonths after the stipulation and order. We are unpersuaded. Where, as here, there is proof that aparent has repeatedly violated significant terms of a suspended judgment, petitioner is notobligated to wait until the end of the period of suspended judgment to seek to revoke thesuspended judgment (see e.g. Matter ofRonnie P. [Danielle Q.], 85 AD3d 1246, 1246 [2011] [three months]; Matter of Krystal B. [Thomas B.], 77AD3d 1110, 1110 [2010] [four months]; Matter of Jessica J., 44 AD3d 1132, 1132-1133 [2007] [fourmonths]; Matter of Jonathan P., 283 AD2d 675, 676 [2001], lv denied 96 NY2d717 [2001] [six weeks]; see also Family Ct Act § 633 [d] [indicating that a motionor order to show cause can be filed prior to the expiration of the period of the suspendedjudgment]).

Finally, respondent asserts that her parental rights should not have been terminated. Althoughthere was evidence that respondent and the child had a good relationship when together,respondent nevertheless failed to address in any meaningful manner the issues that resulted inremoval of the child and the finding of permanent neglect despite ample opportunity to do so.The child has been in foster care the majority of her life and the permanency report in the recordindicates that she is currently in foster care with her paternal grandmother, who is willing toadopt her. The attorney for the child advocated for freeing the child for adoption. Family Court'sfinding that it is in the best interests of the child to terminate respondent's parental rights and freethe child for adoption at this time is supported by the record (see e.g. Matter of Clifton ZZ.[Latrice ZZ.], 75 AD3d at 685; Matter of Leala T., 55 AD3d 997, 998 [2008]).

Mercure, A.P.J., Spain, Stein and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed,without costs.[*3]


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