| People v Capela |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 05646 [97 AD3d 760] |
| July 18, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v JohnCapela, Also Known as John Capella, Appellant. |
—[*1] Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Lori Glachman ofcounsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (D'Emic, J.),rendered May 16, 2008, convicting him of murder in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, andimposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of those branchesof the defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress his statements to law enforcementofficials and physical evidence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
On October 7, 2002, emergency personnel, responding to a telephone call to the 911emergency number, went to the defendant's apartment. In the defendant's bedroom, they foundthe body of the defendant's wife, which contained many stab wounds. A bloody knife was on thebed. The defendant, who was sitting on a chair in another room, was staring straight ahead at theopen front door. He was the only other person in the apartment.
We reject the defendant's contention that, under these circumstances, the police lackedprobable cause to arrest him. Probable cause does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt(see People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417, 423 [1985]; People v Francis, 44 AD3d 788, 789 [2007]), but, rather, requires"the existence of facts and circumstances which, when viewed as a whole, would lead areasonable person possessing the same expertise as the arresting officer to conclude that anoffense has been or is being committed, and that the defendant committed or is committing thatoffense" (People v Wright, 8 AD3d304, 306 [2004]; see People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d at 423). Here, the evidence at thesuppression hearing supported the hearing court's determination that, viewing the circumstancesas a whole, it was reasonable for the police to conclude that it was more probable than not thatthe defendant had killed his wife (see People v Carrasquillo, 54 NY2d 248, 254 [1981];People v Wright, 8 AD3d at 307). Accordingly, the hearing court properly denied thosebranches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress his statements to lawenforcement officials and physical evidence on the ground that his arrest was made withoutprobable cause.
We also agree with the hearing court that the People established beyond a reasonable doubtthat the defendant's statements to the police were made voluntarily (see People v Huntley,15 [*2]NY2d 72, 78 [1965]; People v Slide, 76 AD3d 1106, 1109 [2010]; People vSeda, 289 AD2d 422, 423 [2001]). In particular, the evidence established beyond areasonable doubt that the defendant was advised of his rights under Miranda v Arizona(384 US 436 [1966]) and that he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived them. That thedefendant suffered from mental illness did not preclude a valid waiver (see People vBostick, 124 AD2d 811 [1986]; People v Mathis, 77 AD2d 720 [1980]); as long ashe comprehended "the immediate import of those warnings," he could validly waive hisMiranda rights (People v Williams, 62 NY2d 285, 289 [1984]; see People v Guinyard, 72 AD3d1545, 1546 [2010]; People v Rogers, 247 AD2d 765, 766 [1998]; People vCorona, 173 AD2d 484, 484-485 [1991]).
The jury's verdict rejecting the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect (seePenal Law § 40.15) was not against the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5]). "Where conflicting expert testimony is presented, the question [of] whether the defendantsuffered from a mental disease or defect at the time of the commission of the crime is for the factfinder, who may accept or reject the opinion of any expert" (People v Hill, 276 AD2d716, 716 [2000]; see People vCollins, 27 AD3d 660, 661 [2006]; People v Esmail, 260 AD2d 396, 397[1999]). Although there is no dispute that the defendant suffered from mental illness, thetestimony of the prosecution's expert regarding the defendant's state of mind at the time of thecrime was well-reasoned and supported by the evidence. In light of that testimony, we agree withthe jury's conclusion that the defendant failed to establish the defense by a preponderance of theevidence, notwithstanding the evidence provided by the defense experts (see People v Noll, 82 AD3d 1266,1266-1267 [2011]; People v Trojan,73 AD3d 818, 819 [2010]; People v Collins, 27 AD3d at 661).
The trial court properly denied the defendant's request to charge the affirmative defense ofextreme emotional disturbance (see Penal Law § 125.25 [1] [a]). "For thedefendant to be entitled to a charge on extreme emotional disturbance, sufficient evidence mustbe presented for the jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the elements of theaffirmative defense are satisfied" (People v Moye, 66 NY2d 887, 889 [1985]; see People v Cass, 18 NY3d 553,561 [2012]; People v Casassa, 49 NY2d 668, 678-680 [1980], cert denied 449 US842 [1980]). Here, there was no evidence of a "reasonable excuse or explanation" for the extreme"emotional disturbance" under which the defendant may have been acting when he stabbed hiswife (People v Acevedo, 56 AD3d341, 341 [2008]).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]).
The defendant's remaining contention is without merit. Balkin, J.P., Eng, Leventhal andChambers, JJ., concur.