Williams v New York City Tr. Auth.
2012 NY Slip Op 03635 [95 AD3d 1003]
May 8, 2012
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 27, 2012


Ruth Williams, Appellant,
v
New York City TransitAuthority, Respondent.

[*1]Subin Associates, LLP (Pollack, Pollack, Isaac & De Cicco, New York, N.Y. [Brian J.Isaac and Michael H. Zhu], of counsel), for appellant.

Wallace D. Gossett, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Lawrence A. Silver of counsel), forrespondent.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by herbrief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Solomon, J.), datedJanuary 7, 2010, as, upon a jury verdict finding that she sustained damages in the sums of$35,000 for future medical expenses, $600,000 for past pain and suffering, and $1,000,000 forfuture pain and suffering, granted those branches of the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR4404 (a) which were to set aside the verdict as to future medical expenses as a matter of law, andto set aside the verdict as to past and future pain and suffering as excessive to the extent ofdirecting a new trial as to those damages unless the parties stipulated to reduce the verdict as topast pain and suffering from the principal sum of $600,000 to the principal sum of $150,000 andas to future pain and suffering from the principal sum of $1,000,000 to the principal sum of$250,000.

Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, on the facts, and in the exercise of discretion,by deleting the provision thereof granting those branches of the defendant's motion pursuant toCPLR 4404 (a) which were to set aside the verdict as to past and future pain and suffering asexcessive to the extent of directing a new trial as to those damages unless the parties stipulated toreduce the verdict as to past pain and suffering from the principal sum of $600,000 to theprincipal sum of $150,000 and as to future pain and suffering from the principal sum of$1,000,000 to the principal sum of $250,000, and substituting therefor a provision granting thosebranches of the defendant's motion to the extent of directing a new trial as to those damagesunless the plaintiff shall serve and file in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court, KingsCounty, a written stipulation consenting to reduce the verdict as to past pain and suffering fromthe principal sum of $600,000 to the principal sum of $200,000, and to reduce the verdict as tofuture pain and suffering from the principal sum of $1,000,000 to the principal sum of $400,000;as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,

Ordered that the time for the plaintiff to serve and file her written stipulation, if she shall beso advised, shall be within 30 days after service upon her of a copy of this decision and order;and it is further,

Ordered that the plaintiff is awarded one bill of costs.[*2]

On June 1, 2001, the then-51-year-old plaintiff suffered abimalleolar fracture of her right ankle as a result of tripping on steps in the Nevins Street subwaystation in Brooklyn. The next day, she underwent open reduction internal fixation surgery inwhich 11 screws were inserted into the lateral and remedial sides of the injured ankle. In theyears that followed, the plaintiff experienced ongoing pain in the injured ankle and, in order toavoid the use of steps, moved from the third floor of her sister's home to the ground level.

The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR4404 (a) which was to set aside the verdict as to future medical expenses as a matter of law, asthere is "no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational[people] to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial"(Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493, 499 [1978]).

Under the circumstances of this case, however, the damages awarded to the plaintiff for pastand future pain and suffering, as reduced by the Supreme Court, deviated materially from whatwould be reasonable compensation to the extent indicated herein (see CPLR 5501 [c]; Eun Sook Maing v Po Ching Fong, 71AD3d 1077, 1078 [2010]; Rivera vLincoln Ctr. for Performing Arts, Inc., 16 AD3d 274 [2005]; cf. Fishbane v Chelsea Hall, LLC, 65AD3d 1079 [2009]). Dillon, J.P., Angiolillo, Belen and Cohen, JJ., concur.


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