Matter of James v Hoosick Falls Cent. School Dist.
2012 NY Slip Op 02374 [93 AD3d 1131]
March 29, 2012
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, April 25, 2012


In the Matter of Dennis James, Petitioner, v Hoosick Falls CentralSchool District et al., Respondents.

—[*1]Gleason, Dunn, Walsh & O'Shea, Albany (Ronald G. Dunn of counsel), for petitioner.

Tabner, Ryan & Keniry, L.L.P., Albany (William F. Ryan Jr. of counsel), forrespondents.

Lahtinen, J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of theSupreme Court, entered in Rensselaer County) to review a determination of respondent Board ofEducation of the Hoosick Falls Central School District which terminated petitioner'semployment.

Petitioner, a custodian for many years at respondent Hoosick Falls Central School District,was involved in an apparent domestic incident in February 2010 with his girlfriend. Thegirlfriend ended up hospitalized with fractured ribs and petitioner was charged with, among otherthings, assault in the second degree. When the District's Superintendent of Schools, respondentKenneth A. Facin, learned of the incident, he became concerned about petitioner's presence at theschool and the District commenced a disciplinary proceeding against petitioner pursuant to CivilService Law § 75.

Various versions of the incident were provided by both petitioner and the girlfriend. Theinitial story told by both was that the girlfriend fell down stairs. By the next day, the girlfriendprovided police with a written statement in which she related that, after a night of drinking, theyhad been pushing each other during a fight, she punched petitioner, and he then [*2]threw her to the floor causing her injuries. Two days after theincident, petitioner stated to police that they had been arguing, she was hitting him, he tried torestrain her, and she fell. At the disciplinary hearing, both testified that they were arguing, thegirlfriend was intoxicated, she grabbed petitioner and fell, pulling him down on top of her as theyhit the floor. Although by the time of the hearing it appeared that the criminal charges againstpetitioner were not going to be pursued, Facin stated that this did not alter the decision tocontinue with the disciplinary matter.

Following the disciplinary hearing, the Hearing Officer determined that petitioner and hisgirlfriend had a physical altercation during which petitioner threw her to the floor causing herinjuries. The Hearing Officer held that this evidence was sufficient to sustain two of the chargesof misconduct and he recommended the penalty of dismissal "considering the severity of theresultant injuries, nature of [petitioner's] conduct, and the public backlash." Respondent Board ofEducation of the Hoosick Falls Central School District adopted the Hearing Officer's findingsand terminated petitioner's employment. This proceeding ensued.

Petitioner initially argues that the Hearing Officer erred in basing his determination uponsubstantial evidence rather than a preponderance of the evidence. We are unpersuaded. AlthoughCivil Service Law § 75 does not articulate a specific level of proof for the hearing level (agap frequently filled by a provision of collective bargaining agreements), the substantial evidencestandard that is generally applicable to administrative determinations applies to disciplinarymatters involving public employees under the statute (see Matter of Rosenthal v Hartnett,36 NY2d 269, 274 [1975]; Matter of Williams v Nicoletti, 295 AD2d 353, 354 [2002];see also 2003 NY Assembly Bill A5887 [the bill jacket in this failed effort to amend thestatute to raise the level of proof to clear and convincing contains numerous memorandaacknowledging the standard as substantial evidence]).

Petitioner contends that it was error to admit into evidence a written statement that hisgirlfriend gave to police since the officer did not appear at the hearing. Civil Service Law §75 (2) provides that "[c]ompliance with technical rules of evidence shall not be required" and it issettled that hearsay may be considered at hearings conducted under the statute (see Matter of Correll v Bucci, 19 AD3d919, 920 [2005]; Matter of Hoffman v Village of Sidney, 252 AD2d 844, 845[1998]; Matter of Breu v Board of Educ. of Windsor Cent. School Dist., 215 AD2d 969,970 [1995], lv denied 86 NY2d 708 [1995]). The officer who took the statement from thegirlfriend did not testify. However, the girlfriend testified at the hearing, admitted making thestatement and offered an explanation as to why she gave the officer information that she nowcontended was not an accurate account of what transpired. The admission and consideration ofthe statement was not error.

Substantial evidence supports the Hearing Officer's determination. The Hearing Officer waspresented with evidence of several different versions of how the incident occurred. We defer tothe Hearing Officer's credibility determinations (see Matter of Sindoni v County of Tioga, 67 AD3d 1183, 1184[2009]; Matter of Longton v Village ofCorinth, 57 AD3d 1273, 1274 [2008], lv denied 13 NY3d 709 [2009]) and,accepting those determinations, the record contains ample evidence of petitioner's actions tosustain the two charges.

We do, however, find merit in petitioner's assertion that termination was so disproportionateas to be shocking to one's sense of fairness (see Matter of Senior v Board of Educ. of Byram Hills Cent. SchoolDist., 37 AD3d 610, 611 [2007]). Petitioner had been employed by the District for 20years without any prior incidents of misconduct. The misconduct [*3]in question occurred off premises, it did not involve anyoneassociated with the school, and he did not hold a high profile job at the school. Moreover, evenunder the version of events found credible by the Hearing Officer, it is apparent that the girlfriendwas intoxicated, she instigated the physical conduct during their fight and she struck petitionerbefore he pushed her to the floor. The prosecutor determined not to pursue any criminal chargesfor the incident. Facin stated that the District pursued the disciplinary charges out of concern forthe safety of the school, but he acknowledged that no school staff had indicated a concern aboutworking with petitioner and no proof was introduced indicating that the students at the schoolwere in any danger because of petitioner's presence. Although Facin further expressed concernsince "everybody" knew about the incident because it is a "small community," there is no legalbasis for making discipline more severe based on the size of the community. Clearly, anydomestic violence is serious and the absence of the mitigating factors mentioned herein couldjustify termination. However, we find that, under these circumstances, termination is undulydisproportionate.

Mercure, A.P.J., Spain, Stein and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Adjudged that determination ismodified, without costs, by annulling so much thereof as imposed a penalty of termination ofemployment; petition granted to that extent and matter remitted to respondents for imposition ofa less severe penalty; and, as so modified, confirmed.


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