| People v Stickler |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 05348 [97 AD3d 854] |
| July 5, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Steven C. Stickler, Appellant. |
—[*1] Weeden A. Wetmore, District Attorney, Elmira (John R. Thweatt of counsel), forrespondent.
Mercure, J.P. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Chemung County (Hayden, J.),rendered October 13, 2011, convicting defendant following a nonjury trial of the crimes ofvehicular manslaughter in the second degree and driving while intoxicated (two counts).
Defendant was charged in an indictment with vehicular manslaughter in the second degreeand driving while intoxicated (two counts) after operating a John Deere "Gator" utility vehicle ona public road while he was intoxicated and, in doing so, causing the death of Joshua Long, hispassenger. Long was killed when he was ejected from the vehicle as defendant allegedly droveoff the road onto gravel and dirt, and then corrected the deviation of the vehicle's course.Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that Penal Law § 125.12,defining vehicular manslaughter, is unconstitutional. Upon County Court's denial of the motion,defendant waived his right to a jury trial, and agreed to a "bench trial[ ] conducted on stipulatedfacts," with the expectation that County Court would sentence him to no more than a year in jailif he was convicted (People v Harler, 296 AD2d 712, 713-714 [2002]). The court founddefendant guilty as charged and sentenced him to five years of probation, with six months to be[*2]served in the county jail.[FN1]Defendant appeals and we now reverse his vehicular manslaughter conviction and remit thismatter to County Court.
As relevant here, "[a] person is guilty of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree whenhe or she causes the death of another person, and . . . operates a motor vehicle. . . in violation of [Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (2) or (3)], and as a resultof such intoxication . . . operates such motor vehicle . . . in a mannerthat causes the death of such other person" (Penal Law § 125.12 [1]). If it is establishedthat the defendant was unlawfully intoxicated or impaired while operating the vehicle, "thereshall be a rebuttable presumption that, as a result of such intoxication . . . , [thedefendant] operated the motor vehicle . . . in a manner that caused such death"(Penal Law § 125.12). Defendant argues that the statute—which he interprets asproviding that causation must be both proved by the People and presumed until disproved by thedefendant—is contradictory and void for vagueness. Defendant further contends that therebuttable presumption impermissibly relieves the People of the burden of proving causation byrequiring—he maintains—that if a defendant is driving while intoxicated and adeath occurs, criminal liability for the death will attach even absent proof that the vehicle wasoperated in a deficient manner or that the manner of operation of the vehicle was a sufficientlydirect cause of death. In our view, defendant misinterprets the statute.
In 2005, the legislature amended the statutes defining the crimes of vehicular assault andvehicular manslaughter (see Penal Law §§ 120.03, 120.04, 125.12, 125.13;L 2005, ch 39). The amendments "eliminate[d] criminal negligence as a required element of eachof the crimes, and provided that after the People establish that the defendant driver causedserious injury or death, a rebuttable presumption would arise that the serious injury or death wascaused by the driver's intoxication, impairment or use of a drug" (People v Mojica, 62 AD3d 100,108-109 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 856 [2009]; see L 2005, ch 39). Thelegislative history of the 2005 amendments indicates that they were intended to strengthen thedeterrent effect of the relevant statutes by eliminating the heavy prosecutorial burden of provingcriminal negligence and "creat[ing] a ca[us]al link between a driver who causes serious physicalinjury or death and a presumption that it was his or her intoxication or impairment that was thecause o[f] such serious physical injury or death" (Assembly Sponsor's Mem in Support, BillJacket, L 2005, ch 39 at 3).
The presumption, "like all other statutory presumptions in New York, is permissive"(Matter of Raquel M., 99 NY2d 92, 95 [2002]; see People v Baker, 14 Misc 3d 629, 631 [2006]). It "allows, butdoes not require, the trier of fact to accept the presumed fact, and does not shift to the defendantthe burden of proof" (Matter of Raquel M., 99 NY2d at 95; see County Court ofUlster Cty. v Allen, 442 US 140, 156-157 [1979]).[FN2]A permissive presumption will be found to [*3]undermine thefactfinder's responsibility at trial " 'only if, under the facts of the case, there is no rational way thetrier [of fact] could make the connection permitted by the inference' " (Matter of RaquelM., 99 NY2d at 95-96, quoting County Court of Ulster Cty. v Allen, 442 US at 157).We note that a presumption is rational if it is "more likely than not that the presumed fact flowsfrom [the] basic facts [to be] proved by the State" (Matter of Raquel M., 99 NY2d at 96),and the legislature's judgment in that regard is to be given great deference by the courts, if thatjudgment is based on common experience or reliable, empirical data (People v Leyva, 38NY2d 160, 165-166 [1975]).
Contrary to defendant's argument that the statute improperly relieves the People from provingthat the charged conduct was a sufficiently direct cause of death, the statutory terms expresslyprovide that the rebuttable presumption arises only "[i]f it is established that the person operatingsuch motor vehicle . . . caused such death while unlawfully intoxicated"(Penal Law § 125.12 [emphasis added]). Thus, as the Second Department has explained,"if a driver's operation of a vehicle cannot be deemed [the] cause of the subject accident, then therebuttable presumption would not arise" (People v Mojica, 62 AD3d at 110). Defendant'schallenges to the statute are undermined by his failure to distinguish between the separateelements of causation to which the statute refers. The People must establish that a defendant, inoperating a vehicle while unlawfully intoxicated, caused the victim's death; only then may thejury draw an inference regarding the second element of causation—that it was the driver'sintoxication that caused him or her to operate the vehicle in a dangerous manner.
In our view, the rebuttable presumption does not render the statute vague inasmuch as "itcontains sufficient standards to afford a reasonable degree of certainty so that a person ofordinary intelligence is not forced to guess at its meaning, and to safeguard against arbitraryenforcement" (Salvatore v City of Schenectady, 139 AD2d 87, 89 [1988] [citationsomitted]; see People v Mojica, 62 AD3d at 111-113). Moreover, according deference tothe legislature's judgment, "there is a fair and rational connection" between the fact that adefendant caused death or serious physical injury by operating a vehicle while impaired byalcohol and the presumption that it was the alcohol impairment that caused the defendant tooperate the vehicle in a dangerous manner (Matter of Raquel M., 99 NY2d at 96). Here,defendant stipulated that he operated a vehicle while unlawfully intoxicated, the vehicle deviatedfrom its course, Long fell out of the vehicle as defendant corrected the deviation, Long struck hishead and died as a result of injuries sustained in the fall, and defendant caused the death of Longwhile unlawfully intoxicated. Based upon these admissions, it cannot be said that there is "norational way" that the factfinder could conclude that defendant's intoxication caused him tooperate the vehicle in such a manner as to result in Long's death (County Court of Ulster Cty.v Allen, 442 US at 157).
That said, County Court nevertheless erred by treating the statutory presumption asmandatory, rather than permissive (see Matter of Raquel M., 99 NY2d at 96 n), andtherefore did not make the necessary finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, thecourt concluded that the presumption mandates a finding of guilt whenever "the defendant isintoxicated and death occurs," thereby "reliev[ing] the People from proving that the defendant. . . operated the vehicle in a manner which was a sufficiently direct cause of death."Inasmuch as [*4]the factfinder was evidently unaware that itremained free to reject the inference set forth in the presumption (CJI2d[NY] Penal Law §125.12), and did not determine whether defendant, in fact, operated the vehicle in a manner thatcaused the victim's death and did so as a result of unlawful intoxication—elementsnecessary to sustain a finding of guilt—we must remit this matter for trial or otherappropriate disposition on the vehicular manslaughter charge (see People v Douglas, 24 AD3d1019, 1020-1021 [2005]; see also People v Neff, 287 AD2d 809, 809-810 [2001]; see generally People v Pagan, 36 AD3d1163, 1164-1165 [2007]).
Rose, Kavanagh, McCarthy and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is modified,on the law, by reversing defendant's conviction of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree;matter remitted to the County Court of Chemung County for further proceedings not inconsistentwith this Court's decision; and, as so modified, affirmed.
Footnote 1: Defendant was sentenced to aconditional discharge and $1,000 fine on each driving while intoxicated conviction. He indicatesin his brief that he is not challenging those two convictions.
Footnote 2: In that regard, the relevantcriminal jury instruction provides that "if the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that thedefendant was operating a motor vehicle while unlawfully intoxicated . . . and whiledoing so caused the death of another person," then the jury is to be instructed that it"may, but [is] not required to, infer that, as a result of such intoxication. . . [,] defendant operated the motor vehicle in a manner that caused such death"(CJI2d[NY] Penal Law § 125.12 [emphasis added]).