| People v Miller |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 07585 [100 AD3d 466] |
| November 13, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Devon Miller, Appellant. |
—[*1] Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx (Cynthia A. Carlson of counsel), forrespondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (John W. Carter, J.), rendered June 29, 2010,convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of murder in the first degree and criminal possession of aweapon in the second degree, and sentencing him, as a second violent felony offender, to anaggregate term of life without parole, unanimously affirmed.
The court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress statements made to lawenforcement personnel. The record supports the hearing court's finding that when defendantmade his pre-Miranda statements, a reasonable innocent person in defendant's positionwould not have thought he was in custody (see People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585 [1969],cert denied 400 US 851 [1970]; see also Stansbury v California, 511 US 318[1994]).
Defendant voluntarily went to the precinct at the request of a detective after the detective toldhim that he "needed" to make a formal statement. When viewed in context, this was clearly arequest that defendant appear for an interview as a possible witness to a crime (see People v Dillhunt, 41 AD3d216, 217 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 764 [2008]). Defendant came to the precinctunaccompanied by police, he was never restrained in any way, and neither the questioning northe atmosphere was coercive.
Regardless of whether the detectives believed that defendant was a suspect in the crime, noneof them did anything to suggest to him that his freedom of movement had been restricted.Although a detective mentioned to defendant that another suspect had provided some informationconnecting him with the crime, the detective did not convey that a decision had been made toarrest defendant, but rather "that the police were still in the process of gathering informationabout the alleged incident prior to taking any action" (id.).
Defendant's later statements preceded by the administration of Miranda warnings,including his videotaped statement to the assistant district attorney, were also voluntarily made.Furthermore, the videotaped statement was attenuated from the pre-Miranda statements.
The court providently exercised its discretion in briefly informing the jury that a separatelytried codefendant in this case, who did not testify at defendant's trial, had been convicted ofmurder and was serving prison time. This was permissible as a means of clarifying a reference indefense counsel's opening statement to the possibility that the codefendant might [*2]be testifying for the prosecution (see generally People v Reid, 19 NY3d382, 389 [2012]). This information was not unduly prejudicial, and any prejudice wasminimized by the court's instructions. Given these instructions, there is no reasonable possibilitythat the jury was influenced by the fact that another jury had convicted another defendant.Concur—Tom, J.P., Andrias, DeGrasse and Richter, JJ.