| People v Zapata |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 05844 [98 AD3d 539] |
| August 1, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Fernando Zapata, Appellant. |
—[*1] Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Nicoletta J.Caferri, and Laura T. Ross of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Latella, J.),rendered September 15, 2010, convicting him of burglary in the second degree, upon a juryverdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court erred in denying his Batsonapplication (see Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79, 96 [1986]) regarding the prosecution'suse of peremptory challenges to three prospective Latino jurors is without merit. "It is incumbentupon a party making a Batson challenge to articulate and develop all of the groundssupporting the claim, both factual and legal, during the colloquy in which the objection is raisedand discussed" (People v Scott, 70AD3d 977, 977 [2010]; see People v James, 99 NY2d 264, 270 [2002]; People v Fryar, 29 AD3d 919, 920[2006]). In support of the Batson application, the defendant noted only that theprosecutor peremptorily challenged three of the four Latino prospective jurors in the first jurypool. In the absence of a record demonstrating other circumstances supporting a prima facieshowing, the Supreme Court correctly found that the defendant failed to establish a pattern ofpurposeful exclusion sufficient to raise an inference of racial discrimination (see generally People v Hecker, 15NY3d 625, 651 [2010], cert denied sub nom. Black v New York, 563 US —,131 S Ct 2117 [2011]; People v Scott, 70 AD3d at 977; People v Fryar, 29 AD3dat 920-921). Since the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, theprosecutor was not required to provide a race-neutral explanation for his challenges to thosejurors (see People v Childress, 81 NY2d 263, 268 [1993]; People v Scott, 70AD3d at 977).
The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court erred when it reinstructed the jury on theelements of the crimes charged without reinstructing it on the evidentiary significance of abroken shower rod, if any, is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Wright, 90 AD3d 679,679-680 [2011]; People v Brown,71 AD3d 1043, 1044 [2010]). In any event, the contention is without merit, as the jury didnot request reinstruction regarding the evidentiary nature of the shower rod (see People vAllen, 69 NY2d 915, 916 [1987]; People v Francis, 262 AD2d 581 [1999]).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court did not err when it [*2]reinstructed the jury on the elements of the crimes charged withoutreinstructing it on intoxication, as the jury did not request reinstruction on intoxication (seePeople v Allen, 69 NY2d at 916; People v Francis, 262 AD2d at 581). The SupremeCourt's response to the jury's request was meaningful (see CPL 310.30).
The defendant's contention that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt by legally sufficientevidence because his intoxication rendered him incapable of forming the requisite criminal intentis unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484,492 [2008]; People v Alston, 42AD3d 468, 469 [2007]). "In any event, the general rule is that an intoxicated person canform the requisite criminal intent to commit a crime, and it is for the trier of fact to decide if theextent of the intoxication acted to negate the element of intent" (People v Alston, 42AD3d at 469 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Penal Law § 15.25). Viewingthe evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonabledoubt that the defendant manifested the requisite criminal intent (see People v Dorst, 194AD2d 622, 622 [1993]). Moreover, upon our independent review pursuant to CPL 470.15 (5), weare satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d633, 644-645 [2006]). Angiolillo, J.P., Dickerson, Belen and Chambers, JJ., concur.