| Matter of Shapiro v Town of Ramapo |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 06028 [98 AD3d 675] |
| August 22, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Sonya Shapiro et al., Appellants, v Townof Ramapo et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] Michael L. Klein, Town Attorney, Suffern, N.Y. (Janice Gittelman of counsel), forrespondent Town of Ramapo. Amy Mele, Senior Deputy Town Attorney, New City, N.Y. (Harold Y. MacCartney, Jr., ofcounsel), for respondent Town of Clarkstown. Rice & Amon, Suffern, N.Y. (Terry Rice of counsel), for respondent Scenic Development,LLC.
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review three determinations of the TownBoard of the Town of Ramapo, all dated January 25, 2010, resolving to approve a findingsstatement pursuant to the State Environmental Quality Review Act (ECL article 8) in connectionwith a proposed development project, to amend the Comprehensive Plan of the Town of Ramaposo as to permit the development project, and to rezone the real property on which thedevelopment project is proposed to be constructed, respectively, the petitioners appeal from anorder and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Jamieson, J.), enteredOctober 19, 2010, which granted those branches of the motion of the Town of Ramapo, and theseparate motion of Scenic Development, LLC, which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) and(7) and 7804 (f) to dismiss the first cause of action, and pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (3) and 7804(f) to dismiss the second, third, and fourth causes of action, dismissed the first cause of action astime-barred, and dismissed the second, third, and fourth causes of action for lack of standing andon the merits.
Ordered that the order and judgment is modified, on the law, by deleting the provisionsthereof granting those branches of the separate motions which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a)(3) and 7804 (f) to dismiss the second, third, and fourth causes of action and dismissing thosecauses of action for lack of standing and on the merits, and substituting therefor provisionsdenying those branches of the separate motions; as so modified, the order and judgment isaffirmed, without costs or disbursements, the second, third, and fourth causes of action arereinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Rockland County, for furtherproceedings on those causes of action consistent herewith, and the respondents' time to serve andfile an answer to those causes of action and the time of the Town of Ramapo to file the completeadministrative record are extended until 20 days after service upon them of a copy of thisdecision and order (see CPLR 7804 [e], [f]).
In July 2001, the Town Board of the Town of Clarkstown adopted a resolution authorizingthe sale of certain real property that it owned in the Town of Ramapo (hereinafter the [*2]Town), known as Patrick Farm (hereinafter the site), to ScenicDevelopment, LLC (hereinafter Scenic), a private developer. Subsequently, in 2008, Scenicapplied to the Town Board of the Town of Ramapo (hereinafter the Town Board) foramendments to the Town's zoning map and Comprehensive Plan to permit the development ofmultifamily residential units on a portion of the site. In January 2010, the Town Board enactedLocal Law No. 1 (2010) of Town of Ramapo (hereinafter the Local Law) to amend the Town'szoning map, changing the zoning designation of a certain parcel on the site from R-40 residentialto MR-8 multifamily residential.
In May 2010, the petitioners, who live across the street from the site, commenced thisproceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review the Town Board's determinations leading up tothe enactment of the Local Law. In the first cause of action, the petitioners alleged that the sitewas dedicated parkland that had been alienated for nonpark purposes without the approval of theNew York State Legislature, in violation of the public trust doctrine (see Friends of VanCortlandt Park v City of New York, 95 NY2d 623, 630 [2001]). The remaining causes ofaction centered upon the Town Board's alleged failure to comply with the requirements of theState Environmental Quality Review Act (ECL article 8 [hereinafter SEQRA]). Prior toanswering the petition, the Town and Scenic separately moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) (5) and 7804 (f) to dismiss the first cause of action as time-barred, and pursuant to CPLR3211 (a) (3) and 7804 (f) to dismiss the remaining causes of action for lack of standing. TheSupreme Court granted those branches of the motions. In addition to holding that the petitionerslacked standing to assert the second, third, and fourth causes of action, the Supreme Court alsodetermined that those causes of action lacked merit and warranted dismissal for that reason aswell. The Supreme Court therefore dismissed the proceeding insofar as asserted against all of therespondents. The petitioners appeal, and we modify.
As the petitioners correctly contend, a declaratory judgment action is the proper vehicle forresolving the first cause of action, founded upon the public trust doctrine, and the cause of actionis governed by the six-year limitations period set forth in CPLR 213 (1) (see Matter of Jones v Amicone, 27AD3d 465, 469-470 [2006]; see generally Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224, 229[1980]; Matter of Dandomar Co., LLC vTown of Pleasant Val. Town Bd., 86 AD3d 83, 90-91 [2011]). However, since thepetitioners commenced this proceeding in May 2010, more than six years after July 2001, whenthe Town Board of the Town of Clarkstown authorized the sale of the alleged parkland to Scenic,those branches of the separate motions which were to dismiss the first cause of action astime-barred were properly granted.
However, the Supreme Court erred in granting those branches of the motions which werepursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (3) and 7804 (f) to dismiss the second, third, and fourth causes ofaction for the petitioners' lack of standing to assert those causes of action, which alleged a failureto comply with the requirements of SEQRA. Since the petitioners live in close proximity to theportion of the site that is the subject of the challenged determinations, they did not need to showactual injury or special damage to establish standing (see Matter of Gernatt Asphalt Prods. vTown of Sardinia, 87 NY2d 668, 687 [1996]; Matter of Sun-Brite Car Wash v Board ofZoning & Appeals of Town of N. Hempstead, 69 NY2d 406, 409-410, 413-414 [1987]; Matter of Village of Chestnut Ridge vTown of Ramapo, 45 AD3d 74, 89-90 [2007]; Matter of Ontario Hgts. Homeowners Assn. v Town of Oswego PlanningBd., 77 AD3d 1465, 1466 [2010]). Further, the injuries alleged by the petitioners fellwithin the zone of interests to be protected by SEQRA (see Matter of Gernatt Asphalt Prods.v Town of Sardinia, 87 NY2d at 687; Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk,77 NY2d 761, 772-775 [1991]; Matterof Bloodgood v Town of Huntington, 58 AD3d 619, 621 [2009]; Matter of Villageof Chestnut Ridge v Town of Ramapo, 45 AD3d at 94).
Moreover, it was error for the Supreme Court to reach the merits of the petitioners' SEQRAclaims prior to service of the respondents' answers and the filing of the full administrative record(see CPLR 7804 [e], [f]). On the appellate record before us, it cannot be said that "thefacts are so fully presented in the papers of the respective parties that it is clear that no dispute asto the facts exists and no prejudice will result from the failure to require an answer" (Matterof Nassau BOCES Cent. Council of Teachers v Board of Coop. Educ. Servs. of NassauCounty, 63 NY2d 100, 101 [1984]; see Matter of Bill's Towing Serv., Inc. v County of Nassau, 83 AD3d698, 699-700 [2011]; cf. Matter ofShellfish, Inc. v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 76 AD3d 975, 978-979[2010]; Matter of Laurel Realty, LLC, vPlanning Bd. of Town of Kent, 40 AD3d 857, 860 [2007]).[*3]
Contrary to the respondents' contention, the petitioners'submissions demonstrated that their arguments were advanced during the administrativeproceeding (cf. Matter of Miller v Kozakiewicz, 300 AD2d 399, 400 [2002]; Matterof Schodack Concerned Citizens v Town Bd. of Town of Schodack, 148 AD2d 130, 135[1989]; Aldrich v Pattison, 107 AD2d 258, 267-268 [1985]).
The parties' remaining contentions need not be reached in light of our determination.
Accordingly, the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Rockland County, for adetermination on the merits of the second, third, and fourth causes of action after the respondentsserve and file their answers to those causes of action and the Town files the completeadministrative record. Florio, J.P., Lott, Sgroi and Miller, JJ., concur.