Matter of Dickinson v New York State Unified Ct. Sys.
2012 NY Slip Op 06895 [99 AD3d 569]
October 16, 2012
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, November 28, 2012


In the Matter of John Dickinson, Petitioner,
v
New YorkState Unified Court System, Respondent.

—[*1]Raymond Nardo, Mineola, for petitioner.

John W. McConnell, Office of Court Administration, New York (Pedro Morales of counsel),for respondent.

Determination of respondent, dated May 24, 2010, which found petitioner guilty of certaindisciplinary charges and terminated his employment as an associate court clerk, unanimouslyconfirmed, the petition denied, and the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78(transferred to this Court by order of Supreme Court, New York County [Martin Schoenfeld, J.],entered March 2, 2011) dismissed, without costs.

Substantial evidence supports respondent's determination (see generally 300 GramatanAve. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176 [1978]). Petitioner was chargedwith both misconduct and incompetency due to excessive absenteeism and lateness. Althoughpetitioner correctly notes that misconduct "requir[es] a showing of willfulness or intentionalconduct" (Matter of Weatherlow v Board of Educ. of Jamestown City School Dist., 236AD2d 855, 856 [4th Dept 1997] [internal quotation marks omitted]), "a finding of incompetence. . . only requires evidence of some dereliction or neglect of duty" (Matter of Phillips v Le Page, 4 AD3d704, 705 [3d Dept 2004] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Excessive absenteeism, even ifnonwillful, constitutes incompetence (see Cicero v Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth.,264 AD2d 334, 336 [1st Dept 1999]), and contrary to petitioner's contention, respondent was notrequired to warn him that his absences and tardiness could lead to dismissal (see e.g. Smack vPattison, 80 AD2d 874, 874 [2d Dept 1981] [no indication that the respondent warned thepetitioner before terminating him for being "repeatedly late or absent from work withoutappropriate excuse"]).

Respondent did not violate due process by relying on evidence of absences and tardinessoutside the time period delineated in the specification of charges. Respondent relied on suchevidence to determine the appropriate sanction, not to determine petitioner's guilt (see Matterof Bigelow v Board of Trustees of Inc. Vil. of Gouverneur, 63 NY2d 470, 474 [1984]). Nordid respondent violate due process by considering a time sheet that was not introduced atpetitioner's hearing. Petitioner had "notice sufficient to afford him a reasonable opportunity toprepare and present a defense or explanation" for his post-hearing absences (Matter of Kiefferv New York State Thruway Auth., 135 AD2d 1017, 1019 [3d Dept 1987]).[*2]

The penalty of termination does not shock our sense offairness (see Matter of Rannacher v McGuire, 85 AD2d 521 [1st Dept 1981]; Matterof De Stefano v Village of Port Chester, 211 AD2d 716 [2d Dept 1995]). Being present atwork is an essential job function (see e.g. Corr v MTA Long Is. Bus, 27 F Supp 2d 359,366 [ED NY 1998], affd 199 F3d 1321 [2d Cir 1999]), and petitioner's "disability. . . may not be used to shield him from the adverse consequences of inadequate jobperformance" (27 F Supp 2d at 369). Concur—Andrias, J.P., Sweeny, Renwick andRomán, JJ.


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