| People v Knight |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 03316 [94 AD3d 1527] |
| April 27, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v ShamallKnight, Appellant. |
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Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (John J. Brunetti, A.J.),rendered December 12, 2008. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, ofcriminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his guilty plea of criminalpossession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]), defendant contendsthat Supreme Court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained by the policefollowing his arrest, including the loaded firearm he was charged with possessing. We reject thatcontention. Defendant was arrested based on information provided to the police by a confidentialinformant. The informant telephoned a detective with whom he had a relationship and stated thata black male wearing a brown hooded sweatshirt, jeans and brown boots was in possession of a.380 caliber handgun in the area of Lafayette Avenue and South Salina Street in Syracuse. Theinformant also stated that the man with the gun was riding a "female type bicycle." The detectiverelayed that information to police headquarters, and the information was then transmitted overthe police radio. Within minutes, two uniformed officers arrived at the specified location andobserved defendant, who matched the description provided by the informant. Defendant wasstanding in front of a house on South Salina Street, and there was a bicycle on the ground next tohim. Defendant ran inside the house when the marked police vehicle stopped in front of it, andthe officers gave chase. Defendant was tackled inside the house by one of the officers,whereupon a handgun fell onto the floor from defendant's clothing.
Contrary to defendant's contention, the court did not err in restricting defense counsel'scross-examination of the detective with respect to his understanding of the informant's basis ofknowledge. The court properly determined that "the full factual predicate for the warrantlesssearch at issue could not be disclosed without jeopardizing the confidential informant's safety"(People v Merejildo, 305 AD2d 143, 143 [2003], lv denied 1 NY3d 540 [2003];see generally People v Morales, 292 AD2d 253, 254-255 [2002]). Stated otherwise, if thecourt had required the detective to respond to defense counsel's proposed line of questioning, theidentity of the informant would no longer have been confidential.[*2]
We further conclude that the informant's basis ofknowledge was sufficiently established at the in camera Darden hearing (see People vDarden, 34 NY2d 177 [1974]). "Without disclosing the exact substance of theDarden hearing testimony," we conclude that the information from the informant, in itstotality, "provided ample basis to conclude that the informant had a basis for his or herknowledge that defendant was in possession of" a weapon (People v Lowe, 50 AD3d 516, 516 [2008], affd 12 NY3d768 [2009]). Defendant does not challenge the reliability of the informant, who had providedaccurate information to the police on many occasions in the past, and we thus conclude that thePeople satisfied both prongs of the Aguilar/Spinelli test (see People v Henry, 74 AD3d1860 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 852 [2010]).
We reject defendant's further contention that the information provided by the confidentialinformant was not sufficient to support the officers' pursuit of defendant into the house, where headmittedly did not reside. We conclude that, at a minimum, the officers had "reasonablesuspicion to stop and detain defendant based on the totality of the circumstances, including aradio transmission providing a general description of the perpetrator[ ] of [the] crime. . .[,] the . . . proximity of the defendant to the site of the crime, thebrief period of time between the crime and the discovery of the defendant near the location of thecrime, and the [officers'] observation of the defendant, who matched the radio-transmitteddescription" (People v Moss, 89AD3d 1526, 1527 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 885 [2012] [internal quotation marksomitted]). Defendant's flight upon seeing the officers exit their marked patrol vehicle furtherestablished the informant's reliability (see People v Norman, 66 AD3d 1473, 1474 [2009], lvdenied 13 NY3d 940 [2010]; see generally People v Lee, 258 AD2d 352 [1999],lv denied 93 NY2d 900 [1999]), and increased the degree of suspicion (see People vPines, 99 NY2d 525, 526 [2002]). Thus, the pursuit and forcible detention of defendant bythe officers thereafter was justified (see id. at 526-527; People v Wilson, 49 AD3d 1224,1224-1225 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 966 [2008]).
We have reviewed defendant's remaining contentions and conclude that they lack merit.Present—Scudder, P.J., Fahey, Lindley and Martoche, JJ.