| People v Moustakos |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 03324 [94 AD3d 1538] |
| April 27, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v ChristopherMoustakos, Appellant. |
—[*1] Jon E. Budelmann, District Attorney, Auburn (Christopher T. Valdina of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Cayuga County Court (Thomas G. Leone, J.), rendered March31, 2011. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of attempted promotingprison contraband in the first degree.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty ofattempted promoting prison contraband in the first degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00,205.25 [2]), defendant contends that he was denied due process and his right to a speedy trialbased on a delay of just over seven months between the date of the incident and the date theindictment was issued. Applying the factors set forth in People v Taranovich (37 NY2d442, 445 [1975]), we reject that contention (see People v Vernace, 96 NY2d 886,887-888 [2001]). "There is no specific temporal period by which a delay may be evaluated orconsidered 'presumptively prejudicial' " (People v Romeo, 12 NY3d 51, 56 [2009], cert denied 558US —, 130 S Ct 63 [2009], quoting Doggett v United States, 505 US 647, 652[1992]), but a delay of just over seven months alone is insufficient to require dismissal of theindictment (see People v Doyle, 50AD3d 1546 [2008]; People vWalker, 2 AD3d 1454 [2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 808 [2004]; People vBeyah, 302 AD2d 981 [2003], lv denied 99 NY2d 626 [2003]). The delay wascaused in part by an investigative delay inherent in the process by which crimes that occur inprison are referred to the District Attorney's Office, and defendant does not contend that the delaywas caused by bad faith (see Romeo, 12 NY3d at 56-57). "The charge against defendantwas serious, 'involv[ing] the safety and security of a correctional facility' . . .Moreover, because defendant was already incarcerated on a prior felony conviction, 'the delaycaused no further curtailment of his freedom' . . . Finally, we are unable to concludeon the record before us that the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay" (People v Jenkins, 2 AD3d 1390,1391 [2003]; see People v Coggins, 308 AD2d 635, 636 [2003]; People vRichardson, 298 AD2d 711, 712 [2002]). Present—Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Lindley,Sconiers and Martoche, JJ.