| Kregg v Maldonado |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 06454 [98 AD3d 1289] |
| September 28, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| Charlotte Kregg, as Guardian of Christopher M. Williams,Appellant, v Eileen Maldonado et al., Defendants, and American Suzuki MotorCorporation et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] Webster Szanyi LLP, Buffalo (Thomas S. Lane of counsel), fordefendants-respondents.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (John L. Michalski, A.J.), enteredAugust 5, 2011. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that part of the motion ofdefendants American Suzuki Motor Corporation and Suzuki Motor Corporation of Japan seekingto compel plaintiff to disclose computer records regarding the use of social media.
It is hereby ordered that the order insofar as appealed from is unanimously reversed on thelaw without costs and that part of the motion seeking disclosure of all social media accountrecords maintained by or on behalf of Christopher M. Williams is denied in accordance with thefollowing memorandum: Plaintiff, as limited by her brief, appeals from an order insofar as itgranted that part of the motion of defendants Suzuki Motor Corporation of Japan and AmericanSuzuki Motor Corporation (collectively, Suzuki defendants) to compel the disclosure of all socialmedia account records concerning plaintiff's son (hereafter, injured party), who was involved in amotor vehicle accident while driving a motorcycle manufactured and distributed by the Suzukidefendants. After initial disclosure exchanges, the Suzuki defendants learned that familymembers of the injured party had established Facebook and MySpace accounts for him and hadmade Internet postings on his behalf in connection with those accounts. The Suzukidefendants moved, inter alia, to compel the disclosure of the "entire contents" of those and anyother social media accounts maintained by or on behalf of the injured party. Plaintiff objected tosuch disclosure on the grounds of relevance and burden, contending that the demand fordisclosure was a "fishing expedition." Supreme Court agreed with the Suzuki defendants thatthey were entitled to such disclosure. That was error.
Although CPLR 3101 (a) provides for "full disclosure of all matter material and necessary inthe prosecution or defense of an action," it is well settled that a party need not respond todiscovery demands that are overbroad (see Optic Plus Enters., Ltd. v Bausch & Lomb Inc., 35 AD3d 1263,1263 [2006]). Where discovery demands are overbroad, " 'the appropriate remedy [*2]is to vacate the entire demand rather than to prune it' " (Board of Mgrs. of the Park RegentCondominium v Park Regent Assoc., 78 AD3d 752, 753 [2010]). In McCann v Harleysville Ins. Co. ofN.Y. (78 AD3d 1524, 1525 [2010]), we addressed a similar discovery demand andconcluded that the request for access to social media sites was made without "a factual predicatewith respect to the relevancy of the evidence" (see Crazytown Furniture v Brooklyn UnionGas Co., 150 AD2d 420, 421 [1989]). Here, as in McCann, there is no contentionthat the information in the social media accounts contradicts plaintiff's claims for the diminutionof the injured party's enjoyment of life (cf. Romano v Steelcase Inc., 30 Misc 3d 426, 427 [2010]). Asin McCann, the proper means by which to obtain disclosure of any relevant informationcontained in the social media accounts is a narrowly-tailored discovery request seeking only thatsocial-media-based information that relates to the claimed injuries arising from the accident.Thus, we deny that part of the Suzuki defendants' motion to compel the disclosure of the entirecontents of the injured party's social media accounts, without prejudice to the service of a morenarrowly-tailored disclosure request. Present—Scudder, P.J., Centra, Carni, Sconiers andMartoche, JJ.