Weiss v Lowenberg
2012 NY Slip Op 03366 [95 AD3d 405]
May 1, 2012
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 27, 2012


Michael C. Weiss et al., Appellants,
v
Terrence Lowenberget al., Defendants, and Dennis Konner et al., Respondents.

—[*1]Law Offices of Michael A. Haskel, Mineola (Michael A. Haskel of counsel), forappellants.

Matalon Shweky Elman PLLC, New York (Howard I. Elman and Jeremy C. Bates ofcounsel), for Dennis Konner, respondent.

DLA Piper LLP (US), New York (Jodie E. Buchman of counsel), for First American TitleInsurance Company of New York, respondent.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Richard B. Lowe, III., J.), entered October 28,2010, dismissing the complaint as against defendant Dennis Konner pursuant to an order, sameCourt and Justice, entered August 26, 2010, which, inter alia, granted Konner's motion to dismissthe complaint as against him, unanimously modified, on the law, to the extent of reinstating thefirst and fifth causes of action against Konner alleging slander per se and the third cause of actionagainst him alleging slander of title, and otherwise affirmed, without costs. Order, same courtand Justice, entered August 26, 2010, which granted the motion of defendant First AmericanTitle Insurance Company of New York (First American) to dismiss the second cause of action asagainst it alleging tortious interference with contract, unanimously affirmed, without costs.Appeal from order, same court and Justice, entered August 26, 2010, which granted defendantKonner's motion to dismiss the complaint as against him, unanimously dismissed, without costs,as subsumed in the appeal from the judgment.

Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that defendants defamed them by accusing them, at a real estateclosing at which third parties were present, of signing and filing a perjurious and fraudulentprobate petition. The defamatory statements and allegations of malice set forth in the complaintwere sufficient to state a claim for slander per se. Although allegations of malice may not rest onmere surmise and conjecture, on a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs are not obligated to showevidentiary facts to support their allegations of malice (see Arts4All, Ltd. v Hancock, 5 AD3d 106, 109 [2004]). Moreover,a defamation complaint should not be dismissed on a pre-answer motion to dismiss based on aqualified privilege claim where, as here, the content and [*2]context of the alleged defamatory statements in the complaint orsupporting materials on the motion are "sufficient to potentially establish malice" (Pezhman v City of New York, 29AD3d 164, 168 [2006]), or are such that malice can be inferred (see Hame v Lawson, 70 AD3d640, 641 [2010]). This comports with the principle that the allegations of a complaint facinga pre-answer motion to dismiss are to be deemed true and, the plaintiff is to be accorded thebenefit of every reasonable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]),and that an inference of malice flows from a defamatory statement (see Toker v Pollak,44 NY2d 211, 219 [1978]). Thus, the allegations that Konner made false statements aboutplaintiffs in order to provide a pretext to abort the closing, satisfied the pleading requirements ofmalice (see e.g. Kotowski v Hadley,38 AD3d 499, 500 [2007]), and Supreme Court erred in dismissing the slander claims on theground that the allegations of malice were conclusory.

The alleged defamatory statements Konner made about plaintiffs, which impugned theirability and intention to pay the appropriate estate taxes on the property to be sold, were sufficientto state a claim for slander of title and to satisfy the pleading requirements of CPLR 3016 (a), asthe statements cast doubt on the validity of title of the property to be sold. The court, however,properly dismissed the claim for injurious falsehood (fourth cause of action) based on its findingthat alleged defamatory statements involved a single sale of property and did not involveplaintiffs' business or trade or affect a business relationship (see Waste Distillation Tech. vBlasland & Bouck Engrs., 136 AD2d 633, 634 [1988]).

The court properly dismissed the cause of action for tortious interference with contractasserted against First American. Although plaintiffs alleged that the transaction failed to close asa result of First American's failure to insure, the complaint does not allege that First Americanintentionally procured the buyer's breach of the contract for sale of the property, or even that thecontract was breached (see Lama Holding Co. v Smith Barney, 88 NY2d 413, 424-425[1996]; Krinos Foods, Inc. v VintageFood Corp., 30 AD3d 332, 333 [2006]). Moreover, plaintiffs' allegation that FirstAmerican asserted a title exception in order to accommodate the buyer's desire to avoid closingon the contract contradicts the claim that the contract would have closed but for First American'spurportedly malicious and reckless actions.

The court properly struck the demand for punitive damages. Such damages "require ademonstration that the wrong complained of rose to a level of such wanton dishonesty as toimply a criminal indifference to civil obligations" (164 Mulberry St. Corp. v Columbia Univ., 4 AD3d 49, 60 [2004],lv dismissed 2 NY3d 793 [2004] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Here,the allegations of malice do not rise to such a level. Concur—Friedman, J.P., Sweeny,Acosta, Renwick and Abdus-Salaam, JJ.


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