Shaw v Bluepers Family Billiards
2012 NY Slip Op 02669 [94 AD3d 858]
April 10, 2012
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, May 23, 2012


David Shaw, Appellant,
v
Bluepers Family Billiards et al.,Respondents.

—[*1]Lawrence P. Biondi (Lisa M. Comeau, Garden City, N.Y., of counsel), for appellant.

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Nicholas P. Hurzeler and GregoryS. Katz of counsel), for respondents Bluepers Family Billiards and Claude Davis.

Lori D. Fishman, Tarrytown, N.Y. (Silvia C. Souto of counsel), for respondents RosenGroup, Inc., Price Chopper Operating Co., Inc., V.G.R. Associates, LLC, and Vail's Gate, LLC.

Craig P. Curcio, Middletown, N.Y. (Kevin P. Ahrenholz of counsel), for respondentsChristopher C. Fitch, individually, Christopher C. Fitch, doing business as Upstate Landscapingand Upstate Landscapes, Upstate Landscaping, and Upstate Landscapes.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by hisbrief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Alfieri, J.), dated January3, 2011, as granted those branches of the motion of the defendants Bluepers Family Billiards andClaude Davis, the cross motion of the defendants Rosen Group, Inc., Price Chopper OperatingCo., Inc., V.G.R. Associates, LLC, and Vail's Gate, LLC, and the cross motion of the defendantsChristopher C. Fitch, individually, Christopher C. Fitch, doing business as Upstate Landscapingand Upstate Landscapes, Upstate Landscaping, and Upstate Landscapes, which were forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs awarded tothe defendants appearing separately and filing separate briefs.

The plaintiff allegedly was injured when he slipped and fell on ice outside of the defendantBluepers Family Billiards, which was owned by the defendant Claude Davis (hereinafter togetherBluepers). Bluepers was situated in a rented commercial space in the Price Chopper Plaza locatedin Vails Gate. Price Chopper Plaza was owned by the defendants V.G.R. Associates, LLC, andVails Gate, LLC, and managed by the defendant Rosen Group, Inc. (hereinafter collectively withthe defendant Price Chopper Operating Co., Inc., the landlord). Rosen Group, Inc., contractedwith the defendant Christopher C. Fitch to remove snow from the parking lot of the PriceChopper Plaza. The plaintiff commenced this action sounding in negligence against Bluepers, thelandlord, and the defendants Christopher C. Fitch, individually, Christopher C. Fitch, doingbusiness as Upstate Landscaping and Upstate Landscapes, Upstate Landscaping, and UpstateLandscapes (hereinafter [*2]collectively Upstate). In the orderappealed from, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted those branches of the motion of Bluepersand the separate cross motions of Upstate and the landlord which were for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them.

The Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the motion of Bluepers and the crossmotion of the landlord which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar asasserted against each of them. Bluepers and the landlord established their prima facie entitlementto judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of themby submitting proof that they did not create or have actual or constructive notice of the allegedlydangerous condition that caused the plaintiff's accident (see generally Cantwell v Fox Hill Community Assn., Inc., 87 AD3d1106 [2011]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Gerardi v Verizon N.Y., Inc., 66AD3d 960, 961 [2009]; Construction by Singletree, Inc. v Lowe, 55 AD3d 861, 863[2008]).

The Supreme Court also properly granted that branch of Upstate's cross motion which wasfor summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. "In Espinal vMelville Snow Contrs. (98 NY2d 136, 138 [2002]), the Court of Appeals held that 'acontractual obligation, standing alone, will generally not give rise to tort liability in favor of athird party' " (Foster v Herbert SlepoyCorp., 76 AD3d 210, 213 [2010], quoting Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs., 98NY2d 136, 138 [2002]). However, the Court identified three exceptions to the general rule,pursuant to which "a party who enters into a contract to render services may be said to haveassumed a duty of care—and thus be potentially liable in tort—to third persons: (1)where the contracting party, in failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of hisduties, launche[s] a force or instrument of harm; (2) where the plaintiff detrimentally relies onthe continued performance of the contracting party's duties and (3) where the contracting partyhas entirely displaced the other party's duty to maintain the premises safely" (Espinal vMelville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d at 140 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

Here, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the pleadings asserted, among otherthings, that Upstate failed to exercise reasonable care in the performance of its duties, therebylaunching a force or instrument of harm. Since the pleadings contained allegations which wouldestablish that this Espinal exception applied, in order to establish its prima facieentitlement to judgment as a matter of law, Upstate was required to eliminate all triable issues offact with regard thereto (see Rubistello vBartolini Landscaping, Inc., 87 AD3d 1003, 1004 [2011]; Foster v Herbert SlepoyCorp., 76 AD3d at 214). Upstate succeeded in demonstrating that it did not launch a force orinstrument of harm as a result of a failure to exercise reasonable care in the performance of snowremoval duties. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

In his main brief, the plaintiff did not raise an issue regarding the denial of his cross motionfor leave to serve an amended bill of particulars. This issue was raised for the first time in theplaintiff's reply brief. Thus, the plaintiff abandoned whatever argument he may have had withrespect to the Supreme Court's denial of his cross motion for leave to serve an amended bill ofparticulars (see Levy v Kung SitHuie, 54 AD3d 731, 732 [2008]; Vasquez v Wood, 18 AD3d 645, 646-647 [2005]; see also Kane v Triborough Bridge &Tunnel Auth., 8 AD3d 239, 242 [2004]). Balkin, J.P., Eng, Hall and Sgroi, JJ., concur.


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