| Delijani v Delijani |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 07952 [100 AD3d 823] |
| November 21, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Morgan Delijani, Respondent, v Parham Delijani,Appellant. |
—[*1] Anthony A. Capetola, Williston Park, N.Y. (Robert P. Johnson and Michele R. Olsen ofcounsel), for respondent.
In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment entered December 4,2003, the defendant appeals from an order and money judgment (one paper) of the SupremeCourt, Nassau County (Maron, J.), entered August 17, 2009, which, in effect, granted that branchof the plaintiff's unopposed motion which was for an award of interim counsel fees in the sum of$59,000, and is in favor of the plaintiff's counsel and against him in the principal sum of $59,000.
Ordered that the order and money judgment is affirmed, with costs.
On appeal, the defendant contends that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised itsdiscretion in denying his attorney's request for an adjournment in which to appear to oppose theplaintiff's motion, inter alia, for an award of interim counsel fees in the sum of $59,000, and ingranting that branch of the plaintiff's unopposed motion. Initially, we note that, while CPLR 5511prohibits an appeal from an order or judgment entered upon the default of the appealing party,the appeal from the order and money judgment entered August 17, 2009, brings up for reviewthose matters which were the subject of contest before the Supreme Court (see Matter of Branch v Cole-Lacy, 96AD3d 741, 742 [2012]; Sarlo-Pinzur v Pinzur, 59 AD3d 607, 607-608 [2009]; Tun v Aw, 10 AD3d 651, 652[2004]). Since the adjournment requested by the defendant's attorney was the subject of disputein the Supreme Court, the denial of that request may be reviewed on appeal.
The granting of an adjournment for any purpose is a matter resting within the sounddiscretion of the trial court (see Matterof Steven B., 6 NY3d 888, 889 [2006]; Matter of Anthony M., 63 NY2d 270,283 [1984]; Matter of Branch v Cole-Lacy, 96 AD3d at 742; Matter of O'Leary v Frangomihalos, 89AD3d 948, 949 [2011]; Natoli v Natoli, 234 AD2d 591, 592 [1996]). "In decidingsuch motions by a defendant, the court must engage in a balanced consideration of all relevantfactors" (Cabral v Cabral, 35 AD3d779, 779 [2006]; see Matter ofSicurella v Embro, 31 AD3d 651 [2006]; Natoli v Natoli, 234 AD2d at 592;Cuevas v Cuevas, 110 AD2d 873, 877 [1985]). Upon balancing the relevant factors here,we conclude that the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying therequest of the defendant's attorney for an adjournment to appear to oppose the plaintiff's motion(see Matter of Sicurella v Embro, 31AD3d 651 [2006]; Natoli v Natoli, 234 AD2d 591 [1996]; York v [*2]York, 250 AD2d 841 [1998]). Eng, P.J., Rivera, Roman andSgroi, JJ., concur.