Herrera v MTA Bus Co.
2012 NY Slip Op 08096 [100 AD3d 962]
November 28, 2012
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 26, 2012
As corrected through Wednesday, December 26, 2012


Yolanda Herrera, Appellant,
v
MTA Bus Company,Respondent.

[*1]Helen Dalton & Associates, P.C., Forest Hills, N.Y. (Roman Avshalumov of counsel),for appellant.

Morris Duffy Alonso & Faley, New York, N.Y. (Anna J. Ervolina and Andrea M. Alonso ofcounsel), for respondent.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order ofthe Supreme Court, Queens County (Brathwaite-Nelson, J.), dated September 22, 2011, whichdenied her motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) to vacate an order of the same court datedNovember 24, 2010, granting the defendant's unopposed motion for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order dated September 22, 2011, is affirmed, with costs.

To vacate her default in opposing the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissingthe complaint, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for her default and apotentially meritorious opposition to the motion (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Tsikotis v Pioneer Bldg. Corp., 96AD3d 936, 936 [2012]; Walker vMohammed, 90 AD3d 1034, 1034 [2011]; Roche v City of New York, 88 AD3d 978, 979 [2011]; Casali v Cyran, 84 AD3d 711, 711[2011]; Simpson v Tommy HilfigerU.S.A., Inc., 48 AD3d 389, 392 [2008]). Whether an excuse is reasonable is adetermination within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court (see Walker vMohammed, 90 AD3d at 1034; SSConstantine & Helen's Romanian Orthodox Church of Am. v Z. Zindel, Inc., 44 AD3d744, 745 [2007]), and the Supreme Court has the discretion to accept law office failure as areasonable excuse (see CPLR 2005) where that claim is supported by a " 'detailed andcredible' " explanation of the default at issue (Swensen v MV Transp., Inc., 89 AD3d 924, 925 [2011], quoting Henry v Kuveke, 9 AD3d 476, 479[2004]).

Here, the plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable excuse for her default in opposing thedefendant's motion for summary judgment. Her claim of law office failure was conclusory andunsubstantiated and, under the circumstances presented here, did not constitute a reasonableexcuse for her default (see Wells FargoBank, N.A. v Cervini, 84 AD3d 789, 790 [2011]). Since the plaintiff failed todemonstrate a reasonable excuse for her default, it is unnecessary to determine whether shedemonstrated the existence of a potentially meritorious opposition to the motion (seegenerally Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Cervini, 84 AD3d at 790; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Roldan, 80AD3d 566, 567 [2011]; see also Tsikotis v Pioneer Bldg. Corp., 96 AD3d at 936).Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly [*2]denied theplaintiff's motion to vacate the order dated November 24, 2010. Mastro, J.P., Skelos, Florio andDickerson, JJ., concur.


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