| People v DePonceau |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 04457 [96 AD3d 1345] |
| June 8, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Victor A.DePonceau, Appellant. |
—[*1] Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Nicole M. Fantigrossi of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (Stephen R. Sirkin, A.J.), renderedFebruary 22, 2008. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of conspiracy in thesecond degree (two counts) and conspiracy in the fifth degree (two counts).
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him, upon a jury verdict, of twocounts each of conspiracy in the second degree (Penal Law § 105.15) and conspiracy in thefifth degree (§ 105.05 [1]), defendant contends that the August 5, 2005 extension to theeavesdropping warrant violated CPL 700.20 (2) (b) (iv), which was applicable to the extensionpursuant to CPL 700.40. Inasmuch as defendant moved to suppress conversations interceptedpursuant to the warrant on a different ground at trial, he failed to preserve his present contentionon appeal for our review (see People v Manuli, 156 AD2d 388 [1989], lv denied75 NY2d 870 [1990]; see also People v Di Stefano, 38 NY2d 640, 646-647 [1976];see generally People v Tutt, 38 NY2d 1011, 1012-1013 [1976]; People v Poole, 55 AD3d 1354,1355 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 929 [2009]). We decline to exercise our power toreview that contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15[6] [a]).
Defendant further contends that County Court erred in allowing him to proceed pro se at trialbecause his waiver of the right to counsel was not unequivocal, voluntary and intelligent. Wereject that contention. Throughout these proceedings, defendant had four separate attorneysassigned to represent him. He was not satisfied with any of them and sought to have eachreplaced. The court properly denied defendant's request to appoint a fifth attorney inasmuch asdefendant did not present good cause for a substitution of counsel (see People v Medina,44 NY2d 199, 207-208 [1978]; cf. People v Sides, 75 NY2d 822, 824-825 [1990]). Whenfaced with the denial of his request, defendant, "who was not totally unfamiliar with criminalprocedure, so determinedly and so unequivocally insisted on rejecting counsel and proceeding[pro se], the court had no recourse but to permit him to do so" (Medina, 44 NY2d at 209;see People v Allen, 4 AD3d479 [2004], lv denied 2 NY3d 795 [2004]; People v Robinson, 244 AD2d364 [1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 879 [1997]). We likewise conclude that the courtconducted the requisite" 'searching inquiry' to insure that defendant's request to proceed pro se was accompanied by a'knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel' " (People v Providence, 2 NY3d 579,580 [2004], quoting People v Arroyo, 98 NY2d 101, 103 [2002]; see People vDuffy, 299 AD2d [*2]914 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d628 [2003]; People v Outlaw, 184 AD2d 665 [1992], lv denied 80 NY2d 932[1992]).
We reject defendant's further contention that the court's imposition of consecutive sentencesof an indeterminate term of incarceration of 10 to 20 years on each count of conspiracy in thesecond degree was illegal. "[S]entences imposed for two or more offenses may not runconsecutively: (1) where a single act constitutes two offenses, or (2) where a single actconstitutes one of the offenses and a material element of the other" (People v Laureano,87 NY2d 640, 643 [1996]; see Penal Law § 70.25 [2]; People v Arroyo, 93NY2d 990, 991 [1999]). "In resolving whether concurrent sentences are required, the sentencingcourt must first examine the statutory definitions of the crimes for which defendant has beenconvicted . . . [and] . . . determine whether the actus reuselement is, by definition, the same for both offenses (under the first prong of the statute), or if theactus reus for one offense is, by definition, a material element of the second offense(under the second prong). If it is neither, then the People have satisfied their obligation ofshowing that concurrent sentences are not required" (People v Taveras, 12 NY3d 21, 25 [2009] [internal quotation marksomitted]). The crime of conspiracy in the second degree has two elements: the agreement tocommit or to cause the commission of a class A felony (Penal Law § 105.15), and theovert act in furtherance thereof (see § 105.20; People v McGee, 49 NY2d48, 57-58 [1979], cert denied sub nom. Waters v New York, 446 US 942 [1980];People v Hamilton, 263 AD2d 966, 967, appeal dismissed 94 NY2d 915 [1999];cf. People v Hiladrio, 291 AD2d 221, 222 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 676[2002]; People v Miller, 284 AD2d 724, 725 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 685[2001]). Both elements constitute a distinct actus reus.
We conclude that the People satisfied their obligation of showing that concurrent sentencesare not required. Addressing first the second prong of Penal Law § 70.25 (2), we concludethat, by definition, the actus rei of conspiracy, i.e., the agreement and an overt act, are notmaterial elements of a second offense of conspiracy.
With respect to the first prong of Penal Law § 70.25 (2), the statutory elements ofcounts one and two are, by definition, identical inasmuch as they charge the same offense. That,however, does not end the inquiry. Even where there is some overlap in the elements of multiplestatutory offenses, consecutive sentences can still be imposed if the People can demonstrate thatthe " 'acts or omissions' committed by defendant were separate and distinct acts"(Laureano, 87 NY2d at 643; seePeople v Frazier, 16 NY3d 36, 41 [2010]). Defendant contends that, because many ofthe overt acts alleged in the indictment are the same for both offenses, it is impossible to knowwhether the acts or omissions committed by defendant were separate and distinct actusrei. We conclude, however, that defendant's contention lacks merit. Where, as here, adefendant agrees to commit or to cause the commission of two separate and distinct class Afelonies, i.e., the murder of two individuals, there are in fact two separate and distinctagreements, even if the same overt act is committed in furtherance of each. Thus, we concludethat the acts committed by defendant, i.e., the separate and distinct agreements, were separate anddistinct acts (cf. People v Kadry, 63AD3d 856, 857, appeal dismissed 13 NY3d 903 [2009]). Finally, we conclude thatthe sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. Present—Scudder, P.J., Centra, Peradotto,Lindley and Martoche, JJ.