Matter of Peterson v City of Poughkeepsie
2012 NY Slip Op 06608 [99 AD3d 714]
October 3, 2012
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, November 28, 2012


In the Matter of Carlton Peterson, Appellant,
v
City ofPoughkeepsie, Respondent.

—[*1]O'Neil & Burke, LLP, Poughkeepsie, N.Y. (William T. Burke of counsel), for appellant.

Jacobowitz & Gubits, LLP, Walden, N.Y. (Tobias A. Lake of counsel), forrespondent.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of Ronald J. Knapp,as Acting City Administrator of the City of Poughkeepsie, dated September 9, 2010, whichadopted the recommendation of a hearing officer dated September 8, 2010, made after a hearing,finding the petitioner guilty of misconduct, and terminated the petitioner's employment as a streetsupervisor for the City of Poughkeepsie Department of Public Works, the petitioner appeals froma judgment of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Wood, J.), dated March 31, 2011, whichdenied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.

Ordered that the appeal is dismissed, and the judgment is vacated; and it is further,

Adjudged that the petition is granted to the extent that so much of the determination as foundthe petitioner guilty of charges four and five is annulled, charges four and five are dismissed, thepenalty imposed is vacated, the determination is otherwise confirmed, and the matter is remittedto the respondent for a new consideration of the appropriate penalty to be imposed in accordanceherewith, and the imposition of such a penalty thereafter; and it is further,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the petitioner.

"The review of an administrative decision made after an employee disciplinary hearing islimited to a consideration of whether the determination was supported by substantial evidence"(Matter of Shade v Mahon, 37AD3d 611, 612 [2007]; see Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist.No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222, 231[1974]). "Since the petition raises the question of whether the challenged determination issupported by substantial evidence, the Supreme Court should have transferred the proceeding tothis Court (see CPLR 7804 [g]). Nevertheless, because the record is now before thisCourt, we will treat the matter as one initially transferred here and will review the administrativedetermination de novo" (Matter of Bondv Howard Houses [NYCHA], 89 AD3d 730, 730 [2011] [internal quotation marksomitted]).[*2]

Substantial evidence "is related to the charge orcontroversy and involves a weighing of the quality and quantity of the proof," and the term"means such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusionor ultimate fact" (300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d176, 180 [1978]). Where there is conflicting evidence or different inferences may be drawn fromthe evidence, "the duty of weighing the evidence and making the choice rests solely upon the[administrative agency]. The courts may not weigh the evidence or reject the choice made by[such agency] where the evidence is conflicting and room for choice exists" (Matter ofBerenhaus v Ward, 70 NY2d 436, 443-444 [1987] [internal quotation marks omitted];see 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d at 180).

Following a disciplinary hearing, the petitioner, a street supervisor for the City ofPoughkeepsie Department of Public Works, was found guilty of five charges of misconduct.Upon our review of the record, we conclude that substantial evidence in the record supports thedetermination of Ronald J. Knapp, as Acting City Administrator, that the petitioner was guilty ofcharges one, two, and three, arising out of the petitioner's conduct on December 24, 2009, when,after the Department of Public Works' holiday party and while he was still on duty, he drank onebeer, in violation of the Alcohol and Drug Policy of the Civil Service Employees Association,and that he exceeded his 30-minute lunch break without so indicating on his time card.Moreover, there is no merit to the petitioner's contention that he was deprived of his rights underCivil Service Law § 75 (2) by the appointment of Knapp to review the hearing officer'srecommendation and issue a final determination (see City of PoughkeepsieAdministrative Code § 3.06 [b] [1]; City of Poughkeepsie Charter § 3.07; cf. Matter of Gomez v Stout, 13 NY3d182, 187 [2009]). In light of the foregoing, we may not disturb Knapp's determination thatthe petitioner was guilty of charges one, two, and three (see CPLR 7803 [4]; Matter ofPell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck,Westchester County, 34 NY2d at 231).

However, the determination that the petitioner was guilty of charge four, arising out of thealleged improper use of a City-owned vehicle on January 4, 2010, January 5, 2010, and January6, 2010, was not supported by substantial evidence. Although the petitioner drove a City-ownedvehicle outside of City limits on January 4, 2010, he did so to fill up the fuel tank of the vehiclewith gasoline at a Mobil service station located in the Town of Poughkeepsie, specifically in theHome Depot plaza on U.S. Route 9 North. The Department of Public Works' City-OwnedVehicles Policy, effective July 31, 2008, explicitly provides that City employees may driveCity-owned vehicles to this location without permission. Additionally, although the petitionerdrove a City-owned vehicle outside of City limits on January 5, 2010, he did so to purchase workboots in accordance with then-existing policy and work rules, which was a purpose for which hedid not need permission. Further, there was no evidence in the record demonstrating that thepetitioner drove a City-owned vehicle outside of City limits on January 6, 2010.

Similarly, the determination that the petitioner was guilty of charge five, arising out of anincident on January 13, 2010, in which the petitioner allegedly sat in a City-owned vehicle in aparking lot for more than one hour without performing any work, was not supported bysubstantial evidence. There was no evidence in the record that the petitioner sat in the vehicle inthe parking lot for any longer than seven minutes, or that it was improper for him to do so.

Accordingly, those portions of the determination that found the petitioner guilty of chargesfour and five must be annulled, and those charges dismissed. Since the City imposed a penalty oftermination of the petitioner's employment upon a finding that the petitioner was guilty ofcharges one, two, three, four, and five, and we are dismissing charges four and five, we vacatethe penalty and remit the matter to the City to give it the opportunity to consider the appropriatepenalty to be imposed upon the petitioner in connection with charges one, two, and three, and theimposition of that penalty thereafter (seegenerally Matter of McDougall v Scoppetta, 76 AD3d 338 [2010]). Dillon, J.P., Belen,Austin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.


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