| Annicaro v Corporate Suites, Inc. |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 05899 [98 AD3d 542] |
| August 8, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Joseph Annicaro, Appellant, v Corporate Suites, Inc., et al.,Defendants, and RFR Realty, LLC, et al., Respondents. (And Third-PartyActions.) |
—[*1] Baxter Smith & Shapiro, P.C., Hicksville, N.Y. (Margot L. Ludlam of counsel), forrespondents.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by hisbrief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Taylor, J.), dated June15, 2011, as denied those branches of his motion which were for summary judgment on the issueof liability on the causes of action alleging common-law negligence and violations of Labor Law§§ 200 and 241 (6) insofar as asserted against the defendants RFR Realty, LLC,Corporate Suites 757, LLC, and 757 3rd Avenue Associates, LLC, and granted those branches ofthe cross motion of the defendants RFR Realty, LLC, Corporate Suites 757, LLC, and 757 3rdAvenue Associates, LLC, which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of actionalleging common-law negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200 and 241 (6)insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The defendant 757 3rd Avenue Associates, LLC (hereinafter 757 3rd Avenue), owned acommercial building in Manhattan. The defendant RFR Realty, LLC (hereinafter RFR Realty),managed the building. The defendant Corporate Suites 757, LLC (hereinafter Corporate Suites),leased the 20th and 21st floors of the building.
Corporate Suites engaged certain contractors, including Millenium Contracting [*2]Services Corp. (hereinafter Millenium), for a construction project torenovate the demised premises. A Corporate Suites employee supervised Millenium's employees.
The plaintiff was a Millenium employee. His job was to clean up the debris generated by theconstruction project, thereby making the site safer for the workers. On November 25, 2008, at11:40 a.m., the plaintiff, who had been directed to remove debris from an unfinished interiorstaircase, began removing the debris. Starting with the top tread, he used a broom to sweep debrison each tread down to the bottom of the staircase. When he finished cleaning a tread, he wouldstep backwards, onto a lower tread.
When the plaintiff stepped backwards off of one of the treads, he stepped onto a long, thin,threaded metal rod. The plaintiff, who had seen other threaded rods lying about the constructionsite on prior occasions, described them as "garbage" that he would pick up and discard. Hence, heindicated that if had seen the threaded rod that he stepped onto, he would have picked it up anddiscarded it. The plaintiff's foot rolled off of the threaded rod. As a result, the plaintiff lost hisbalance, and fell down the staircase.
The plaintiff allegedly sustained certain injuries as a result of the accident. He commencedthis personal injury action, alleging violations of, inter alia, Labor Law §§ 200 and241 (6), as well as common-law negligence.
Owners and general contractors, and their agents, have a common-law duty to provideemployees with a safe place to work (seeRamos v Patchogue-Medford School Dist., 73 AD3d 1010, 1011 [2010]). Labor Law§ 200 merely codified that duty (see Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 NY2d311, 316-317 [1981]).
The common-law duty to provide employees with a safe place to work does not extend tohazards that are part of, or inherent in, the very work the employee is to perform (see Hansen v Trustees of M.E. Church ofGlen Cove, 51 AD3d 725, 726 [2008]). Here, RFR Realty, Corporate Suites, and 7573rd Avenue (hereinafter collectively the RFR defendants) established, prima facie, that theplaintiff's job responsibilities required him to keep a particular area free of debris, and that hisalleged injuries were caused by debris in that area (see Imtanios v Goldman Sachs, 44 AD3d 383, 385-386 [2007]; Jackson v Board of Educ. of City ofN.Y., 30 AD3d 57, 63 [2006]). Since, in opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triableissue of fact, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the RFR defendants' crossmotion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging common-lawnegligence and a violation of Labor Law § 200 insofar as asserted against them. For thesame reasons, the Supreme Court also properly denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion whichwas for summary judgment on the issue of liability on those causes of action.
Labor Law § 241 (6) imposes upon owners and general contractors, and their agents, anondelegable duty to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety for workers, and tocomply with the specific safety rules and regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of theDepartment of Labor (see Comes v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82 NY2d 876,878 [1993]; Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 501-502 [1993];Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 NY2d at 317-318). To prevail on a cause of actionalleging a violation of Labor Law § 241 (6), a plaintiff must establish the violation of aspecific and concrete provision of the Industrial Code, and that such violation was a proximatecause of his or her injuries (seeRakowicz v Fashion Inst. of Tech., 56 AD3d 747 [2008]).[*3]
The plaintiff alleged that certain regulations wereviolated, and that such violations were proximate causes of his alleged injuries. However, theRFR defendants established, prima facie, that some of those regulations were inapplicable orwere complied with (see Paladino v Society of N.Y. Hosp., 307 AD2d 343, 345 [2003]).The RFR defendants also established, prima facie, that any violations of the remainingregulations were not proximate causes of the plaintiff's alleged injuries (see Briglio v J.D.K.Group, 238 AD2d 297, 298 [1997]). Since, in opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triableissue of fact, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the RFR defendants' crossmotion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation ofLabor Law § 241 (6) insofar as asserted against them. For the same reasons, the SupremeCourt also properly denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgmenton the issue of liability on that cause of action. Skelos, J.P., Balkin, Leventhal and Roman, JJ.,concur. [Prior Case History: 32 Misc 3d 1213(A), 2011 NY Slip Op 51274(U).]