| People v Sibblies |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 06046 [98 AD3d 458] |
| August 28, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Marsha Sibblies, Appellant. |
—[*1] Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx (Kayonia L. Whetstone of counsel), forrespondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Peter J. Benitez, J.), rendered March 3, 2009,convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of obstructing governmental administration in the seconddegree and resisting arrest, and sentencing her to a conditional discharge for a period of one year,unanimously affirmed.
On November 27, 2006, a police officer stopped defendant in her car after she was seenmaking an illegal left turn. Defendant refused the officer's request to turn over her license andregistration and then, after being told that she was about to be placed under arrest for that refusal,she physically resisted the efforts of that officer and others to obtain the requested paperwork, toremove her from the vehicle, and to place her under arrest. Among other obstructive actions,defendant closed her vehicle's window on the officer's arm, causing him injury, and flailed andkicked as she was handcuffed. Based on this incident, which occurred on November 27, 2006,defendant was initially charged with a felony, but on February 8, 2007, the People dropped thatcharge, which left pending the misdemeanor charges of assault in the third degree, resistingarrest, obstructing governmental administration in the second degree, and harassment in thesecond degree. The People filed a certificate of readiness on February 22, 2007.
At the next calendar call for the case, on March 28, 2007, the prosecutor stated: "The Peopleare not ready at this time. The People are continuing to investigate and are awaiting medicalrecords. It was a cop assault." On this basis, the People requested an adjournment of one week.Defendant's attorney, who was appearing for her for the first time, also requested an adjournmentto prepare motions. The court adjourned the case to June 7 for trial, instructing the People to filea certificate of readiness when they were ready.
Within one week of the March 28 calendar call, the People received the medical records. OnMay 23, 2007, they filed a certificate of readiness. Defendant moved to dismiss on the groundthat the People violated the speedy trial provisions of CPL 30.30. She noted that the People werenot in possession of the medical records concerning the medical treatment rendered to the injuredofficer when they filed their certificate of readiness on February 22, and argued that the February22 statement of readiness was illusory because the People announced on March 28 that they werenot ready, a situation that did not change until May 23, when they again filed a certificate ofreadiness. In defendant's view, the People are chargeable with the period from [*2]February 8 to May 23, which exceeds the 90 days permitted by CPL30.30.
In opposing the motion, the People asserted that, because they could have proceeded to trialwithout the medical records, the statement of readiness filed with the court on February 22 wasmade in good faith and was not way illusory. They further asserted that their decision to continuetheir investigation after filing their February 22 statement of readiness did not render thatstatement of readiness, made in good faith, a nullity. Supreme Court denied the motion, and weaffirm.
The People's unequivocal contention that they could have proceeded without the medicalrecords is both undisputed and plainly correct. The People could have proven their case throughthe testimony of the injured officer, as well as that of his partner, who also participated in thedefendant's stop and arrest. Without any medical records, these witnesses could have describedhow defendant committed the crime of assault in the third degree by rolling up her vehicle'swindow on one officer's arm. The officer could also have testified to the pain and bruising hesuffered from defendant's actions and the time he missed from work as a result. The Peopleindicated that they in fact subsequently changed their strategy for presenting the case, anddecided to offer the medical records in support of the assault charge (of which defendant wasultimately acquitted). Since the People were plainly ready to present a prima facie case when theyfiled their certificate of readiness on February 22, that certificate was not illusory (see People v Fulmer, 87 AD3d1385 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 994 [2012]; People v Bargerstock, 192AD2d 1058 [1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 751 [1993]).
A statement of readiness by the prosecution "is presumed to be accurate and truthful"(People v Acosta, 249 AD2d 161, 161 [1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 892 [1998]).Defendant argues that the People's March 28 statement that they were not ready to proceedrebutted the presumption of the accuracy of their February 22 statement of readiness. Defendant'sposition is inconsistent with our decision in People v Wright (50 AD3d 429 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d966 [2008]), in which we made the following statement: "We find no basis for finding theseunequivocal announcements of present readiness to be illusory. There is nothing in CPL 30.30 topreclude the People from declaring their present readiness, but still gathering additional evidenceto strengthen their case" (id. at 430). Notably, at the time of the initial statement ofreadiness in Wright, the People were "not yet in possession of forensic evidence andmedical records that they ultimately introduced at trial" (id.). In rejecting the defendant'sspeedy trial claim, we observed that "the People could have tried this case on the basis ofeyewitness testimony alone, and the wisdom of doing so is irrelevant for speedy trial purposes"(id.). Inasmuch as the same is true here, defendant's motion to dismiss under CPL 30.30was properly denied.
The evidence at trial was legally sufficient to support defendant's convictions for obstructinggovernmental administration in the second degree (Penal Law § 195.05) and resistingarrest (Penal Law § 205.30), and the convictions were not against the weight of theevidence. According to the police testimony, after defendant was told that she was about to beplaced under arrest for refusing an officer's lawful request that she produce her license andregistration, she [*3]physically obstructed the police as theyattempted to obtain requested paperwork, to remove her from the vehicle, and to place her underarrest, as previously noted. Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Friedman, Acosta, Freedman andAbdus-Salaam, JJ.