People ex rel. Kuby v Merritt
2012 NY Slip Op 05071 [96 AD3d 607]
June 21, 2012
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 1, 2012


The People of the State of New York ex rel. Ronald L. Kuby, onBehalf of Gigi Jordan, Appellant,
v
Darlene Merritt,Respondent.

—[*1]Ronald L. Kuby, New York (Alan M. Dershowitz, of the bar of the State ofMassachusetts, admitted pro hac vice, of counsel), for appellant.

Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Aaron Ginandes of counsel), forrespondent.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Larry Stephen, J.), entered September 21,2011, denying the writ of habeas corpus and dismissing the petition, unanimously affirmed,without costs.

In February 2010, petitioner, Gigi Jordan, was charged with second-degree murder stemmingfrom allegations that she intentionally caused the death of her eight-year-old autistic son bygiving him an overdose of prescription medication. Petitioner also ingested a number of pills andleft a suicide note stating that her son's death was the only way to protect him from his allegedlyabusive father and that she did not wish to live without him.

Following arraignment, petitioner asked the court to set bail in the amount of $5 million,with a specific condition that she be released to a psychiatric facility. Supreme Court (DanielFitzGerald J.) denied the request and remanded petitioner with the understanding that theapplication could be renewed before the assigned judge. On renewal, petitioner offered to post a$5 million bond fully secured by her New York City properties, and to freeze her assets,allegedly totaling approximately $40 million, by placing them in an escrow account to bemanaged by two named attorneys. She also proposed that her release be conditioned on a securitypackage providing that she would be confined to her Manhattan brownstone and monitored roundthe clock by on-premises armed security guards and an electronic G.P.S. system, at her ownexpense, and on her continued psychiatric treatment.

By order dated April 23, 2010, Supreme Court (Charles Solomon, J.), considering the factorsenumerated in CPL 510.30 (2) (a), denied the application. Petitioner, by new counsel, moved forreconsideration of bail "under the same conditions and restrictions that apply to DominiqueStrauss-Kahn." By order dated August 11, 2010, Justice Solomon denied the application. Afterhearing argument, Justice Stephen denied the writ of habeas corpus and dismissed the petition onthe ground that it "[could] not say based on the seriousness of this case and all of the otherfactors laid out at these bail hearings that [Justice Solomon] did abuse his [*2]discretion."[FN*]

"The action of the bail-fixing court is nonappealable, but may be reviewed in a habeas corpusproceeding if it appears that the constitutional or statutory standards inhibiting excessive bail orthe arbitrary refusal of bail are violated" (People ex rel. Rosenthal v Wolfson, 48 NY2d230, 231-233 [1979] [internal quotation marks omitted]). It is not the function of the habeas courtto "examine the bail question afresh or to make a de novo determination of bail" (id.[internal quotation marks omitted]). The scope of inquiry is whether or not the bail courtabused its discretion by denying bail without reason or for reasons insufficient in law (id.;People ex rel. Hunt v Warden of Rikers Is. Correctional Facility, 161 AD2d 475 [1990],lv denied 76 NY2d 703 [1990]). Where the record shows that the bail court consideredthe factors enumerated in CPL 510.30 (2) (a), and the "denial is supported by the record, it is anexercise of discretion resting on a rational basis and thus beyond correction in habeas corpus"(People ex rel. Parker v Hasenauer, 62 NY2d 777, 778-779 [1984]; see also People exrel. Lazer v Warden, N.Y. County Men's House of Detention, 79 NY2d 839 [1992]).

Applying these principles, Justice Stephen properly found that Justice Solomon'sdetermination denying the bail application was "an exercise of discretion resting on a rationalbasis" (People ex rel. Parone v Phimister, 29 NY2d 580, 581 [1971]). "The recordsupports the bail court's determination, based upon the factors enumerated in CPL 510.30 (2) (a),that petitioner is a flight risk, given the severity of the crime charged, . . . thelikelihood of a conviction and lengthy sentence, [the lack of strong ties to this community] andthe financial resources petitioner could use to facilitate flight, including [the possibility of]property outside the jurisdiction" (People ex rel. Litman v Warden of Manhattan House of Detention, 23AD3d 258 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 708 [2006]; People ex rel. Schreiber vWarden of Queens House of Detention for Men, 282 AD2d 555 [2001]). This is not anappropriate case for granting bail under special conditions, particularly in light of petitioner'smental instability (see People ex rel. Hunt, 161 AD2d at 475). There is a sufficient basisin the record for concern that petitioner may not be capable of consistently controlling her fearsand impulses, which in the past have led to flight.

Nor are we persuaded by petitioner's argument that the bail court's determination wasarbitrary because the court failed to expressly rule on the adequacy of her security package. In itsApril 23, 2010 decision, the bail court discussed the security package in detail, but nonethelessconcluded that "no amount of bail, even when coupled with the very stringent conditionsproposed by the defense, can adequately assure defendant's return to court." On renewal, thesecurity package proposed was essentially the same, and in its August 11, 2011 decision, the bailcourt stated that it "reconsidered its prior decision in light of the new arguments made and stillfeels that the setting of bail is inappropriate."

The bail court also explained why it rejected petitioner's contention that the bail conditionsgranted for Dominique Strauss-Kahn compelled the grant of bail here. The court rationallyobserved that the only similarity between the cases was that both defendants had the financialmeans to post significant bail and pay for a private security team to monitor them. However,unlike Strauss-Kahn's case, this case involves the murder of a child, a more serious [*3]charge than the charge against Strauss-Kahn, and a greaterpossibility of conviction, given that petitioner's defense of "altruistic filicide" has not beensuccessfully advanced in any court in this country, which together provide a greater incentive toflee. Further, Strauss-Kahn's mental condition was not at issue in his case. Petitioner'scompromised mental state bears directly on her judgment, making her more willing to undertakeextreme and even dangerous measures in an effort to abscond.

Petitioner's position, if accepted, would mandate that bail be granted in every case in whichthe accused has the financial resources to offer private security and monitoring, thereby deprivingthe court of its discretion to grant or deny bail on consideration of the factors enumerated in CPL510.30 (2) (a). While petitioner claims that her security package is foolproof and trumps all otherfactors, the fact remains that no ad hoc arrangement based on keeping a defendant in her privatehome under the watch of a security firm that she hired could be as secure as remand. Indeed,petitioner is an accomplished woman who accumulated vast financial resources. She has movedaround repeatedly, and on previous occasions endeavored to conceal her tracks in doing so.While petitioner contends that she provided an explanation for a $14.5 million transfer from aSwiss bank to the United States, the concern that the bail court expressed that her disclosure wasinadequate and that she might have other undisclosed assets was not eliminated. Thus, as therespondent argues, it is not inconceivable that petitioner could by stealth or promise manipulateher way to freedom.

Petitioner also argues that the court did not properly take into account the new evidence shesubmitted in her renewed bail application regarding her mental condition, her community ties,her financial circumstances, and the likelihood of conviction. However, while the reports indicatethat petitioner's mental condition has stabilized, she still suffers from depression. Further, hermental condition was so extreme at the time of the initial application, and such extensivepsychiatric treatment was required, that it is rational to conclude that her mental condition at thetime of the renewed application remained questionable.

While petitioner presented additional facts intended to demonstrate community ties, the bailcourt accurately noted that she had resided in various states and did not have family in New YorkCity. These facts support the court's conclusion that she was a flight risk. While the court madeobservations regarding the overwhelming evidence against petitioner and the sentence she faces,it did not place undue weight on those factors or otherwise abuse its discretion.

We have considered and rejected petitioner's remaining claims, including all her proceduralarguments. Concur—Tom, J.P., Andrias, DeGrasse, Richter and Román, JJ.

Footnotes


Footnote *: On September 22, 2011, aJustice of this Court denied petitioner's request for bail on an interim basis pending appeal. OnNovember 10, 2011, this Court denied petitioner's motion for bail pending appeal (2011 NY SlipOp 89516 [2011]).


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