| Francis v Leon D. Dematteis Assoc., LLC |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 06916 [99 AD3d 856] |
| October 17, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Carol Ann Francis, Appellant, v Leon D. DeMatteisAssociates, LLC, et al., Respondents, et al., Defendant. |
—[*1] Gartner & Bloom, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Arthur P. Xanthos of counsel), for respondentsLeon D. DeMatteis Associates, LLC, Ry Management Co., Inc., and L.I.R.A. Apartments Co.,L.P. Faust Goetz Schenker & Blee LLP (Shaub, Ahmuty, Citrin & Spratt, LLP, Lake Success,N.Y. [Steven J. Ahmuty, Jr., Timothy R. Capowski, and Deirdre E. Tracey], of counsel), forrespondent Hazardous Elimination Corp.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by herbrief, (1) from so much of an interlocutory judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County(Kramer, J.), dated November 29, 2010, as, upon a jury verdict, is in favor of the defendantsLeon D. DeMatteis Associates, LLC, Hazardous Elimination Corp., and RY Management Co.,Inc., and against her on the issue of liability, and (2) from so much of a judgment of the samecourt dated December 3, 2010, as, upon the jury verdict, is in favor of the defendants Leon D.DeMatteis Associates, LLC, Hazardous Elimination Corp., and RY Management Co., Inc., andagainst her dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against those defendants, and awardedcertain costs to the defendants Leon D. DeMatteis Associates, LLC, and RY Management Co.,Inc.
Ordered that the appeal from the interlocutory judgment dated November 29, 2010, isdismissed, as that judgment was superseded by the judgment dated December 3, 2010; and it isfurther,
Ordered that the judgment dated December 3, 2010, is affirmed insofar as appealed from;and it is further,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendants appearing separately and filingseparate briefs.
The plaintiff alleged that in 2004 the defendants caused her to sustain personal injuries bydefectively remediating a mold condition in her apartment on Spring Street in Manhattan. Afterone defendant was awarded summary judgment and the Supreme Court granted the unopposed[*2]motion of another defendant for judgment as a matter of lawat the close of the plaintiff's case at trial, the jury found in favor of the remaining defendants. Theplaintiff contends, among other things, that the verdict was contrary to the weight of theevidence. We may not set aside a jury verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence "unlessthe jury could not have reached the verdict by any fair interpretation of the evidence" (Geary v Church of St. ThomasAquinas, 98 AD3d 646, 646 [2012]; see Nicastro v Park, 113 AD2d 129,133-134 [1985]). In conducting our review, we accord great deference to a jury's credibilityfindings, including its determinations as to which expert to credit, because the jury is in asuperior position to assess the witnesses (see Geary v Church of St. Thomas Aquinas, 98AD3d at 647; Bailey v Brookdale Univ.Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 98 AD3d 545, 546 [2012]; Saccone v Gross, 84 AD3d 1208, 1208-1209 [2011]). Here,contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the jury verdict was based on a fair interpretation of theevidence and, thus, was not contrary to the weight of the evidence (see Lolik v Big VSupermarkets, 86 NY2d 744, 746 [1995]; Nicastro v Park, 113 AD2d at 134).
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit. Skelos, J.P., Balkin, Leventhal andCohen, JJ., concur.