| Chester v Alsol Enters., Ltd. |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 03583 [95 AD3d 922] |
| May 8, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Weber Chester, Respondent, v Alsol Enterprises, Ltd.,Respondent, and City of New York, Appellant, et al., Defendants. |
—[*1] Baron Associates, P.C., Brooklyn, N.Y. (Daniel Davidovic of counsel), forplantiff-respondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant City of New Yorkappeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Velasquez, J.), dated January 26,2011, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all crossclaims insofar as asserted against it.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with one bill of costs, and the motion of thedefendant City of New York for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all crossclaims insofar as asserted against it is granted.
During the early afternoon of April 12, 2010, the plaintiff allegedly was injured when shetripped and fell over a raised sidewalk abutting a commercial property in Brooklyn. The Cityestablished its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that it didnot create the alleged defect and that it had no duty to maintain the subject sidewalk whichabutted a commercial property (see Administrative Code of City of NY § 7-210; see also Yarborough v City of NewYork, 10 NY3d 726, 728 [2008]). In opposition, the respondents failed to raise a triableissue of fact. Although determination of a summary judgment motion may be delayed to allowfor further discovery where evidence necessary to oppose the motion is unavailable to theopponent (see CPLR 3212 [f]), the mere hope that further discovery will reveal theexistence of a triable issue of fact is insufficient to delay determination of the motion (see Williams v D & J School Bus, Inc.,69 AD3d 617, 619 [2010]; Rodgersv City of New York, 34 AD3d 555, 556 [2006]; Wyllie v District Attorney of County of Kings, 2 AD3d 714, 717[2003]; Greenberg v McLaughlin, 242 AD2d 603 [1997]). Accordingly, the SupremeCourt should have granted the City's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint andall cross claims insofar as asserted against it. Dillon, J.P., Balkin, Eng and Chambers, JJ., concur.