| People v Monroe |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 06461 [98 AD3d 1293] |
| September 28, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jimmy L.Monroe, Appellant. |
—[*1] Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Matthew Dunham of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (John R. Schwartz, A.J.), renderedJanuary 28, 2009. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminalpossession of a weapon in the second degree.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of criminalpossession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]), defendant contendsthat County Court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea on theground that the plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent based, inter alia, on the court'sfailure to inform him of certain constitutional rights set forth in Boykin v Alabama (395US 238, 243 [1969]). We reject that contention. We note at the outset that, although defendant iscorrect that the court did not address certain rights that he waived by pleading guilty, the courtwas not required to do so (see People v Harris, 61 NY2d 9, 16, 18-19 [1983]; People v Johnson, 60 AD3d 1496,1496 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 926 [2009]). Instead, "[t]he seriousness of the crime, thecompetency, experience and actual participation by counsel, the rationality of the 'plea bargain[,']and the pace of the proceedings in the particular criminal court are among the many factorswhich the Trial Judge must consider in exercising discretion" during a plea colloquy(Harris, 61 NY2d at 16, citing People v Nixon, 21 NY2d 338, 353 [1967],cert denied sub nom. Robinson v New York, 393 US 1067 [1969]).
Contrary to defendant's contention, we conclude that the plea was knowing, voluntary, andintelligent (see generally Harris, 61 NY2d at 16-19), and thus the court properly deniedhis motion. The record establishes that the court properly exercised its discretion duringdefendant's plea colloquy in light of defendant's criminal history, his representation by counsel,and his statements during the plea colloquy. Defendant had pleaded guilty five times in NewYork prior to the current case, thus indicating that defendant was familiar with the plea processand aware of the rights that he waived by pleading guilty (see Nixon, 21 NY2d at 350).Defendant was represented by counsel in the current case, who actively advocated for defendant,and defendant confirmed that defense counsel had explained his rights to him. Defendant alsoindicated that he understood that he had the right to a trial. Although he did not explicitly waivethat right, his [*2]statements demonstrated that he understood thathe would not have a trial.
Contrary to defendant's further contention, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.Present—Scudder, P.J., Smith, Centra, Lindley and Martoche, JJ.