Chichester v Alal-Amin Grocery & Halal Meat
2012 NY Slip Op 07950 [100 AD3d 820]
November 21, 2012
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 26, 2012
As corrected through Wednesday, December 26, 2012


Ester Chichester et al., Respondents,
v
Alal-Amin Grocery& Halal Meat, Defendant, and Ian Rajiu Sahai et al., Appellants.

[*1]Friedman, Khafif & Sanchez, LLP, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Fabien A. Robley of counsel), forappellants.

Elliot Ifraimoff (Pollack, Pollack, Issac & De Cicco, New York, N.Y. [Dmitriy Shulman andBrian J. Issac], of counsel), for respondents

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants Ian Rajiu Sahai andAmy N. Sahai appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lebowitz, J.),entered September 22, 2011, which denied their motion to vacate a judgment of the same courtentered July 16, 2010, which, upon an order of the same court dated March 30, 2007, granting theplaintiffs' unopposed motion for leave to enter judgment against them on the issue of liabilityupon their default in appearing or answering, and after an inquest, was in favor of the plaintiffsand against them in the principal sum of $1,050,000, and for leave to serve a late answer.

Ordered that the order entered September 22, 2011, is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly denied the appellants' motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) tovacate a default judgment entered against them. The affidavits of the plaintiffs' process serverestablished, prima facie, that the appellants were properly served with process pursuant to CPLR308 (2) (see Bank of N.Y. v Segui,68 AD3d 908, 909 [2009]; CavalryPortfolio Servs., LLC v Reisman, 55 AD3d 524, 525 [2008]; Jefferson v Netusil, 44 AD3d 621[2007]). Although a defendant's sworn denial of receipt of a copy of the summons and complaintgenerally rebuts the presumption of proper service established by the process server's affidavitand necessitates an evidentiary hearing (see Skyline Agency v Coppotelli, Inc., 117AD2d 135, 139 [1986]), no hearing is required where the defendant fails to swear to specificfacts to rebut the statements in the process server's affidavits (see US Natl. Bank Assn. v Melton, 90 AD3d 742, 743 [2011]; US Bank, N.A. v Arias, 85 AD3d1014, 1015 [2011]; Scarano vScarano, 63 AD3d 716 [2009]; Simonds v Grobman, 277 AD2d 369, 370[2000]).

In support of the appellants' motion to vacate their default, the appellant Amy N. Sahaidenied, in an affidavit, that she received any mailing concerning this action and, although sheadmitted that her relatives were present at the address where process was served, she claimed thatshe did not live at that address and that none of her relatives fit the description in the affidavits of[*2]service. The appellants failed to submit any documentaryevidence to support the claim of Amy N. Sahai that she did not reside at the subject premises atthe time that she was served, and they failed to submit an affidavit from a relative at that addressdenying receipt of a copy of the summons and complaint or stating that the appellants did not livethere (see Foster v Jordan, 269 AD2d 152, 153 [2000]). Furthermore, the appellantsfailed to rebut the evidence submitted by the plaintiffs in opposition to the motion to vacate thejudgment, demonstrating that the appellants had represented, in several real estate documents,that the address where process was delivered and mailed was a one-family dwelling in whichthey resided (cf. Toyota Motor CreditCorp. v Lam, 93 AD3d 713, 714 [2012]; U.S. Bank, N.A. v Arias, 85 AD3d 1014, 1016 [2011]). In light ofthe foregoing, the appellants failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their defaults and,thus, they were not entitled to relief pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1).

Similarly, the appellants were not entitled to relief pursuant to CPLR 317. While, underCPLR 317, it was unnecessary for the appellants to offer a reasonable excuse for their defaults(see Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 141 [1986]), theyfailed to demonstrate that they did not personally receive notice of the commencement of theaction in time to defend it (seeWassertheil v Elburg, LLC, 94 AD3d 753, 754 [2012]; Fleisher v Kaba, 78 AD3d 1118,1119 [2010]; Levine v Forgotson's Cent.Auto & Elec., Inc., 41 AD3d 552 [2007]).

The appellants' remaining contentions are not properly before this Court, as they are beingraised for the first time on appeal (seeWaterman v Weinstein Mem. Chapel, 49 AD3d 717, 718 [2008]; Pile v Grant, 41 AD3d 810 [2007];Evergreen Sys. v Geotech Lizenz, 155 AD2d 584 [1989]). Angiolillo, J.P., Balkin,Austin and Miller, JJ., concur.


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