O'Donnell v Ferguson
2012 NY Slip Op 07821 [100 AD3d 1534]
November 16, 2012
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 26, 2012
As corrected through Wednesday, December 26, 2012


John O'Donnell, Appellant, v Robert Ferguson, Individually and asChief of Police of Town of Evans, et al., Respondents.

—[*1]Chiacchia & Fleming, LLP, Hamburg (Christen Archer Pierrot of counsel), forplaintiff-appellant.

Smith, Murphy & Schoepperle, LLP, Buffalo (Stephen P. Brooks of counsel), fordefendants-respondents.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Donna M. Siwek, J.), enteredNovember 23, 2011. The order, inter alia, precluded plaintiff from offering evidence on the issueof whether he was a part-time employee.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law bydenying that part of the motion seeking to preclude plaintiff from offering evidence that, afterthis Court's determination in Matter of O'Donnell v Ferguson (273 AD2d 905, 906[2000], lv denied 96 NY2d 701 [2001]) that plaintiff was not a part-time employee,defendants made statements and engaged in conduct that was inconsistent with thatdetermination, and as modified the order is affirmed without costs in accordance with thefollowing memorandum: Plaintiff, a former police officer employed by the Town of Evans,commenced this action seeking damages pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 and Labor Law§ 201-d for defendants' allegedly illegal termination of his employment. In 1998,defendants terminated plaintiff's employment without affording him notice or a hearing. Plaintiffsubsequently commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking, inter alia, reinstatement to hisposition and, on a prior appeal, we modified the judgment by dismissing the petition in itsentirety on the ground that plaintiff "was a 'special' police officer appointed pursuant to TownLaw § 158 (1) who served at the pleasure of the Town Board [of the Town of Evans (TownBoard)] and therefore was not entitled to the protections of Town Law § 155" (Matterof O'Donnell v Ferguson, 273 AD2d 905, 906 [2000], lv denied 96 NY2d 701[2001]). In a prior appeal with respect to this action, we determined that the doctrine of collateralestoppel did not preclude this action because "none of the issues relating to the federalconstitutional causes of action and the cause of action under Labor Law § 201-d wasdecided in the prior proceeding" (O'Donnell v Ferguson, 23 AD3d 1005, 1007 [2005]). We furthernoted that "[d]efendants are incorrect to the extent that they contend that, as an 'at-will' employee,plaintiff could be terminated for a constitutionally impermissible or statutorily proscribedpurpose" (id.).[*2]

In another prior appeal with respect to this action, wedetermined that Supreme Court abused its discretion in refusing to allow plaintiff to presentevidence of defendant Robert Ferguson's September 2007 deposition testimony that plaintiff wasa part-time employee, which evidence was contrary to our determination in the CPLR article 78proceeding in 2000 that plaintiff was not entitled to the protections of Town Law § 155because he was not a part-time employee (O'Donnell v Ferguson, 68 AD3d 1681, 1682 [2009]).

In the instant appeal, plaintiff appeals from an order that, inter alia, granted defendants'motion in limine to preclude him from presenting further evidence on the issues whether he wasa part-time employee and whether he was entitled to formal charges and a hearing prior totermination. We note at the outset that, although the parties do not address the issue of theappealability of an order determining a motion in limine, the order in this case is appealable (see Franklin Corp. v Prahler, 91 AD3d49, 54 [2011]). "Generally, an order ruling [on a motion in limine], even when made inadvance of trial on motion papers constitutes, at best, an advisory opinion which is neitherappealable as of right nor by permission" (Innovative Transmission & Engine Co., LLC v Massaro, 63 AD3d1506, 1507 [2009] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Scalp & Blade v Advest,Inc., 309 AD2d 219, 224 [2003]). Here, however, the order precluded the introduction ofevidence on the issue whether defendants were liable for punitive damages. "[B]ecause thecourt's order 'has a concretely restrictive effect on the efforts of plaintiff [ ] to . . .recover [punitive] damages[,] . . . defendant[s'] motion . . . "[was] thefunctional equivalent of a motion for partial summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofaras it sought [such] damages" ' " (Franklin, 91 AD3d at 54). "[A]n order that. . . 'limits the legal theories of liability to be tried' or the scope of the issues at trial. . . is appealable" (Scalp & Blade, 309 AD2d at 224).

Contrary to plaintiff's contention, the court did not abuse its discretion by precluding plaintifffrom relitigating the issue whether plaintiff was a part-time employee entitled to the protectionsof Town Law § 155. That issue was decided in defendants' favor on a prior appeal(O'Donnell, 273 AD2d at 906), and "[t]he doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes a partyfrom relitigating 'an issue which has previously been decided against him [or her] in a proceedingin which he [or she] had a fair opportunity to fully litigate the point' " (Kaufman v Eli Lilly &Co., 65 NY2d 449, 455 [1985]; see Pinnacle Consultants v Leucadia Natl. Corp., 94NY2d 426, 431-432 [2000]).

Nevertheless, although the court has broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of evidence(see Carlson v Porter [appeal No. 2], 53 AD3d 1129, 1132 [2008], lv denied 11NY3d 708 [2008]), we agree with plaintiff that the court abused its discretion by granting thatpart of defendants' motion in limine seeking to preclude plaintiff from offering evidence that,after our 2000 determination that plaintiff was not a part-time employee, defendants madestatements and engaged in conduct that was inconsistent with our 2000 determination (seeO'Donnell, 68 AD3d at 1682). We therefore modify the order accordingly. In this case, therecord on appeal includes the entire transcript of Ferguson's deposition testimony, in whichFerguson admitted that plaintiff was a part-time employee. He further admitted both that, afterwe issued our determination in 2000, another police officer with the same employmentclassification as plaintiff was presented with formal charges and the opportunity for a hearingprior to termination, and that the Town of Evans unsuccessfully attempted to change theemployment classification of certain police officers. The record also includes copies of theformal charges offered to the other police officer, resolutions of the Town Board dated April 17,2002, appointing certain individuals to the position of "Special Policemen pursuant to Section158 of the Town Law," and subsequent resolutions of the Town Board dated June 5, 2002,reappointing those same individuals to positions as "part-time Police Officers." We conclude thatplaintiff should be permitted to present that evidence as well as any similar evidence ofdefendants' statements and actions after our determination in 2000 that were inconsistent withthat determination for the purpose of demonstrating defendants' intent with respect to theirconduct toward plaintiff (see id.). Present—Smith, J.P., Fahey, Sconiers, Valentinoand Whalen, JJ.


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