| Spinney at Pond View, LLC v Town Bd. of the Town ofSchodack |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 07020 [99 AD3d 1088] |
| October 18, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The Spinney at Pond View, LLC, et al., Respondents, v TownBoard of the Town of Schodack, as Improvement District Commissioners for ConsolidatedWater District No. 101, et al., Appellants. |
—[*1] Donald Zee, PC, Albany (Andrew Brick of counsel), for respondents.
Egan Jr., J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Zwack, J.), entered September 22,2011 in Rensselaer County, which granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs are the respective owners of two adjacent commercial properties located in theTown of Schodack, Rensselaer County. Although plaintiffs' properties are situated within thenow former Town of Schodack Water Improvement District No. 5 and Town of Schodack SewerDistrict No. 6, pursuant to the terms of various intermunicipal agreements, plaintiffs actuallyreceive their water and sewer services from the Town of East Greenbush, Rensselaer County.Following public hearings in August 2009, defendant Town Board of the Town of Schodackpassed a resolution creating Consolidated Water District No. 101 to encompass various waterdistricts within the Town of Schodack, including District No. 5. Thereafter, in October 2009, theBoard passed another resolution setting the 2010 water rates to be applied to Consolidated WaterDistrict No. 101 and confirming the assessment roll for properties located within its boundaries.
Plaintiffs received their 2010 municipal tax bills in December 2009 and, in July 2010,commenced this declaratory judgment action contending that the water and sewer charges wereexcessive, lacked a rational basis and constituted an unconstitutional tax upon their properties.[*2]Defendants answered and raised the statute of limitations asan affirmative defense. Plaintiffs then moved for summary judgment and Supreme Court grantedthe motion, finding that the fees imposed lacked a rational basis. This appeal by defendantsensued.
We reverse. "Although declaratory judgment actions are typically governed by a six-yearstatute of limitations, if the underlying dispute could have been resolved through an action orproceeding for which a specific, shorter limitations period governs, then such shorter period mustbe applied" (Trager v Town of Clifton Park, 303 AD2d 875, 876 [2003] [citationsomitted]; see New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v McBarnette, 84 NY2d 194,200-201 [1994]; Matter of Town ofOlive v City of New York, 63 AD3d 1416, 1418 [2009]). Where, as here,"governmental activity is being challenged, the immediate inquiry is whether the challenge couldhave been advanced in a CPLR article 78 proceeding" (Matter of Frontier Ins. Co. v TownBd. of Town of Thompson, 252 AD2d 928, 929 [1998]; see New York City Health &Hosps. Corp. v McBarnette, 84 NY2d at 201). That inquiry, in turn, requires us "to examinethe substance of [the] action to identify the relationship out of which the claim arises and therelief sought" (New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v McBarnette, 84 NY2d at 201[internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Town of Olive v City of NewYork, 63 AD3d at 1418; Trager v Town of Clifton Park, 303 AD2d at 876; Marshv New York State & Local Employees' Retirement Sys., 291 AD2d 713, 713 [2002];Matter of Aubin v State of New York, 282 AD2d 919, 921 [2001], lv denied 97NY2d 606 [2001]).
Here, a review of the underlying complaint reveals that plaintiffs' claims center upon theoverall assignment of "benefit units" to Consolidated Water District No. 101, the allocation ofthose benefit units to the individual properties contained within its borders and theanalysis—or perceived lack thereof—of the level of benefit to the individualproperties as the result of the consolidation and/or the capital improvements made in conjunctiontherewith. Such rate-fixing or fee-setting activities are properly viewed as "quasi-legislativeact[s]" (Matter of Valentino v County ofTompkins, 45 AD3d 1235, 1236 [2007]) and, as such, are reviewable in the context of aCPLR article 78 proceeding (see New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v McBarnette,84 NY2d at 203-204; Matter of Valentino v County of Tompkins, 45 AD3d at 1236;Trager v Town of Clifton Park, 303 AD2d at 877-878; cf. Matter of Bassett Mtn.Recreation Ctr. v Town of Jay Bd. of Assessors, 232 AD2d 934, 934 [1996]; see generally NYCTL 1998-2 Trust v T.Jan Realty Corp., 63 AD3d 810, 811 [2009]). To the extent that plaintiffs attempt tocouch their claims in constitutional terms, we note that "[t]he simple expedient of denominatingthe [instant] action [as] one for declaratory relief and characterizing the matter as one ofconstitutional . . . dimension does not cure" plaintiffs' failure to comply with thefour-month statute of limitations applicable to CPLR article 78 proceedings (Marsh v NewYork State & Local Employees' Retirement Sys., 291 AD2d at 714 [internal quotation marksand citation omitted]; see Matter of Town of Olive v City of New York, 63 AD3d at1418; Matter of Aubin v State of New York, 282 AD2d at 921-922). Accordingly,plaintiffs' claims are time-barred.
Peters, P.J., Rose, Spain and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is reversed, on thelaw, without costs, motion denied and complaint dismissed.