| Matter of Alvarez v Fischer |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 02961 [94 AD3d 1404] |
| April 20, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| In the Matter of Ramon Alvarez, Petitioner, v Brian Fischer,Commissioner, New York State Department of Correctional Services,Respondent. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Martin A. Hotvet of counsel), forrespondent.
Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to the Appellate Division of theSupreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department by order of the Supreme Court, Erie County[John L. Michalski, A.J.], entered July 26, 2011) to review determinations of respondent and forinjunctive and declaratory relief. The determinations found that petitioner had violated variousinmate rules and transferred petitioner to Gowanda Correctional Facility to attend a sex offendercounseling and treatment program.
It is hereby ordered that the determinations are unanimously confirmed without costs and thepetition is dismissed.
Memorandum: Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul thedeterminations, following two separate disciplinary hearings, that he violated various inmaterules. He also seeks to challenge a determination transferring him into a sexual offendercounseling and treatment program (SOCTP) and the denial of a grievance in which he allegedthat he was denied medical attention after he was allegedly assaulted by correction officers. Withrespect to the relief requested for the SOCTP transfer, petitioner sought an order annulling thatdetermination and returning him to his status before he was placed in the SOCTP facility. Evenassuming, arguendo, that the petition raised a substantial evidence issue and thus that theproceeding was properly transferred to this Court (see Matter of Grant v Prack, 86 AD3d 885, 886 n [2011]), we notethat petitioner in his brief to this Court does not raise a substantial evidence issue. We thus deemabandoned any substantial evidence issue (see Matter of Lineberger v Bezio, 89 AD3d 1293, 1294 [2011];Grant, 86 AD3d at 886 n).
On December 17, 2010, petitioner was served with a tier III misbehavior report (first MBR)alleging that he violated rules 101.22 (7 NYCRR 270.2 [B] [2] [v] [stalking]), 106.10 (7 NYCRR270.2 [B] [7] [i] [refusal to obey orders]), and 107.10 (7 NYCRR 270.2 [B] [8] [i] [interferencewith an employee]). Petitioner's contention that he was denied an employee assistant is notproperly before us inasmuch as it was not raised in the petition (see Matter of Pigmentel v Selsky, 19AD3d 816, 817 [2005]; Matter of Crawford v Kelly, 124 AD2d 1018 [1986]). In anyevent, his contention lacks merit. Petitioner signed a document waiving the right to an employeeassistant, and he has demonstrated no prejudice resulting from the lack of such an assistant (see Matter of Truman v Fischer, 75AD3d 1019, 1020 [2010]; Matter of Johnson v Goord, 297 AD2d 881, [*2]883 [2002]). Petitioner further contends that the Hearing Officerwho presided at the hearing on the first MBR was biased. That contention, however, also is notproperly before us (see Matter ofMadison v Cunningham, 67 AD3d 1141, 1142 [2009]; Matter of Smith v Fischer, 64 AD3d1061, 1062 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 712 [2009]). In any event, we again concludethat the contention lacks merit. "The record does not support petitioner's contention that theHearing Officer was biased or that the determination flowed from the alleged bias" (Matter ofRodriguez v Herbert, 270 AD2d 889, 890 [2000]; see Matter of Colon v Fischer, 83 AD3d 1500, 1501-1502 [2011]).Petitioner's final contention with respect to the first MBR is that he was denied his right ofconfrontation when he was denied access to adverse evidence. Petitioner failed to exhaust hisadministrative remedies with respect to that contention, and this Court has no discretionaryauthority to reach that contention (see Matter of Nelson v Coughlin, 188 AD2d 1071,1071 [1992], appeal dismissed 81 NY2d 834 [1993]).
While petitioner was confined in the special housing unit (SHU) as a result of the first MBR,he was served with another MBR (second MBR) alleging that he violated rules 113.22 (7NYCRR 270.2 [B] [14] [xii] [possessing articles in unauthorized areas]) and 106.10 (7 NYCRR270.2 [B] [7] [i] [refusing to obey orders promptly and without argument]). The second MBRwas written on December 21, 2010. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the hearing on the secondMBR was timely commenced and completed (see 7 NYCRR 251-5.1 [a], [b]). Because"petitioner was already confined to [the SHU] as a result of an unrelated matter when he receivedthe instant misbehavior report[,] . . . the seven-day rule for commencing the hearingwas inapplicable" (Matter of Faison v Senkowski, 256 AD2d 702 [1998], appealdismissed 93 NY2d 870 [1999]; see 7 NYCRR 251-5.1 [a]; Matter of Applewhite v Goord, 45AD3d 1112 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 711 [2008]; Matter of Rodriguez vGoord, 276 AD2d 493 [2000]). Petitioner also contends that the hearing on the second MBRwas untimely under section 251-5.1 (b) because it was not completed within 14 days followingthe writing of the second MBR. That contention lacks merit. "In calculating the 14-day timeperiod, the date the misbehavior report is written is excluded" (Matter of Freeman vSelsky, 270 AD2d 547, 547-548 [2000]; see Matter of Harris v Goord, 268 AD2d933, 934 [2000]; see generally General Construction Law § 20). Here, the secondMBR was written on December 21, 2010, and the hearing was completed on January 4, 2011,which was within the requisite time period.
Petitioner further contends that the Hearing Officer presiding over the hearing on the secondMBR was biased as well, but he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to thatcontention (see Nelson, 188 AD2d at 1071). With respect to petitioner's contention thathe did not receive adequate employee assistance on the second MBR, we conclude that hiscontention is not properly before us inasmuch as petitioner did not raise that contention in hispetition (see Pigmentel, 19 AD3d at 817; Crawford, 124 AD2d 1018).
Finally, we note that Supreme Court erred in transferring that part of the proceeding relatedto the SOCTP transfer and medical attention grievances to this Court inasmuch as anydeterminations with respect to those grievances were " 'not made as a result of a hearing held. . . pursuant to direction by law' " (Matter of McEachin v Fischer, 71 AD3d 1558, 1559 [2010],amended on rearg on other grounds 74 AD3d 1879 [2010]; see CPLR 7803 [4];Matter of Shomo v Zon, 35 AD3d1227 [2006]). We nevertheless address the contentions with respect thereto in the interest ofjudicial economy (see McEachin, 71 AD3d at 1559; Shomo, 35 AD3d 1227). Inhis brief to this Court, petitioner does not raise any arguments with respect to his placement inthe SOCTP program, and thus his "challenge to [that] determination is deemed abandoned" (Matter of Lamage v Bezio, 74 AD3d1676, 1676 [2010]; see Matter ofGathers v Artus, 59 AD3d 795 [2009]). In any event, petitioner admits that hisgrievances related to the SOCTP transfer were summarily rejected by the Grievance Office andthat there was no determination thereon, and that the Grievance Office stated that it neverreceived his purported grievance related to the denial of medical care. Thus, petitioner does notdispute that he did not receive a determination on his purported grievances and did not [*3]file any administrative appeals related to the purported denial of hisgrievances. Because petitioner has failed to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to thosealleged grievances, we have no discretion to address the merits of his contentions related to them(see Matter of Fulton v Reynolds,83 AD3d 1308, 1308-1309 [2011]; Matter of Torres v Fischer, 73 AD3d 1355, 1356 [2010]; Matterof Francis v Hollins, 255 AD2d 1008 [1998], lv denied 93 NY2d 801 [1999]).Present—Scudder, P.J., Smith, Centra, Fahey and Peradotto, JJ.