| Matter of Teriyana A. Mc. |
| 2012 NY Slip Op 08012 [100 AD3d 902] |
| November 21, 2012 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Teriyana A. Mc.,Appellant. |
—[*1] Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Pamela Seider Dolgow andDona B. Morris of counsel), for respondent.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Teriyana A. Mc.appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Queens County (Lubow, J.), datedJanuary 17, 2012, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated December 6, 2011,made after a hearing, finding that she committed acts which, if committed by an adult, wouldhave constituted the crime of attempted assault in the third degree, adjudged her to be a juveniledelinquent and placed her on probation for a period of 12 months.
Ordered that the order of disposition is reversed, on the facts and in the exercise ofdiscretion, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Family Court,Queens County, for an adjournment of the proceeding in contemplation of dismissal, on thecondition that the probation department monitor the appellant's school attendance during theperiod of the adjournment.
Under the circumstances of this case, the Family Court improvidently exercised its discretionin adjudicating the appellant a juvenile delinquent and placing her on probation for a period of 12months. An adjournment in contemplation of dismissal was the "least restrictive availablealternative" (Family Ct Act § 352.2 [2] [a]), and would have adequately served the needsof the appellant and society (see Matterof Tyvan B., 84 AD3d 462, 462 [2011]).
The appellant, who was 15 years old at the time of the underlying offense, had no record ofever having previously committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute acriminal offense. There is no indication that the appellant ever used drugs or alcohol, or that shewas affiliated with a gang. Moreover, under the terms of an adjournment in contemplation ofdismissal, the Family Court could have required the probation department to monitor theappellant's school attendance (seeMatter of Osriel L., 94 AD3d 523 [2012]; Matter of Justin Charles H., 9 AD3d 316, 317 [2004]).
Accordingly, we reverse the order of disposition and remit the matter to the Family Court,Queens County, for an adjournment of the proceeding in contemplation of dismissal, on the [*2]condition that the probation department monitor the appellant'sschool attendance during the period of the adjournment. Rivera, J.P., Chambers, Hall and Lott,JJ., concur.