| Cantor v Flores |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 02830 [94 AD3d 936] |
| April 17, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| David A. Cantor, Respondent, v Frantzie Flores, Appellant,et al., Defendants. |
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Knuckles, Komosinski & Elliott, LLP, Elmsford, N.Y. (Stephen M. Forte of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant Frantzie Flores appeals from an order ofthe Supreme Court, Nassau County (Adams, J.), entered January 5, 2011, which denied hermotion to vacate a judgment of foreclosure and sale of the same court entered August 11, 2008,upon her default in answering the complaint.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the motion of thedefendant Frantzie Flores (hereinafter the appellant) to vacate a judgment of foreclosure and saleentered upon her default in answering the complaint. While the appellant explicitly stated that hermotion was based upon CPLR 5015 (a) (4), she failed to allege that the Supreme Court did notobtain personal jurisdiction over her. The affidavit of the plaintiff's process server, whichconstituted prima facie evidence of proper service (see Argent Mtge. Co., LLC v Vlahos, 66 AD3d 721 [2009]),indicated that the appellant was served on August 7, 2006, pursuant to CPLR 308 (1). Theappellant failed to challenge, let alone rebut, the plaintiff's prima facie showing of proper service.To the extent the appellant based her motion to vacate the default judgment of foreclosure andsale on CPLR 5015 (a) (1), the motion was properly denied, as she failed to demonstrate areasonable excuse for her default. While the Supreme Court has the discretion to accept lawoffice failure as a reasonable excuse (see CPLR 2005; Swensen v MV Transp., Inc., 89 AD3d924, 925 [2011]), the excuse must be supported by detailed allegations of fact explaining thelaw office failure (see Matter ofEsposito, 57 AD3d 894, 895 [2008]; Gazetten Contr., Inc. v HCO, Inc., 45 AD3d 530 [2007]). Here, theappellant's allegation of law office failure was vague, conclusory, and unsubstantiated (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Cervini,84 AD3d 789, 789-790 [2011]; StarIndus., Inc. v Innovative Beverages, Inc., 55 AD3d 903, 904-905 [2008]). Since theappellant failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for her default, it is unnecessary to determinewhether she demonstrated the existence of a potentially meritorious defense (see Tribeca Lending Corp. v Correa, 92AD3d 770 [2012]; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Cervini, 84 AD3d at 790).
The appellant's remaining contentions either are without merit or have been rendered [*2]academic by our determination. Dillon, J.P., Dickerson, Hall andAustin, JJ., concur.