| Steinsvaag v City of New York |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 04992 [96 AD3d 932] |
| June 20, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Shane Steinsvaag, Appellant, v City of New York et al.,Respondents, et al., Defendants. |
—[*1] Cerussi & Spring, P.C., White Plains, N.Y. (Jennifer R. Freedman and Jennifer L.Christiansen of counsel), for respondents.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by hisbrief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kerrigan, J.), enteredFebruary 8, 2011, as granted those branches of the motion of the defendants City of New York,New York City Department of Education, and Leon D. DeMatteis Construction Corporationwhich were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging common-lawnegligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200 and 241 (6) insofar as assertedagainst them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The plaintiff, an apprentice carpenter, was assisting a coworker in carrying door bucks off atruck and into a construction site. While walking along a ramp that was wet from precipitation,the door buck that the plaintiff and his coworker were carrying struck the plaintiff in his rightshoulder, allegedly resulting in personal injuries. The plaintiff, attributing the accident to hiscoworker having lost his grip on the door buck after slipping on the ramp, commenced this actionalleging, among other things, common-law negligence and violations of Labor Law§§ 200 and 241 (6), the latter of which was predicated on a violation of 12 NYCRR23-1.7 (d). The defendants City of New York, the New York City Department of Education, andLeon D. DeMatteis Construction Corporation (hereinafter collectively the defendants), moved,inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging common-lawnegligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200 and 241 (6) insofar as assertedagainst them on the ground that, among other things, the plaintiff could not identify the cause ofhis coworker's slip without engaging in speculation.
In order for liability to be imposed for violations of the Labor Law and common-lawnegligence, the violations or negligence must be a proximate cause of the accident (see McCormack v Universal Carpet &Upholstery Cleaners, 29 AD3d 542, 544 [2006]; Weingarten v Windsor Owners Corp., 5 AD3d 674, 676 [2004])."Proximate cause may be established without direct evidence of causation, by inference from thecircumstances of the accident; however, mere speculation as to the cause of an accident, whenthere could have been many possible causes, is fatal to a cause of action" (Costantino v Webel, 57 AD3d472, 472 [2008]; see Bolde vBorgata Hotel Casino & Spa, 70 AD3d 617, 618 [2010]). Here, the defendants met theirburden of establishing their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law bydemonstrating that the plaintiff could not establish that his coworker lost his grip on the doorbuck because he slipped on a wet ramp without relying on speculative or inadmissible hearsayevidence (see Mallen v FarmingdaleLanes, LLC, 89 AD3d 996, 997 [2011]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise atriable issue of fact. The affidavit submitted by the plaintiff in opposition to the defendants'motion, which contradicted his earlier deposition testimony, raised only a feigned issue of fact(see Rivera v Glen Oaks Vil. Owners,Inc., 41 AD3d 817, 821 [2007]; Stancil v Supermarkets Gen., 16 AD3d 402, 403 [2005]).Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the defendants' motionwhich were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging common-lawnegligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200 and 241 (6) insofar as assertedagainst them.
The plaintiff's remaining contention is academic in light of our determination. Balkin, J.P.,Chambers, Hall and Austin, JJ., concur. [Prior Case History: 2011 NY Slip Op30425(U).]