| Matter of c/o Hamptons, LLC v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Inc. Vil. of E.Hampton |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 06073 [98 AD3d 738] |
| August 29, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of c/o Hamptons, LLC, Doing Business as c/oMaidstone, et al., Respondents, v Zoning Board of Appeals of Incorporated Village ofEast Hampton et al., Appellants. |
—[*1] Cahn & Cahn, LLP, Huntington, N.Y. (Richard C. Cahn of counsel), forrespondents.
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review determinations of the Zoning Board ofAppeals of the Incorporated Village of East Hampton and the Design Review Board of theIncorporated Village of East Hampton dated April 8, 2011 and April 20, 2011, respectively,imposing conditions upon the issuance of a special use permit, the appeal is from an order andjudgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Tanenbaum, J.), dated October 5,2011, which granted the petition, annulled the challenged conditions imposed upon the issuanceof the special use permit, and granted the petitioners' motion to preliminarily enjoin the ZoningBoard of Appeals of the Incorporated Village of East Hampton and the Design Review Board ofthe Incorporated Village of East Hampton from enforcing those conditions.
Ordered that the order and judgment is modified, on the law, by deleting the provisionthereof granting the petitioners' motion to preliminarily enjoin the Zoning Board of Appeals ofthe Incorporated Village of East Hampton and the Design Review Board of the IncorporatedVillage of East Hampton from enforcing conditions they imposed on the issuance of a special usepermit to the petitioners, and substituting therefor a provision denying the motion as academic; asso modified, the order and judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
In a judgment dated December 9, 2010, the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, directed theZoning Board of Appeals of the Incorporated Village of East Hampton and the Design ReviewBoard of the Incorporated Village of East Hampton (hereinafter together the Boards) to grant thepetitioners' application for a special use permit allowing them to offer outdoor dining subject toconditions consistent with those imposed upon the owner of the 1770 House, an inn andrestaurant which is similarly situated to and located in the same zoning district as the petitioners'inn and restaurant, and whose application for the same special use permit had been granted by theBoards. Thereafter, in resolutions which expressly acknowledged the existence of the judgmentdated December 9, 2010, the Boards granted the special use permit to the petitioners, butimposed additional, more onerous conditions then had been imposed upon the owner of the 1770House. In a related appeal this Court, among other things, is affirming the above-mentionedportion of the judgment dated December 9, 2010 (see Matter of c/o Hamptons, LLC vRickenbach, 98 AD3d 736 [2012] [decided herewith]).
The petitioners commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, seeking, inter alia,to review the determinations making the resolutions imposing those additional conditions. TheSupreme Court granted the petition, and the Boards appeal.
" 'A decision of an administrative agency which neither adheres to its own prior precedentnor indicates its reasons for reaching a different result on essentially the same facts is arbitraryand capricious' (Matter of Tall Trees Constr. Corp. v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town ofHuntington, 97 NY2d 86, 93 [2001], quoting Knight v Amelkin, 68 NY2d 975, 977[1986]; see also Matter of CampoGrandchildren Trust v Colson, 39 AD3d 746 [2007]), and mandates reversal, even ifthere may otherwise be evidence in the record sufficient to support the determination (seeMatter of Campo Grandchildren Trust v Colson, 39 AD3d at 747; Matter of Corona Realty Holdings, LLC vTown of N. Hempstead, 32 AD3d 393, 395 [2006]). Thus, where, as here, a zoningboard is [considering] an application that is substantially similar to a prior application that hadbeen previously determined, the zoning board is required to provide a rational explanation forreaching a different result (see Matter of Campo Grandchildren Trust v Colson, 39 AD3dat 747; Matter of Mobil Oil Corp. v Village of Mamaroneck Bd. of Appeals, 293 AD2d679, 681 [2002])" (Matter of Lucas vBoard of Appeals of Vil. of Mamaroneck, 57 AD3d 784, 785-786 [2008] [some internalquotation marks omitted]). Where it is shown that a zoning board has reached contrary results onessentially the same facts, an explanation, or alternatively, a conforming determination, isrequired (see Knight v Amelkin, 68 NY2d 975, 978 [1986]).
Since the Boards' determinations failed to set forth a factual basis for the imposition of theconditions on the special permit issued to the petitioners that were not imposed on the owner ofthe 1770 House, those determinations were arbitrary and capricious (see Matter of Bout v Zoning Bd. of Appealsof Town of Oyster Bay, 71 AD3d 1014, 1015 [2010]), and must be annulled.
"The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until a decision isreached on the merits" (306 Rutledge,LLC v City of New York, 90 AD3d 1026, 1028 [2011], quoting Icy Splash Food & Beverage, Inc. vHenckel, 14 AD3d 595, 596 [2005]). Inasmuch as the Supreme Court rendered adetermination on the merits of the proceeding simultaneously with its disposition of thepetitioners' motion to preliminarily enjoin the Boards from enforcing those determinations, therewas no need to issue a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the motion should have been deniedas academic.
The parties' remaining contentions have been rendered academic in light of ourdetermination. Dillon, J.P., Dickerson, Austin and Miller, JJ., concur.