Matter of Davydov v Mammina
2012 NY Slip Op 05524 [97 AD3d 678]
July 11, 2012
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 22, 2012


Matter of Simon Davydov, Appellant,
v
David Mamminaet al., Respondents.

—[*1]William A. DiConza, Oyster Bay, N.Y., for appellant.

Richard S. Finkel, Town Attorney, Manhasset, N.Y. (Peter A. Dzwilewski of counsel), forrespondents.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Board ofZoning Appeals of the Town of North Hempstead dated April 28, 2010, which, after a hearing,denied the petitioner's application for area variances, the petitioner appeals from a judgment ofthe Supreme Court, Nassau County (Palmieri, J.), entered November 4, 2010, which denied thepetition and dismissed the proceeding.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

"Local zoning boards have broad discretion in considering applications for variances, andjudicial review is limited to determining whether the action taken by the board was illegal,arbitrary or an abuse of discretion" (Matter of Ifrah v Utschig, 98 NY2d 304, 308 [2002];see Matter of Halperin v City of NewRochelle, 24 AD3d 768, 771 [2005]). Thus, the determination of a zoning board shouldbe sustained upon judicial review if it is not illegal, has a rational basis, and is not arbitrary andcapricious (see Matter of Sasso v Osgood, 86 NY2d 374, 384 and n 2 [1995]).

Pursuant to Town Law § 267-b (3), in determining whether to grant an application foran area variance, a town's zoning board must weigh the benefit to the applicant against thedetriment to the health, safety, and welfare of the neighborhood or community if the variance isgranted (see Matter of Pecoraro v Boardof Appeals of Town of Hempstead, 2 NY3d 608, 612 [2004]). This inquiry includes aconsideration of, inter alia, (1) whether the granting of the area variance will produce anundesirable change in the character of the neighborhood or a detriment to nearby properties; (2)whether the benefit sought by the applicant can be achieved by some method, feasible to theapplicant, other than an area variance; (3) whether the requested area variance is substantial; (4)whether the granting of the proposed variance will have an adverse effect or impact on thephysical environmental conditions in the neighborhood or district; and (5) whether the allegeddifficulty was self-created (see Town Law § 267-b [3] [b]; Matter of Sasso vOsgood, 86 NY2d at 382; Matter ofMerlotto v Town of Patterson Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 43 AD3d 926, 928-929 [2007]).

Here, the denial of the petitioner's application for area variances was neither arbitrary andcapricious nor an abuse of discretion in light of, inter alia, the findings by the Board of ZoningAppeals of the Town of North Hempstead (hereinafter the Board), based on the record, that the[*2]granting of the petitioner's application would result in adetrimental change in the character of the neighborhood, that the requested variances weresubstantial, and that the petitioner's claimed hardship was self-created (see Matter of Pecoraro v Board of Appealsof Town of Hempstead, 2 NY3d 608 [2004]; Matter of Qing Dong v Mammina, 84 AD3d 820, 821 [2011]; Matter of Frank v Zoning Bd. of Town ofYorktown, 82 AD3d 764, 765 [2011]; Matter of Kaiser v Town of Islip Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 74 AD3d1203, 1205 [2010]). The Board also was entitled to consider, as a factor in its determination,the precedential effect of its decision, and the impact of its decision upon the "effectiveness ofthe zoning ordinance" (Matter of Genserv Board of Zoning & Appeals of Town of N. Hempstead, 65 AD3d 1144, 1147 [2009]).

Further, although " 'a [determination] of an administrative agency which neither adheres toits . . . prior precedent nor [sets forth] its reasons for reaching a different result onessentially the same facts is arbitrary and capricious' " (Matter of London v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Huntington, 49AD3d 739, 740 [2008], quoting Matter of Tall Trees Constr. Corp. v Zoning Bd. ofAppeals of Town of Huntington, 97 NY2d 86, 93 [2001]), here, the hearing evidenceestablished that the circumstances of the prior variances granted by the Board were notsubstantially similar to those of the instant case. Therefore, those prior matters "did not constitutea precedent from which the [Board] was required to explain a departure" (Matter of Kaiser vTown of Islip Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 74 AD3d at 1205; see Matter of London v ZoningBd. of Appeals of Town of Huntington, 49 AD3d at 740; Matter of Conversions for Real Estate, LLC v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Inc.Vil. of Roslyn, 31 AD3d 635 [2006]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court did not err in denying the petition and dismissing theproceeding. Dickerson, J.P., Chambers, Austin and Miller, JJ., concur.


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