| Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, N.Y. v New York State Workers'Compensation Bd. |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 05062 [96 AD3d 1288] |
| June 21, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, New York, on Behalf of Itselfand All Others Similarly Situated, Appellant, v New York State Workers' Compensation Boardet al., Respondents. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Paul Groenwegen of counsel), for NewYork State Workers' Compensation Board and others, respondents. Steven M. Licht, Special Funds Conservation Committee (Jill B. Singer of counsel), forSpecial Funds Conservation Committee, respondent.
Mercure, J.P. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Connolly, J.), entered April 21,2011 in Albany County, which granted defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint.
Plaintiff, a self-insured employer, requested reimbursement from defendant SpecialDisability Fund (hereinafter the Fund) in June 2010 for benefits paid to three claimants who wereinjured prior to 1994. The Workers' Compensation Board previously determined that plaintiffwas entitled to reimbursement from the Fund pursuant to Workers' Compensation Law §15 (8) (d) on these three claims, and plaintiff has been reimbursed numerous times for benefitspaid to these claimants. Plaintiff's June 2010 requests, however, were rejected as untimely bydefendant Special Funds Conservation Committee—which evaluates section 15 (8)reimbursement requests—pursuant to 2007 legislation reforming the workers'compensation system. As relevant here, the extensive reforms included amendments to Workers'Compensation Law § 15 (8) intended to close the Fund by barring new claims andinstituting a requirement that requests for [*2]reimbursement onestablished claims be filed by the later of one year after payment of benefits or one year after theeffective date of the law, March 13, 2007 (see Workers' Compensation Law § 15[8] [h] [2]; § 2 [19], [20]; seegenerally Matter of Raynor v Landmark Chrysler, 18 NY3d 48, 53 [2011]).
Plaintiff's June 2010 requests for reimbursement covered payments made between November2004 and April 2009; it does not dispute that the requests were untimely under the filingdeadlines imposed by the 2007 legislation. Rather, in this action, plaintiff asserts claims of actualand constructive trust, conversion and unjust enrichment, and seeks an accounting, injunctiverelief and a declaration that the time limitation in Workers' Compensation Law § 15 (8) (h)(2) (B) is unconstitutional. Supreme Court granted defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint,prompting this appeal.
We affirm. At all times relevant here, the Fund was financed by assessments made againstinsurance carriers, including self-insurers, based upon the total disbursements paid from the Fundin the previous year (see Workers' Compensation Law § 15 [8] [h] [4]; former [h]).Plaintiff alleges that it had a property interest in the assessments that it paid into the Fund or acontractual right to the money in the Fund itself, and that the time limitation on reimbursementrequests that was added by Workers' Compensation Law § 15 (8) (h) (2) (B) constitutesboth an unconstitutional deprivation of that interest without due process of law and a takingwithout compensation. We disagree, and conclude that Supreme Court properly dismissed thecomplaint.
Absent any statutory language granting carriers a property right in their assessments or theFund itself, there is no constitutionally protected property interest therein arising by reason of thefact that the moneys to be used in reimbursing carriers are derived from assessments on them(see Methodist Hosp. of Brooklyn v State Ins. Fund, 102 AD2d 367, 378 [1984],affd 64 NY2d 365 [1985], appeal dismissed 474 US 801 [1985]; cf. Allianceof Am. Insurers v Chu, 77 NY2d 573, 579-580, 585 [1991] [holding that the state could notappropriate to its general fund the earnings or assets of the Property and Liability InsuranceSecurity Fund in light of a prior statute granting contributors to that fund rights in the incomegenerated by their contributions]). Nor does plaintiff point to any statutory language"manifest[ing] a legislative intent to create private rights of a contractual nature enforceableagainst the State" (Medical Socy. of State of N.Y. v Sobol, 192 AD2d 78, 81 [1993],appeal dismissed 82 NY2d 802 [1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 917 [1994], certdenied 511 US 1152 [1994] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; seeMethodist Hosp. of Brooklyn v State Ins. Fund, 64 NY2d at 377). Indeed, the statuteprovides that the assessments are deposited "for the benefit of [the] [F]und" (Workers'Compensation Law § 15 [8] [h] [4]; former [h]).
To the extent that plaintiff, having received "benefits under statutory and administrativestandards defining eligibility for them[,] has an interest in continued receipt of those benefits thatis safeguarded by procedural due process" (Board of Regents of State Colleges v Roth,408 US 564, 576 [1972]; see Methodist Hosp. of Brooklyn v State Ins. Fund, 102 AD2dat 380), we conclude that it received constitutionally adequate process. "In altering substantiverights through enactment of rules of general applicability, a legislature generally providesconstitutionally adequate process simply by enacting the statute, publishing it, and. . . affording those within the statute's reach a reasonable opportunity both tofamiliarize themselves with the general requirements imposed and to comply with thoserequirements" (United States v Locke, 471 US 84, 108 [1985]; see Held v State of New York Workers'Compensation Bd., 85 AD3d 35, 46 [2011], lv dismissed and denied 17 NY3d837 [2011], cert denied, 132 S Ct 1906 [Apr. 16, [*3]2012]). With respect to legislation that is "retroactive" in the sensethat it shortens a limitations period for claims that accrued prior to the statute's effective date(see Brothers v Florence, 95 NY2d 290, 299-300 [2000]), due process is satisfied whenthe Legislature expressly sets a "reasonable grace period" (id. at 301). Moreover, courtsdefer to the Legislature's determination of what constitutes a reasonable period (see id.).Here, the enactment and publication of the 2007 legislation provided sufficient notice of thestatute, and the statutory grace period of at least one year gave plaintiff ample time in which tobecome familiar with the new limitations period and to comply with it (see id. at303-305; Held v State of New York Workers' Compensation Bd., 85 AD3d at 46).
Finally, the statute at issue here did not work a taking of any property right that plaintiff mayhave had inasmuch as plaintiff's expectation of reimbursement "can continue to be realized aslong as [it] complies with reasonable regulatory restrictions the [L]egislature has imposed"(United States v Locke, 471 US at 107). That is, it was plaintiff's own "failure to file ontime—not the action of [the Legislature]—that caused [its reimbursement] right tobe extinguished" (id.) and, thus, its takings claim fails.
Plaintiff's remaining arguments, to the extent not addressed by our decision, have beenconsidered and found to be lacking in merit.
Rose, Stein, Garry and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.