| People v Granger |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 05276 [96 AD3d 1669] |
| June 29, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Shawn G.Granger, Appellant. (Appeal No. 3.) |
—[*1] Shawn G. Granger, defendant-appellant pro se. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Hannah Stith Long of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Jefferson County Court (Kim H. Martusewicz, J.), renderedMay 26, 2010. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal sale of acontrolled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in thethird degree (two counts).
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of criminalsale of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.39 [1]) and two countsof criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (§ 220.16 [1], [12]),defendant contends that his plea was involuntary based on allegedly coercive statements made byCounty Court during a pretrial conference with respect to defendant's sentencing exposure.Because he did not move to withdraw his plea or to vacate the judgment of conviction on thatground, defendant failed to preserve that contention for our review (see People v Jackson, 64 AD3d1248, 1249 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 745 [2009]; People v Lando, 61 AD3d 1389[2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 746 [2009]), and we decline to exercise our power to reviewthat contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]).
Defendant further contends that the court erred in conducting the Darden hearing incamera rather than in open court, and that the police did not timely file the search warrant returnwith the court, as required by CPL 690.50 (5). By pleading guilty, however, defendant forfeitedthose contentions. It is well settled that "[a] guilty plea generally results in a forfeiture of the rightto appellate review of any nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings" (People vFernandez, 67 NY2d 686, 688 [1986]), and defendant's contentions regarding theDarden hearing and the search warrant return do not fall within the exception to thegeneral rule set forth in CPL 710.70 (2) for an order "finally denying a motion to suppressevidence" (see generally People v Petgen, 55 NY2d 529, 534 n 2 [1982], rearg denied57 NY2d 674 [1982]).
Although defendant's constitutional speedy trial challenge survives his guilty plea (see[*2]People v Blakley, 34 NY2d 311, 314 [1974]; People v Faro, 83 AD3d 1569,1569 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 858 [2011]), we conclude that it lacks merit. In view ofthe complex undercover investigation that led to defendant's arrest, the serious nature of thecharges and the lack of prejudice to defendant, we conclude that the seven-month delay betweendefendant's commission of the first crime charged and his arrest and arraignment did not violatehis constitutional right to a speedy trial (see People v Jenkins, 2 AD3d 1390, 1390-1391 [2003]; Peoplev Morobel, 273 AD2d 871 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 906 [2000]; see generallyPeople v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 445 [1975]).
Defendant's contention that he received ineffective assistance of counsel does not survive hisguilty plea because "[t]here is no showing that the plea bargaining process was infected by anyallegedly ineffective assistance or that defendant entered the plea because of his attorney['s]allegedly poor performance" (People v Burke, 256 AD2d 1244 [1998], lv denied93 NY2d 851 [1999]). In any event, we reject defendant's contention that his attorney wasineffective based solely on his failure to file a demand for a bill of particulars (see generallyPeople v Ford, 86 NY2d 397, 404 [1995]). Indeed, although defendant was eligible forsentencing as a persistent felony offender and faced consecutive sentences on multiple criminaltransactions, defense counsel negotiated a favorable plea agreement pursuant to which defendantreceived concurrent sentences aggregating eight years in prison with three years of postreleasesupervision.
We have reviewed defendant's remaining contentions, including those advanced in his pro sesupplemental brief, and conclude that none requires reversal or modification of the judgment.Present—Scudder, P.J., Smith, Centra, Lindley and Martoche, JJ.