| People v Bickley |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 07155 [99 AD3d 1113] |
| October 25, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v TheodoreBickley, Appellant. |
—[*1] P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Kenneth C. Weafer of counsel), forrespondent.
Kavanagh, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Albany County (Breslin, J.),rendered March 1, 2011, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of criminal possessionof a forged instrument in the first degree.
Defendant was found in possession of counterfeit United States currency and was chargedwith criminal possession of a forged instrument in the first degree. After a jury trial, he wasconvicted and subsequently sentenced, as a second felony offender, to a prison term of 6 to 12years. Defendant now appeals.
Defendant claims that his conviction was not supported either by legally sufficient evidenceor by the weight of the credible evidence introduced at trial. For such a conviction to besupported by legally sufficient evidence, it must be proven that defendant possessed thiscounterfeit currency "with knowledge that it [was] forged and with intent to defraud, deceive orinjure another" (Penal Law § 170.30; see People v Bailey, 13 NY3d 67, 70 [2009]). Defendantacknowledges that the currency found on his person (18 $50 bills) was counterfeit, but claimsthat it was not established at trial that he knew the currency was counterfeit or that he possessedit with the intent to deceive others. We disagree.[*2]
Evidence establishing an intent to deceive another can "'be inferred from the act itself . . . [or] from the defendant's conduct and thesurrounding circumstances' " (People vRodriguez, 71 AD3d 450, 452 [2010], affd 17 NY3d 486 [2011], quoting People v Bracey, 41NY2d 296 [1977] [citation omitted]). Here, evidence was presented that a week prior to hisarrest, defendant used a counterfeit $50 bill to pay for a food order at a fast-food restaurant.When he was challenged about the integrity of this currency, defendant tendered a new bill to payfor the food order and returned the change he had received when he used the counterfeit $50 bill.After the police were notified, defendant abruptly left the restaurant without his entire food order,but later returned to inquire of an employee as to whether she had given his name to thepolice.[FN*]Therefore, legally sufficient evidence was presented at trial from which the jury could rationallyinfer that defendant possessed the counterfeit currency with the intent to defraud or deceiveothers (see People v Rodriguez, 17 NY3d 486, 489-490 [2011]; compare People vBailey, 13 NY3d at 72) and that the jury's verdict was supported by the weight of the credibleevidence introduced at trial (see Peoplev Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]; People v Monteiro, 93 AD3d 898, 900 [2012], lv denied 19NY3d 964 [2012]).
Defendant also argues that what transpired at the fast-food restaurant constituted evidence ofa prior bad act and should not have been admitted into evidence at trial. Evidence of unchargedcrimes or prior bad acts may be presented to establish, among other things, a defendant's intentand identity (see People v Molineux, 168 NY 264, 293 [1901]; People v Buchanan, 95 AD3d1433, 1436 [2012]; People vLindsey, 75 AD3d 906, 908 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 922 [2010]), and is alsoadmissible when it is "inextricably interwoven" with the conduct that is the subject of thedefendant's trial (People v Burnell,89 AD3d 1118, 1120 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 922 [2012]). Defendant's conductat the restaurant and, in particular, his use of a counterfeit bill was undeniably relevant toestablish that he knew the currency seized from him at the time of his arrest was counterfeit andthat he possessed it with the intent to defraud others. Any prejudice that may have resulted fromthe admission of this evidence at trial, in our view, was far outweighed by its probative value andit was properly admitted at trial (see id. at 1121).
Defendant further argues that it was error to allow a police officer to testify at trial that, whenarrested, defendant had been operating a motor vehicle with a suspended driver's license.However, this evidence was relevant to explain why defendant was stopped by the police andhow the counterfeit currency was found on his person. Given the appropriate limiting instructionsthat County Court gave the jury regarding the use of this evidence, we see no error in itsadmission (see People v Johnson, 233 AD2d 761, 763 [1996], lv denied 89 NY2d1012 [1997]).
We also reject defendant's challenge to County Court's Sandoval ruling permittinghim to be cross-examined regarding his 2003 conviction for felony assault as well as thecircumstances that resulted in his 2009 conviction for criminal possession of stolen property. Inits ruling, the court barred the People from questioning defendant regarding numerous othercriminal convictions on his record. As such, its decision in this regard constituted a measured[*3]effort to balance the relevance of defendant's prior criminalconduct against the potential prejudice that would result in the admission of such evidence at trial(see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371, 377 [1974]; People v Reid, 97 AD3d 1037, 1037-1038 [2012]; People v Lumnah, 81 AD3d 1175,1177-1178 [2011], lv denied 16 NY3d 897 [2011]). Finally, considering defendant'sextensive criminal history, the sentence imposed was neither harsh nor excessive and we are notaware of the existence of any extraordinary circumstances that would warrant its reduction (see People v Rodney, 79 AD3d1363, 1365 [2010]).
Defendant's remaining contentions raised in his pro se brief have been considered and foundto be without merit.
Peters, P.J., Lahtinen, Stein and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Footnote *: Defendant admitted at trial thathe was the person who had used the $50 bill at the restaurant, but claimed that it had been givento him by a passenger in his car and denied knowing that it was counterfeit.