People v O'Toole
2012 NY Slip Op 04381 [96 AD3d 435]
June 7, 2012
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 1, 2012


The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Donald O'Toole, Appellant.

[*1]Steven Banks, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Katheryne M. Martone of counsel),for appellant.

Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Timothy C. Stone of counsel), forrespondent.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Lewis Bart Stone, J.), rendered October 14,2008, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of robbery in the second degree, and sentencinghim, as a second violent felony offender, to a term of 15 years, unanimously reversed, on the law,and the matter remanded for a new trial.

At defendant's first trial, which resulted in a reversal by this Court (39 AD3d 419 [2007]),defendant was convicted of second-degree robbery but acquitted of first-degree robbery and twocounts of attempted second-degree grand larceny. Therefore, under the facts presented, thePeople were barred by collateral estoppel from presenting evidence at the retrial that defendant'saccomplice pointed what appeared to be a pistol at the complaining witness during the allegedrobbery, and that defendant also attempted to extort regular payments of protection money fromthe complaining witness on the day of the robbery and on a later occasion. The court erred inallowing the introduction of this evidence.

"The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, operates in a criminal prosecution tobar relitigation of issues necessarily resolved in [a] defendant's favor at an earlier trial"(People v Acevedo, 69 NY2d 478, 484 [1987]). "[C]ourts considering such claims mustgive a practical, rational reading to the record of the first trial" (id. at 487).

Characterizing the acquittals as resulting from inadequate corroboration of the complainingwitness's testimony, the People urge this Court to treat this scenario in the same manner as casesin which a defendant is acquitted of crimes subject to the statutory requirement that the testimonyof an accomplice be corroborated. This argument is unavailing. When a statutory corroborationrequirement governs, the possibility exists that an acquittal flows not from a factual issue beingresolved in the defendant's favor as a purely factual matter, but "merely [because] the People hadnot met the requirement of corroboration" (People v Goodman, [*2]69 NY2d 32, 42 [1986]). The same cannot be said here, where nostatutory corroboration requirement was applicable.

In view of this disposition, we do not reach defendant's other contentions.Concur—Gonzalez, P.J., Friedman, Renwick, Manzanet-Daniels and Román, JJ.


NYPTI Decisions © 2026 is a project of New York Prosecutors Training Institute (NYPTI) made possible by leveraging the work we've done providing online research and tools to prosecutors.

NYPTI would like to thank New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, New York State Senate's Open Legislation Project, New York State Unified Court System, New York State Law Reporting Bureau and Free Law Project for their invaluable assistance making this project possible.

Install the free RECAP extensions to help contribute to this archive. See https://free.law/recap/ for more information.