| People v Miaram |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 05442 [97 AD3d 606] |
| July 5, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Narish Miaram, Appellant. |
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Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, JohnnetteTraill, and Danielle Hartman of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kron, J.),rendered May 28, 2009, convicting him of robbery in the first degree (two counts), robbery in thesecond degree (three counts), forgery in the second degree, criminal possession of stolen propertyin the fourth degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree, and identity theft in the second degree,upon a jury verdict, and sentencing him to consecutive terms of nine years of imprisonment foreach count of robbery in the first degree, to be followed by a period of five years of postreleasesupervision on each of those convictions, five years of imprisonment for each conviction ofrobbery in the second degree, to be followed by a period of five years of postrelease supervisionon each of those convictions, and one year of imprisonment for each of the remainingconvictions, with the sentences imposed for the first two convictions of robbery in the seconddegree to run concurrently with the sentence imposed for the first conviction of robbery in thefirst degree, and the sentence imposed for the third conviction of robbery in the second degree torun concurrently with the sentence imposed for the second conviction of robbery in the firstdegree, and consecutively to the aforesaid three sentences, with all of the remaining sentences torun concurrently.
Ordered that the judgment is modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, bydirecting that all of the sentences run concurrently with each other; as so modified, the judgmentis affirmed.
The defendant's contention that the conviction of robbery in the first degree under count 16of the indictment is not supported by legally sufficient evidence is without merit. Viewing theevidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish his guilt of robbery in the firstdegree beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct anindependent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342,348 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the fact-finder's opportunity to view thewitnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383,410 [2004], cert denied 542 US 946 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490,495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt of robberyin the first degree under count 16 of the indictment was not against the weight of the evidence(see People v Romero, 7 NY3d633 [2006]).[*2]
The defendant's contention that the trial court erred, withrespect to the conviction of robbery in the first degree under count 16 of the indictment, by notcharging the affirmative defense to robbery in the first degree (see Penal Law §160.15 [4]) is unpreserved for appellate review since counsel neither requested the charge norobjected to its absence (see People v Trinh, 254 AD2d 440 [1998]). In any event, the trialcourt properly determined that the defendant was not entitled to such a charge, which iswarranted "when there is presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find by a preponderance ofthe evidence that the elements of the defense are satisfied, i.e., that the object displayed was not aloaded weapon capable of producing death or other serious physical injury" (People vGilliard, 72 NY2d 877, 878 [1988]). Here, no such evidence was presented to the jury (see People v Wells, 63 AD3d 967,968 [2009], affd 15 NY3d 927 [2010], cert denied 565 US —, 132 S Ct123 [2011]).
Based upon the record before us, the defendant received the effective assistance of counsel(see Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 [1984]; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137,146-147 [1981]; People v Bradley, 296 AD2d 464, 464-465 [2002]; People vWalker, 282 AD2d 628, 628 [2001]).
The sentence imposed was excessive to the extent indicated herein.
The defendant's contention, raised in his pro se supplemental brief, that the Peoplecommitted a Brady violation (see Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 [1963]) iswithout merit. His remaining contentions raised therein are unpreserved for appellate review and,in any event, without merit. Balkin, J.P., Hall, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.