| People v Sweet |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 06413 [98 AD3d 1252] |
| September 28, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jack Z. Sweet,Appellant. |
—[*1] Jack Z. Sweet, defendant-appellant pro se. Michael J. Violante, District Attorney, Lockport (Thomas H. Brandt of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal, by permission of a Justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in theFourth Judicial Department, from an order of the Supreme Court, Niagara County (Richard C.Kloch, Sr., A.J.), entered October 31, 2008. The appeal was held by this Court by order enteredDecember 30, 2010, decision was reserved and the matter was remitted to Supreme Court,Niagara County, for further proceedings (79 AD3d 1772). The proceedings were held andcompleted (Sara S. Sperrazza, A.J.).
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: We previously held this case, reserved decision and remitted the matter toSupreme Court for a hearing on defendant's CPL 440.10 motion to determine whether the Peopleestablished " 'sufficient excludable time' " based upon our conclusion that defendant made aprima facie showing that the People failed to comply with CPL 30.30 (1) (a) (People vSweet, 79 AD3d 1772, 1772 [2010]). The evidence adduced at the hearing on remittalestablishes that the criminal action was commenced on April 9, 2002 by the filing of theindictment in Niagara County Court, and that the People declared their readiness for trial on June17, 2002, well within the six-month limit provided in CPL 30.30 (1) (a). We therefore rejectdefendant's contention that he was denied effective assistance of counsel based upon defensecounsel's failure to seek dismissal of the indictment on the ground that defendant was denied hisright to a speedy trial (see generallyPeople v Manning, 52 AD3d 1295, 1295-1296 [2008], after remand 67 AD3d1378 [2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 803 [2010]).
We have reviewed defendant's remaining contentions in his main and pro se supplementalbriefs and conclude that none requires modification or reversal of the order denying defendant'smotion. Present—Scudder, P.J., Smith, Centra, Fahey and Peradotto, JJ.