Verkey v Hebard
2012 NY Slip Op 06672 [99 AD3d 1205]
October 5, 2012
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, November 28, 2012


Dennis Verkey, Respondent-Appellant, v Roy F. Hebard, Jr., et al.,Appellants-Respondents.

—[*1]Hagelin Kent, LLC, Liverpool (Keith D. Miller of counsel), fordefendants-appellants-respondents.

William K. Mattar, P.C., Williamsville (April J. Orlowski of counsel), forplaintiff-respondent-appellant.

Appeal and cross appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Seneca County (Dennis F.Bender, A.J.), entered July 26, 2011 in a personal injury action. The order denied the motion ofdefendants for summary judgment on the issue of serious injury, denied that part of plaintiff'scross motion seeking summary judgment on the issue of serious injury and granted that part ofplaintiff's cross motion seeking summary judgment on the issue of negligence.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law bydenying plaintiff's cross motion for partial summary judgment in its entirety and as modified theorder is affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries he sustainedwhen a vehicle owned by defendant Roy F. Hebard, Jr. and driven by defendant Roy W. Hebardcollided with a vehicle driven by plaintiff. Defendants moved for summary judgment dismissingthe complaint on the ground that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning ofthe three categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) alleged in the complaint, as amplified byplaintiff's bill of particulars, i.e., the permanent consequential limitation of use, significantlimitation of use, and 90/180-day categories of serious injury. Plaintiff cross-moved for partialsummary judgment on liability, i.e., on the issues of negligence and serious injury (seegenerally Ruzycki v Baker, 301 AD2d 48, 51-52 [2002]).

Addressing first the issue of negligence, we conclude that Supreme Court erred in grantingthat part of plaintiff's cross motion with respect to that issue. We therefore modify the orderaccordingly. Although plaintiff met his initial burden by establishing " 'that the sole proximatecause of the accident was [defendant driver's] failure to yield the right of way' to plaintiff" (Guadagno v Norward, 43 AD3d1432, 1433 [2007]; see Kelsey v Degan, 266 AD2d 843, 843 [1999]), defendantsraised a triable issue of fact by presenting evidence that the collision was head-on and thatdefendant driver was stopped in his lane of travel at the time of the collision (see Phillips v Bartholomew, 20 AD3d920, 921-922 [2005]; see generally S.J. Capelin Assoc. v Globe Mfg. Corp., 34NY2d 338, 341 [1974]). Contrary to plaintiff's contention, the fact that defendant driver [*2]entered a plea of guilty to a Vehicle and Traffic Law offense is onlysome evidence of negligence and does not establish his negligence per se (see Kelley vKronenberg [appeal No. 2], 2 AD3d 1406, 1407 [2003]; Canfield v Giles [appeal No.1], 182 AD2d 1075, 1075 [1992]).

The court properly denied both defendants' motion and that part of plaintiff's cross motion forsummary judgment on the issue of serious injury. We note at the outset that plaintiff's contentionthat his injury constitutes a permanent loss of use under Insurance Law § 5102 (d) is notproperly before us inasmuch as it is raised for the first time on appeal (see Ciesinski v Townof Aurora, 202 AD2d 984, 985 [1994]).

We conclude that there are issues of fact on the record before us with respect to thecategories of permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use, basedon the conflicting expert opinions submitted by the parties (see Cooper v City of Rochester, 16 AD3d 1117, 1118 [2005]).Notably, we reject defendants' contention that the affirmed report of their retained physicianestablished that plaintiff's injury was related to a preexisting condition and thus that, as a matterof law, it was not causally related to the instant accident (see generally Spanos v Fanto, 63 AD3d 1665, 1666 [2009]). Here,although plaintiff had a preexisting degenerative disc disease as noted on a CT scan taken on theday of the accident and an MRI taken one month later, that condition was, by all accounts,asymptomatic at the time of the accident. It is well settled that the aggravation of anasymptomatic condition can constitute a serious injury (see Austin v Rent A Ctr. E., Inc., 90 AD3d 1542, 1543 [2011]; Terwilliger v Knickerbocker, 81 AD3d1350, 1351 [2011]). Moreover, the existence of an asymptomatic condition predating anaccident merely indicates a plaintiff's susceptibility to injury; it does not constitute proof that aplaintiff did not sustain a serious injury in the subject accident (see Feaster v Boulabat, 77 AD3d440, 440-441 [2010]). We further conclude that both defendants and plaintiff failed to meettheir initial burden on the 90/180-day category (see Hedgecock v Pedro, 93 AD3d 1143, 1143 [2012]) and that, inany event, there is a triable issue of fact with respect to that category (see generallyZuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). Present—Scudder, P.J.,Fahey, Lindley, Sconiers and Martoche, JJ.


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