| Matter of Principe v New York City Dept. of Educ. |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 02560 [94 AD3d 431] |
| April 5, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| In the Matter of Peter Principe, Respondent, v New YorkCity Department of Education, Appellant. |
—[*1] Lichten & Bright, P.C., New York (Stuart Lichten of counsel), for respondent.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Alice Schlesinger, J.), entered May 19, 2010,which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied respondent New York CityDepartment of Education's (the DOE) cross motion to deny the petition and dismiss theproceeding brought pursuant to, among other things, CPLR article 75, and granted the petition tothe extent of vacating as excessive the penalty of termination of petitioner's employment as aNew York City schoolteacher, and remanded the matter to the Hearing Officer for a lesserpenalty, affirmed, without costs.
Petitioner Peter Principe was the dean of discipline of a middle school located in East NewYork, where many of the students belong to criminal gangs. This proceeding arose from twoincidents that occurred between petitioner and several students in 2007.
The first incident occurred on April 20, 2007. The Hearing Officer found that petitionerplaced MT, an 11-year-old student, in a headlock and swung him around. At the hearing,petitioner denied placing MT in a headlock or swinging him around. Rather, petitioner testifiedthat, after he received several reports of MT's misconduct from that morning and after breakingup two lunchroom fights involving MT, he took MT out of the lunchroom. Petitioner furthertestified that, as he was holding the lunchroom door open to allow other students to exit, he hadhis arm across the door to prevent MT from coming back into the lunchroom, but MT waspushing with his chest against petitioner's arm to get back into the lunchroom.
The second incident occurred on April 23, 2007. The Hearing Officer found that petitionergrabbed RP, a 13-year-old student, by the neck, threw him against a wall and requested RP andanother student to retract their statements concerning the incident. At the hearing, petitionertestified that when he saw RP and another student in the hallway outside their homeroomteacher's classroom, he questioned them about their whereabouts that morning because he hadlearned from their homeroom teacher that they had run out of their homeroom class that morning,and petitioner had been unable to locate them in their morning classes. Petitioner further testifiedthat, as he was questioning RP and the other student, they entered the homeroom teacher'sclassroom, and RP began shouting threats at his homeroom teacher. [*2]Petitioner testified that, as he and the two students were leaving theclassroom, RP turned to reenter the classroom and shouted more threats at his homeroom teacher,so petitioner grabbed RP to escort him from the room. As they turned to leave the classroom thetwo lost their balance and fell into the wall. Petitioner denied asking the students to retract theirstatements.
As to both incidents, the Hearing Officer found that petitioner's testimony was not credibleand that he committed misconduct by using corporal punishment. We agree with the motioncourt that the Hearing Officer had an apparent bias against petitioner when he discreditedpetitioner's entire testimony based, in part, upon respondent's mischaracterization of a portion ofpetitioner's testimony in addition to petitioner's testimony that he had once filed for bankruptcy.We also agree with the motion court that, by discrediting petitioner's entire testimony, theHearing Officer failed to consider all the circumstances, including the disciplinary histories of thestudents involved, the context of the threatening environment in which the two incidents tookplace and that, at the time of the two incidents, petitioner was, as he testified, "only fulfilling[the] demands" of his position as dean of discipline. Moreover, the Hearing Officer appeared togive an inordinate amount of credit to a portion of a video recording, related to the secondincident, that had been altered from its original format so that it appeared frame by frame at onesecond intervals rather than its original format of a continuous video recorded in real time. Thealteration to the videotape made what actually transpired during that incident unclear andequivocal. Although the motion court sustained the Hearing Officer's findings, petitioner did notcross appeal. That is understandable because petitioner otherwise received a favorable decisionfrom the motion court.
The Hearing Officer also determined that termination was the appropriate penalty in thiscase. However, while we accept the Hearing Officer's findings against petitioner, we agree withthe motion court that the evidence in this case demonstrates that petitioner's actions were notpremeditated. Thus, given all of the circumstances, including petitioner's spotless record as ateacher for five years and his promotion to dean two years prior to the incidents at issue, we findthe penalty excessive and shocking to our sense of fairness (Matter of Pell v Board of Educ.of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, WestchesterCounty, 34 NY2d 222, 233 [1974];cf. City School Dist. of the City of N.Y. v McGraham, 75 AD3d 445 [2010], affd 17 NY3d 917 [2011] [penaltyof 90-day suspension without pay and reassignment rather than termination reinstated in light ofoverall circumstances lending to the improbability of teacher engaging in similar inappropriatebehavior in the future]).
Accordingly, we find that, in determining the penalty of termination, the Hearing Officerfailed to consider all of the circumstances and relevant evidence, leading the Hearing Officer toview the incidents in isolation and divorcing them from the context in which they took place.Thus, we find the Hearing Officer's view of petitioner's credibility carried over, likely influencinghis determination that petitioner should be terminated. Lesser sanctions are available that woulddeter petitioner from engaging in this conduct in the future (see Matter of Riley v City of NewYork, 2010 NY Slip Op 32540[U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2010], affd 84 AD3d 442[2011]).
In this case, in view of the Hearing Officer's apparent unfair bias against petitioner, webelieve that public policy considerations favor retention of a teacher who has a proven record ofgenuinely connecting with his students and making a positive impact in their lives(McGraham, 17 NY3d at 919 ["Courts will only intervene in the arbitration process inthose 'cases in which public policy considerations, embodied in statute or decisional law,prohibit, in an absolute [*3]sense, particular matters beingdecided or certain relief being granted by an arbitrator' "], quoting Matter of Sprinzen[Nomberg], 46 NY2d 623, 631 [1979]). There is no evidence in the record to suggest thatpetitioner was not well liked by the student body, and as the motion court emphasized, RP, oneof the students involved in the second incident "made clear that he really liked [Principe] and thathe felt that [Principe] understood him and was really kind of rooting for him and helping himwith his difficulties."
The dissent, in reasoning that the penalty in this case was proportionate so that it did notshock one's sense of fairness, cites cases in which the teachers involved engaged in conductwholly unrelated to their employment with the DOE (Cipollaro v New York City Dept. of Educ., 83 AD3d 543 [2011];Matter of Rogers v Sherburne-EarlvilleCent. School Dist., 17 AD3d 823 [2005]). Indeed, in both Cipollaro andRogers, neither of the teachers involved held a position similar to that of petitioner, thedean of discipline, and in both cases the hearing officer's determination to terminate the teachers'employment was based on fraudulent conduct wholly unrelated to their employment with theDOE. In the case before us, as the court below explained, petitioner "was put in the position ofDean of the school because obviously there was confidence in his judgment and his ability todeal with difficult situations and difficult children, which was the situation in both of theseincidents" and "he was doing what he was supposed to be doing, which was to maintain order."
Moreover, the dissent cites Cipollaro for the proposition that, when determining theappropriate penalty, a hearing officer may consider a teacher's lack of remorse. Undoubtedly, it isentirely reasonable for a hearing officer to implement the harsher penalty of terminationfollowing a finding of a teacher's lack of remorse for engaging in fraudulent conduct. However,while lack of remorse is one factor that a hearing officer may consider when determining theappropriate penalty, here as the motion court articulated, the Hearing Officer placed petitioner ina "very difficult situation," when he expected petitioner to show remorse, while petitioner, inexercising his responsibilities as dean of discipline, believed he was protecting members of hisschool's student body and faculty from two threatening situations.
Rather than considering the proportionality of petitioner's penalty, in light of "all thecircumstances," as Pell requires, the dissent focuses on the incidents in the worst possiblelight by examining them in isolation from the context in which they occurred. Regarding the firstincident, the dissent ignores the absence of evidence corroborating MT's testimony that petitionerplaced him in a headlock. It also ignores that, in his role as dean of discipline, petitioner believedthat his actions protected students by preventing the escalation of fights between MT and twoother students. Indeed, petitioner was aware of MT's significant history of misbehaving andregularly fighting with other students. Regarding the second incident, the dissent ignores thatpetitioner, again in his role as dean of discipline, was attempting to deal with recalcitrantstudents, both of whom had a history of violence, while he tried to protect a teacher whom hebelieved the students were threatening. Moreover, the dissent urges that the disciplinary historiesof the students involved here are irrelevant. To the contrary, the disciplinary histories of MT andRP are relevant, because they are one factor among "all the circumstances" that Pell callson us to consider when we are evaluating the proportionality of a penalty.
The dissent further attempts to justify the penalty of termination in this case by citing to aCourt of Appeals case where the Court upheld termination for a single instance of corporalpunishment and two cases where courts have upheld the same penalty for acts of corporal [*4]punishment (Matter of Ebner v Board of Educ. of E. WillistonUnion Free School Dist. No. 2, N. Hempstead, 42 NY2d 938 [1977] [teacher terminated fordragging a student by the hair from one class to another]; Matter of Saunders v Rockland Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 62 AD3d1012 [2009] [teacher terminated for allowing a student to be strapped to a chair withoutcause and for striking a student in the chest and jaw]; Matter of Giles vSchuyler-Chemung-Tioga Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 199 AD2d 613 [1993] [teacherterminated for striking a student on the hands with a book and for throwing a car jack through awindow]). However, nothing in those cases indicates that the teachers involved engaged in theirsanctioned conduct in furtherance of their employment with the DOE. Those cases differ fromthe case before us in that petitioner here, while charged with the role of dean of discipline,engaged in conduct that he believed was appropriate to protect members of his school's studentand faculty bodies.
Accordingly, we agree with the determination of the motion court that the penalty imposedhere was excessive and "disproportionate to the offenses, in the light of all the circumstances"(Pell, 34 NY2d at 233) and that the matter be remanded to the Hearing Officer for alesser penalty consistent with this court's decision. Concur—Gonzalez, P.J., Moskowitzand Acosta, JJ.
Friedman and Richter, JJ., dissent in a memorandum by Richter, J., as follows: I respectfullydissent because I do not believe that the penalty imposed here was so disproportionate to the twooffenses as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness. Nor do I believe that the penalty violatespublic policy.
Petitioner, a dean of discipline formerly employed by respondent New York City Departmentof Education, commenced this proceeding pursuant to Education Law § 3020-a (5) andCPLR 7511 seeking to vacate the opinion and award of an impartial hearing officer which foundpetitioner guilty of two separate incidents of corporal punishment, and ordered his termination.Supreme Court upheld the findings of guilt but concluded that the penalty of termination wasexcessive. Respondent now appeals, arguing that the court erred in vacating the penalty.Petitioner has not cross appealed to challenge the findings of guilt.
In the first incident, MT, an 11-year-old student, was exiting the school cafeteria afterwalking away from a verbal dispute he was having with a fellow student. As MT walked throughthe cafeteria doors, petitioner placed him in a headlock, swung him around, and told him to stoparguing. After petitioner let the child go, MT started crying because his "head hurt." MT walkedup the stairs from the cafeteria and came upon a school safety officer. The safety officer noticedthat MT was crying and asked him what was wrong. MT told the officer that petitioner had"choked him."
In the second incident, petitioner saw RP, a 13-year-old student, and another student in theschool hallway. Petitioner and the two boys entered a teacher's adjacent classroom, and petitionerasked the teacher if the students were cutting class. When the teacher responded that they were,RP walked out of the classroom, stating that he was tired of being blamed for things he did notdo. Petitioner followed RP out of the room, grabbed him by the shirt and slammed him into thewall. The back of RP's head hit the wall, and RP felt pain and dizziness. Petitioner continued tohold onto RP's shirt collar while walking him down the hallway and into petitioner's office. RPsubsequently went to the nurse's office and got an ice pack for the "red [*5]lump" on the back of his head, which was several inches indiameter.
Sergeant Johnie Washington, a supervising school safety officer, observed the hallwayincident involving RP in real time on a live video feed. He "couldn't believe" what he saw andimmediately reported the matter to the school's principal. As the principal explained at thehearing, he viewed the video and saw no actions that would have justified petitioner's behavior.The video corroborated RP's account of the incident. RP prepared a written statement, reiteratinghis complaint that petitioner had pushed him into the wall. Later that day, petitioner summonedRP to his office. At that meeting, petitioner asked RP to retract the statement he had made aboutthe incident.
Petitioner testified in his own defense at the hearing. With respect to the first incident,petitioner denied putting MT in a headlock and swinging him around. As for the second incident,petitioner admitted grabbing RP's shoulder, but denied throwing him into the wall. Instead,petitioner explained that RP lost his balance, and the "momentum" caused him to "fall" into thewall.
The Hearing Officer determined that petitioner was not a credible witness because histestimony was internally inconsistent and was contradicted by the credible testimony of sevenother witnesses as well as a video of one of the incidents. The Hearing Officer found thatpetitioner repeatedly fabricated testimony in an effort to deny or justify his physically abusivebehavior. He further found that petitioner's unreasonable use of physical force against the twostudents, who were less than half his size, warranted the penalty of termination. Petitionershowed no remorse for his misconduct and, indeed, argued that his actions toward RP wereproper and professional. For these reasons, the Hearing Officer concluded that petitioner wouldcontinue to engage in similar misconduct if returned to the classroom. As a result, the HearingOfficer found that petitioner was unfit to perform his duties and ordered his dismissal.
Where, as here, the parties are subject to compulsory arbitration, a determination made aftera hearing held pursuant to Education Law § 3020-a must be in accord with due process,have adequate evidentiary support, and cannot be arbitrary, capricious or irrational (CitySchool Dist. of the City of N.Y. v McGraham, 17 NY3d 917, 919 [2011]; Lackow v Department of Educ. (or"Board") of City of N.Y., 51 AD3d 563, 567 [2008]). Moreover, a penalty will not bedisturbed unless it "is so disproportionate to the offense, in the light of all the circumstances, asto be shocking to one's sense of fairness" (Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union FreeSchool Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d222, 233 [1974]). In determining the appropriate penalty, a hearing officer may consider theteacher's lack of remorse and failure to take responsibility for his or her actions (Cipollaro v New York City Dept. ofEduc., 83 AD3d 543, 544 [2011]; Matter of Rogers v Sherburne-Earlville Cent. School Dist., 17 AD3d823, 825 [2005]). Moreover, although the teacher's prior disciplinary history may also beconsidered, even a long and previously unblemished record does not foreclose termination as anappropriate sanction (Cipollaro, 83 AD3d at 544; Matter of Rogers, 17 AD3d at824-825).
In an effort to minimize petitioner's guilt, the majority recites petitioner's version of the facts,which was rejected by the Hearing Officer. Not even petitioner chose to appeal these findings,which must be accepted as true for the purpose of determining the appropriate sanction. Thearbitrator's decision to terminate petitioner was not arbitrary, capricious or irrational, nor does thepenalty imposed shock one's sense of fairness. The Hearing Officer came to a reasonedconclusion that petitioner would continue to engage in similar behavior and that termination was[*6]the appropriate penalty. Petitioner, who served as the dean ofdiscipline at the school, lost his temper on two separate occasions and unleashed his anger inviolent acts involving two different students.
Moreover, as the Hearing Officer noted, petitioner showed no remorse whatsoever for hisactions, and instead either denied or attempted to explain away his behavior. Making mattersworse, in an attempt to interfere with an ongoing investigation, petitioner inappropriately askedone of the students to retract his complaint. Although acting as the dean of discipline at a cityschool may present its challenges, in light of the egregiousness of petitioner's repeatedmisconduct, the penalty of termination should not have been disturbed (see Cipollaro, 83AD3d at 544).
The Court of Appeals has upheld the sanction of dismissal where a teacher's misconductconsisted of a single instance of corporal punishment. In Matter of Ebner v Board of Educ. ofE. Williston Union Free School Dist. No. 2, N. Hempstead (42 NY2d 938 [1977]), theschool board terminated a teacher who lost her self-control and dragged a student by the hairfrom one classroom to another, and the Court of Appeals found that "the punishment was not sodisproportionate as to warrant judicial correction" (42 NY2d at 939). Other courts have similarlyupheld termination of teachers for acts of corporal punishment (see e.g. Matter of Saunders v Rockland Bd.of Coop. Educ. Servs., 62 AD3d 1012 [2009]; Matter of Giles vSchuyler-Chemung-Tioga Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 199 AD2d 613 [1993]).
Citing the Court of Appeals decision in McGraham (17 NY3d 917 [2011]), themajority argues that public policy considerations warrant a penalty less severe than termination.McGraham, however, actually supports upholding the Hearing Officer's decision here.In McGraham, the Court took a narrow view of the public policy exception and cautionedthat "[c]ourts will only intervene in the arbitration process in those cases in which public policyconsiderations, embodied in statute or decisional law, prohibit, in an absolute sense, particularmatters being decided or certain relief being granted by an arbitrator" (McGraham, 17NY3d at 919 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Thus, as the Court emphasized, "Thatreasonable minds might disagree over what the proper penalty should have been does not providea basis for vacating the arbitral award or refashioning the penalty" (id. at 920).
Here, the majority suggests that the fact that petitioner has made a positive impact onstudents' lives is a valid public policy consideration that warrants reversing the penalty oftermination. Although the teacher's positive record is one factor that the Hearing Officer couldconsider, it is not a public policy consideration that "prohibit[s], in an absolute sense" (id.at 919) the Hearing Officer's decision to terminate petitioner for his acts of violence against thetwo students.
This Court's decision in Matter ofRiley v City of New York (84 AD3d 442 [2011]), relied upon by the majority, isdistinguishable. In Riley, we concluded that a penalty of termination wasdisproportionate for a teacher who, in an isolated incident, slapped a student across the face(see Matter of Riley v City of New York, 2010 NY Slip Op 32540[U] [2010],affd 84 AD3d 442 [2011]). Here in contrast, petitioner was found guilty of two separateacts of corporal punishment committed against two different students. Furthermore, inRiley, we focused on the fact that the student involved sustained no physical or emotionalinjury as a result of the incident. Both of the students here testified about the physical effects ofpetitioner's misconduct. RP described feeling pain and dizziness after petitioner slammed himinto the wall. As a result, RP had a several-inch-wide "red lump" on his head requiring treatmentby the school nurse. And, as [*7]MT described, his "head hurt,"causing him to cry, after petitioner grabbed him in a headlock. Finally, unlike the teacher inRiley, petitioner attempted to influence the investigation by asking RP to withdraw hiscomplaint.
The majority unfairly and incorrectly argues that the Hearing Officer failed to consider thecontext in which the two incidents took place and the disciplinary history of the studentsinvolved. The Hearing Officer's opinion explicitly states that in reaching his conclusions, he"fully considered" "[t]he testimony of all witnesses," "the evidence adduced" at the hearing, andthe "positions and arguments advanced by [petitioner] during the hearing and in . . .closing arguments." In any event, the disciplinary history of the students is irrelevant here,especially since there was no finding by the Hearing Officer that petitioner was acting inself-defense or was otherwise justified in using physical force. It is inappropriate to suggest thatpetitioner should have been given more latitude in his use of force, or that he should be penalizedless severely, merely because the students involved had past disciplinary problems. It certainlydoes not shock one's sense of fairness that the Hearing Officer concluded that petitioner's use ofcorporal punishment was wrong and should be severely punished, regardless of the backgroundof the victims.
The majority argues that a lesser penalty is appropriate because petitioner believed that hewas protecting other students and faculty members from threatening situations. This, however,was not petitioner's defense at the hearing. As to the first incident with MT, petitioner flat outdenied that it ever happened. And in the second incident, petitioner offered the absurdexplanation that RP lost his balance and the "momentum" caused him to "fall" into the wall.Petitioner's claim that the two boys had falsely accused him was soundly rejected by the HearingOfficer and is not the subject of this appeal.
I am troubled by the majority's belief that petitioner's punishment should be reduced becausehe was acting "in furtherance of" his role as dean of discipline. In fact, just the opposite is true.Petitioner's acts of violence against the two students were in blatant derogation of his duties aschief disciplinarian. The majority implies that because petitioner was dean of discipline, heshould be treated less severely than a teacher in a classroom. This analysis turns logic on its head.As the dean of discipline, petitioner should be able to control verbal disruptions by studentswithout resorting to excessive force.