| Matter of Kirquel Dev., Ltd. v Planning Bd. of Town ofCortlandt |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 04342 [96 AD3d 754] |
| June 6, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Kirquel Development, Ltd.,Appellant-Respondent, v Planning Board of Town of Cortlandt, Respondent-Appellant.Appellant. |
—[*1] Sive, Paget & Riesel, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Daniel Riesel, Jonathan Kalmuss-Katz, and EdRoggenkamp of counsel), for respondent-appellant.
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Planning Boardof the Town of Cortlandt dated November 3, 2010, adopting a findings statement pursuant to theState Environmental Quality Review Act (ECL art 8) and granting preliminary plat approval for asubdivision of only 16 lots, subject to certain conditions, the petitioner appeals from so much of ajudgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Cacace, J.), entered May 20, 2011, asgranted the petition only to the extent of annulling conditions 5, 6, 13, 14, 15, 21, and 22, and thePlanning Board of the Town of Cortlandt cross-appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much ofthe same judgment as granted those branches of the petition which were to annul conditions 6,21, 22, and so much of conditions 5 and 15 as relate to on-site improvements.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as cross-appealed from, on the law, thosebranches of the petition which were to annul conditions 6, 21, 22, and so much of conditions 5and 15 as relate to on-site improvements are denied, and that portion of the proceeding isdismissed; and it is further,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the Planning Board of the Town of Cortlandt.
The petitioner owns an approximately 53-acre site in the Town of Cortlandt. It applied to thePlanning Board of the Town of Cortlandt (hereinafter the Planning Board) for preliminary platapproval for a 27-lot subdivision to be known as the "Residences at Mill Court Crossing." ThePlanning Board declared itself lead agency for the purposes of the State Environmental QualityReview Act (ECL art 8; hereinafter SEQRA) and, upon concluding that the project would have asignificant impact on the environment, issued a positive declaration. Over the [*2]next few years, hearings were held on the draft and finalenvironmental impact statements, which resulted in the petitioner's reduction of the size of theproject from 27 lots to 21 lots, and then to 19 lots. The Planning Board determined that a furtherreduction in the number of lots was necessary due to the environmental issues specific to theproject site. It approved a SEQRA findings statement and granted preliminary plat approval for asubdivision of 16 lots, with certain conditions.
The petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to review the PlanningBoard's determination, and thereupon to direct the Planning Board to approve the 21-lot plan. Itfurther challenged certain conditions imposed upon the approval. The Supreme Court granted thepetition only to the extent of annulling conditions 5, 6, 13, 14, 15, 21, and 22. The petitionerappeals, and the Planning Board cross-appeals, from stated portions of the judgment.
Judicial review of an agency determination under SEQRA is limited to whether the agencyprocedures were lawful and "whether the agency identified the relevant areas of environmentalconcern, took a hard look at them, and made a reasoned elaboration of the basis for itsdetermination" (Matter of Jackson v New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 NY2d 400,417 [1986] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Riverkeeper, Inc. v Planning Bd. of Town of Southeast, 9NY3d 219, 231-232 [2007]). "In a statutory scheme whose purpose is that the agencydecision-makers focus attention on environmental concerns, it is not the role of the courts toweigh the desirability of any action or choose among alternatives, but to assure that the agencyitself has satisfied SEQRA, procedurally and substantively" (Matter of Jackson v New YorkState Urban Dev. Corp., 67 NY2d at 416). The agency decision should be annulled only if itis arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or affected by an error of law (id.;see Matter of WEOK Broadcasting Corp. v Planning Bd. of Town of Lloyd, 79 NY2d373, 383 [1992]).
Here, the Planning Board fulfilled its obligations under SEQRA by taking a hard look at theenvironmental impacts of the proposed project and issuing a reasoned elaboration for the basis ofits determination to eliminate certain lots from the proposed site plan. Contrary to the petitioner'scontention, SEQRA does not require a lead agency to take a "hard look" at the economicfeasibility of a project (see Matter of Tudor City Assn. v City of New York, 225 AD2d367 [1996]; Coalition Against Lincoln W. v City of New York, 208 AD2d 472 [1994],affd 86 NY2d 123 [1995]; Matter of Nixbot Realty Assoc. v New York State UrbanDev. Corp., 193 AD2d 381 [1993]). Given the environmental constraints of the site,including numerous steep slopes, the existence of wetlands, and the inclusion of the site in abiodiversity corridor, the Planning Board's determination to eliminate certain lots and approve a16-lot plan, rather than the 21-lot plan, was rational and not arbitrary and capricious (seeCode of Town of Cortlandt § 259-2 [I]; cf. Matter of Chase Partners, LLC v Incorporated Vil. of Rockville Ctr.,43 AD3d 1053 [2007]). While the petitioner's biodiversity expert disputed the conclusionsof the Planning Board's expert, the choice between conflicting expert testimony rests in thediscretion of the Planning Board (seeMatter of Brooklyn Bridge Park Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v New York State, 50 AD3d1029 [2008]; Matter of Ball v NewYork State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 35 AD3d 732 [2006]). Moreover, thepetitioner's allegations of an ulterior purpose on the part of the Planning Board find no factualsupport in the record, and are insufficient to demonstrate bad faith (see Matter of Aspen Cr. Estates, Ltd. vTown of Brookhaven, 47 AD3d 267, 275 [2007], affd 12 NY3d 735 [2009],cert denied 558 US —, 130 S Ct 96 [2009]). Accordingly, the Supreme Courtproperly denied those branches of the petition which were to annul the determination based onalleged violations of SEQRA, and thereupon to direct the Planning Board to approve the 21-lotplan, rather than a 16-lot plan.
The Supreme Court should have also denied those branches of the petition which were toannul conditions 6, 21, 22, and so much of conditions 5 and 15 as relate to on-site improvements.Conditions may be properly imposed upon subdivision approval " 'so long as there is areasonable relationship between the problem sought to be alleviated and the applicationconcerning the property' " (Matter ofInternational Innovative Tech. Group Corp. v Planning Bd. of Town of Woodbury, N.Y., 20AD3d 531, 533 [2005], quoting Matter of Mackall v White, 85 AD2d 696, 696[1981]; see Town Law § 276; Code of Town of Cortlandt § 265-8). Here,requisite findings were made for the imposition of a recreational fee (see Town Law§ 277 [4]; Code of Town of Cortlandt § 265-11 [B] [3]; Matter of BayswaterRealty & Capital Corp. v Planning Bd. of Town of Lewisboro, [*3]76 NY2d 460, 467-469 [1990]; Matter of Sepco Ventures vPlanning Bd. of Town of Woodbury, 230 AD2d 913 [1996]). In addition, the inspection feewas proper (see Kencar Assoc., LLC vTown of Kent, 27 AD3d 423 [2006]). Moreover, those conditions which requiredcompletion of specific construction details to the satisfaction of the Town's Director of TechnicalServices were proper, and not an unconstitutional delegation of authority (see Code ofTown of Cortlandt § 77-2). The additional conditions challenged by the petitioner wereproperly upheld. Skelos, J.P., Florio, Roman and Miller, JJ., concur.