| Matter of Rosenberg v New York State Off. of Parks, Recreation, &Historic Preserv. |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 02884 [94 AD3d 1006] |
| April 17, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Andrew Rosenberg et al.,Appellants, v New York State Office of Parks, Recreation, and Historic Preservation etal., Respondents. |
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Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Richard Dearing, MonicaWagner, and Claude S. Platton of counsel), for respondents.
In a hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, inter alia, to review a determination ofthe New York State Office of Parks, Recreation, and Historic Preservation, which denied thepetitioners/plaintiffs' request for rights of access over a bridle path in order to access Beech HillRoad from the southern section of the subject property, and action, among other things, for ajudgment declaring that the New York State Office of Parks, Recreation, and HistoricPreservation had no ownership interests in the bridle path, the petitioners/plaintiffs appeal from ajudgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Hubert, J.), entered February 25, 2011,which, in effect, dismissed the petition/complaint.
Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by deleting the provisions thereof, ineffect, dismissing the causes of action to recover damages and for a declaratory judgment; as somodified, the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements, the causes of action torecover damages and for a declaratory judgment are reinstated and severed, and the matter isremitted to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for further proceedings on those causes ofaction.
The appellants' property in Pleasantville, Westchester County, was described in a deedconveying the property to them as consisting of two "tracts," referred to as "Tract I" and "TractII." The appellants' single-family dwelling was located on "Tract II," which had direct access to apublic road. The appellants had a horse barn on "Tract I," which, if considered as a discreteparcel, had been landlocked since the New York State Department of Transportation (hereinafterthe DOT) acquired a portion of "Tract I" to create Route 117. The appellants applied to the DOTfor permission to construct a driveway from "Tract I" across DOT Parcel 54, which the DOTowned in fee, to gain direct access to the same public road that was directly accessible from"Tract II." The plans submitted by the appellants to the DOT called for relocation of part of anequestrian trail that provided safe access for equestrians to the trail system of the RockefellerState Park Preserve, as well as the construction of part of the proposed driveway over a section ofthe trail. The DOT directed the appellants to seek permission from the New York State Office ofParks, Recreation, and Historic Preservation (hereinafter the agency) to cross and relocate part ofthe equestrian trail. The agency denied the appellants' request.
The applicable standard of review pursuant to CPLR 7803 (3) is "whether a [*2]determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, wasaffected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion" (see Matter of Holcomb v Williams, 72AD3d 687, 688 [2010]). Here, the Supreme Court properly concluded that the agency'sdetermination was not illegal, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion. The project forwhich the appellants sought approval would have necessitated the partial relocation of anequestrian trail that provides access to the trail system of the Rockefeller State Park Preserve, andwould have caused safety concerns for users of the equestrian trail. Accordingly, the SupremeCourt properly denied those branches of the petition/complaint which were pursuant to CPLRarticle 78, inter alia, to annul the agency's determination, and properly, in effect, dismissed thosecauses of action which sought relief pursuant to CPLR article 78.
Nonetheless, in the absence of a dispositive motion addressed to the causes of action whichsought to recover damages and declaratory relief, the Supreme Court improperly, in effect,dismissed those causes action. In a hybrid proceeding and action, separate procedural rules applyto those causes of action which are asserted pursuant to CPLR article 78, on the one hand, andthose which seek to recover damages and declaratory relief, on the other hand. The SupremeCourt may not employ the summary procedure applicable to a CPLR article 78 cause of action todispose of causes of action to recover damages or seeking a declaratory judgment (see Matter of 24 Franklin Ave. R.E. Corp. vHeaship, 74 AD3d 980, 980 [2010]). Thus, where no party makes a request for asummary determination of the causes of action which seek to recover damages or declaratoryrelief, it is error for the Supreme Court to summarily dispose of those causes of action (see Matter of G&C Transp., Inc. vMcGrane, 72 AD3d 819 [2010]; During v City of New Rochelle, N.Y., 55 AD3d 533, 534 [2008]).Since no party made such a motion here, the Supreme Court should not have summarily disposedof the causes of action which sought to recover damages and declaratory relief, and the mattermust be remitted to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for further proceedings on thosecauses of action. We express no opinion as to the merits of those causes of action. Skelos, J.P.,Dickerson, Eng and Leventhal, JJ., concur.