| Matter of Miner v Town of Duanesburg Planning Bd. |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 06043 [98 AD3d 812] |
| August 23, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of William B. Miner et al., Appellants, v Town ofDuanesburg Planning Board et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] Segel, Goldman, Mazzotta & Siegel, PC, Schenectady (Jeffrey A. Siegel of counsel), forTown of Duanesburg Planning Board, respondent. Ganz, Wolkenbreit & Siegfeld, LLP, Albany (Robert E. Ganz of counsel), for Long Oil Heat,Inc. and another, respondents.
Malone Jr., J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Kramer, J.), entered August25, 2011 in Schenectady County, which, among other things, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLRarticle 78, granted a cross motion by respondents Long Oil Heat, Inc. and Marebo, LLC todismiss the petition.
Respondent Long Oil Heat, Inc., doing business as Long Energy, sells and distributespropane gas to residential and business customers. To better serve its customers in theSchenectady County area, Long Energy sought to construct a propane storage facility featuring a30,000 gallon tank on property located in the Town of Duanesburg, Schenectady County. UponLong Energy's application for a building permit, the Town's Code Enforcement Officerdetermined that the proposed use constituted the "retail distribution of propane" and was,accordingly, a use permitted on the commercially zoned subject property only with a special usepermit. The matter was referred to respondent Town of Duanesburg Planning Board to considerwhether a special use permit should be granted. The Planning Board declared itself lead agency[*2]for purposes of the State Environmental Quality Review Act(see ECL art 8 [hereinafter SEQRA]) and, after determining that there would be noadverse environmental impact, issued a negative declaration for the proposal. The PlanningBoard thereafter held a public hearing and decided to grant the special use permit. Long Energyimmediately engaged a contractor to construct the facility and respondent Marebo, LLC, an entityformed by Long Energy, finalized the purchase of the property from respondent Samuel Donadio.
Petitioners, who live in and operate an antique shop across the road from the subjectproperty, attempted to negotiate changes to the appearance of the facility with Long Energy butthe parties did not reach an agreement. When construction of the facility was almost complete,petitioners commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 against the Planning Board,Long Energy, Marebo and Donadio challenging the Planning Board's SEQRA and special usepermit determinations and seeking a preliminary injunction against the construction andoperation of the facility. Supreme Court granted a cross motion by Long Energy and Marebo todismiss the petition.[FN1] Petitioners now appeal.
The entire petition is properly dismissed based upon the doctrine of laches, whichrespondents pleaded and proved.[FN2] Dismissal based upon laches is appropriate where the following circumstances are present: " '(1)conduct by an offending party giving rise to the situation complained of, (2) delay by thecomplainant in asserting his or her claim for relief despite the opportunity to do so, (3) lack ofknowledge or notice on the part of the offending party that the complainant would assert his orher claim for relief, and (4) injury or prejudice to the offending party in the event that relief isaccorded the complainant' " (Bailey vChernoff, 45 AD3d 1113, 1115 [2007], quoting Matter of Kuhn v Town ofJohnstown, 248 AD2d 828, 830 [1998]).
Petitioners were present and spoke at the March 2011 Planning Board meeting at which LongEnergy's application was considered and the special use permit was granted. Nonetheless,petitioners did not commence this proceeding until June 2011, by which time Long Energy hadalready expended over $200,000 and construction of the facility was very near completion.Additionally, inasmuch as petitioners' negotiations with Long Energy centered around theirviewshed concerns, respondents were not on notice that petitioners would commence thisproceeding challenging the use of the property. Thus, although petitioners' effort to resolve theirconcerns through negotiations directly with Long Energy is commendable, their failure to pursueany legal remedy while construction of the facility proceeded to near completion right before[*3]their eyes must result in dismissal of this proceeding (see Matter of Clarke v Town of Sand LakeZoning Bd. of Appeals, 52 AD3d 997, 999-1000 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 707[2008]; Marlowe v Elmwood, Inc.,34 AD3d 970, 971-973 [2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 804 [2007]).
Peters, P.J., Lahtinen, Spain and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed,without costs.
Footnote 1: The proceeding was dismissedagainst Donadio upon the consent of all the parties.
Footnote 2: We note that while SupremeCourt only dismissed petitioners' challenge to the special use permit as moot, the contention thatthe challenge to the SEQRA determination should also have been dismissed on that basis isproperly before us (see Matter of Save The Pine Bush v New York State Dept. of Envtl.Conservation, 289 AD2d 636, 637-638 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 611 [2002]).