| People v Castillo |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 03284 [94 AD3d 678] |
| April 26, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Enrique Castillo, Also Known as Enrique C. Fernandez,Appellant. |
—[*1] Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Hope Korenstein of counsel), forrespondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Daniel P. Conviser, J.), rendered July 12,2010, as amended August 6, 2010, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of offering a falseinstrument for filing in the first degree (three counts) and attempted petit larceny, and sentencinghim to an aggregate term of 3 to 9 years, unanimously affirmed.
The court properly admitted evidence of an uncharged crime. Defendant was charged withfiling documents that falsely represented himself as the owner of a building. The court properlyreceived evidence of a similar, uncharged scheme involving a Brooklyn property. The perpetratorof the Brooklyn scheme also filed fraudulent documents, using the same variation on defendant'sname, the same address, and the same falsified notary stamp that were used with respect to theproperty involved in the charged crime. The uncharged scheme was highly relevant to trial issuesconcerning knowledge, fraudulent intent and motive (see e.g. People v Potter, 30 AD3d 313,314 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 816 [2006]). Furthermore, the charged and unchargedcrimes shared a distinctive pattern and were thus admissible as evidence of identity (seePeople v Beam, 57 NY2d 241, 253 [1982]). There was ample evidence to support theinference that defendant was the perpetrator of the Brooklyn scheme (see People vRobinson, 68 NY2d 541, 544-545 [1986]). Defendant's challenge to the court's limitinginstruction is unpreserved and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. As an alternativeholding, we find no basis for reversal.
The court properly exercised its discretion in permitting testimony by a judge who had beenthe attorney for the deceased owner of the property that was the subject of the charged crimes.Defendant argues that this testimony was cumulative to other evidence and served no purposeexcept to impress the jury by having a judge testify for the prosecution. However, the judge'stestimony was clearly relevant, and it could not have caused any prejudice. The word "judge" wasmentioned only once, when the witness stated his present employment. Furthermore, the courtoffered to instruct the jury that a judge's testimony should be treated like that of any witness, butdefendant declined that offer.
The court properly admitted statements made at arraignment by defendant's former [*2]counsel. These were vicarious admissions by defendant, madethrough his agent (see People v Brown, 98 NY2d 226, 232-233 [2002]). Accordingly,these statements were properly introduced into evidence by way of the testimony of a courtreporter. Defendant's argument that the circumstances required the People to call the formercounsel as a witness is unpersuasive.
We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence. Concur—Andrias, J.P., Saxe,Catterson, Renwick and Román, JJ.